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ABSTRACT 
Since the recognition (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) of 
life-threatening illnesses as a stressor that can precipitate posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), research has focussed on the issue of PTSD following cancer. Although the 
utility of a trauma framework has been questioned, understanding symptoms associated 
with PTSD such as intrusive cognitions may be critical in understanding psychological 
distress in cancer patients. Research has found that cancer patients experience negative 
intrusive thoughts, which are associated with marked distress. However, studies have 
rarely explored the content or nature of intrusions. In addition to verbal intrusions, 
intrusive memories of illness have been reported in cancer patients. More recently, 
intrusive imagery has been found in populations of anxious patients and reported to 
have a causal role in the maintenance of anxiety. Based on the recognition of cancer as a 
protracted experience involving multiple stressors, future-oriented visual intrusions, as 
well as intrusive memories and thoughts may play a role in psychological functioning. 
Chapter 1 is an overview of the literature assessing the presence of posttraumatic 
stress and posttraumatic stress symptoms in cancer patients. Chapter 2 is a cross-
sectional study which showed that anxious prostate cancer patients (N=65) were 
significantly more likely to report intrusive cognitions compared to matched non-
anxious (N=65) prostate cancer patients. Intrusive cognitions were frequent, 
uncontrollable and associated with significant distress and maladaptive adjustment. 
Chapter 3 is a cross-sectional study (N=139), which showed that factors such as how 
patients appraise intrusive cognitions affects anxiety severity and intrusion-related 
distress, after controlling for intrusion frequency. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the 
use of imagery in psychological therapy and how imagery has been used with cancer 
patients in therapy. Chapter 5 presents two single-case studies of cancer patients 
completing a short therapy for anxiety, imagery rescripting, aimed at reducing negative 
properties of intrusive cognitions whilst also alleviating anxiety and depression. The 
final chapter provides a general discussion of the thesis and presents ideas for future 
research. 
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Recent research in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and anxiety 
has emphasised an important role of intrusive cognitions and avoidance in the elicitation 
and maintenance of psychological disorders and distress. The current review aims to 
investigate whether theoretical models and experimental findings within the existing 
literature can be effectively applied to the traumatic experience of being diagnosed and 
coping with cancer. In order to achieve this, PTSD theories and definitions are 
described and previous research applying these conceptual issues to patients with cancer 
are discussed. Limitations of the research conducted so far are covered in order to 
highlight the next important steps in elucidating the value of applying PTSD models and 
intrusion research to the experience of cancer.  
1.1. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD): Theory 
and definitions  
Before describing work concerning PTSD and cancer (see Kangas, Henry, & 
Bryant, 2002 for a review) and intrusive thoughts and cancer, it is important to 
summarise relevant stress response models and PTSD theories. In order to meet PTSD 
criteria, individuals must have been exposed to, or witnessed a traumatic event which 
invoked intense fear and helplessness, experience intrusive memories, nightmares and a 
sense of reliving the event, experience avoidant symptoms (e.g. inability to recall 
trauma, avoidance of thoughts), and experience arousal symptoms (e.g. insomnia, 
irritability). These symptoms must be present for at least one month following trauma 
and must cause significant impairment to daily functioning for the individual (DSM IV: 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
Although there are several cognitive and information processing theories of 
PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, 2001; Brewin & Holmes, 2003), 
the present discussion uses Brewin et al’s (1996,2001) dual representation theory as a 
framework and also discusses Horowitz’s stress response syndromes model (Horowitz, 
1986), which has previously been applied to the PTSD literature  (e.g. Gurevich et al., 
2004; Manne, Glassman, & Du Hamel, 2000) and precedes dual representation theory 
of PTSD. Ehlers & Clarks’ more recent synthesis of PTSD models is also considered 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
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Table 1 Conceptualisation of intrusive cognitions used in present research  
Type of intrusion Definition 
Memory Intrusive memories (in pictorial/ visual form) of a specific event 
that has occurred in the past  
Thought  Intrusive thoughts can relate to the past, present or future but are 
in verbal form (“like a silent conversation in your head”; (Nelson 
& Harvey, 2003) 
Image Images in general have been defined as mental contents that 
possess sensory qualities (Horowitz, 1970).  For the present study, 
intrusive images refer to pictures in the mind concerning the past 
present or future but past images are distinguished from memories 
because they lack autobiographical context and have been 
described as an “abstracted essence of the memory” (Hackmann, 
Clark, & McManus, 2000, p605). 
 
Horowitz’s stress response theory (Horowitz, 1986) suggested that symptoms 
associated with PTSD, namely intrusive cognitions may exist due to the requirement for 
integration of experience into current schemata. Intrusive cognitions can be defined as 
mental phenomenon that repeatedly intrude into our minds and interrupt ongoing mental 
activity. They are difficult to control and can be attributed to an internal origin 
(Rachman, 1981). Other key properties of intrusive cognitions are that they easily 
capture attentional resources and are associated with negative affect (Clark & Rhyno, 
2005). Table 1 provides a more detailed conceptualisation of intrusive cognitions 
adopted for the present research. After an initial trauma, Horowitz (1986) argued that 
there is information overload, in which thoughts, memories and images from the trauma 
cannot be integrated with current schemata. In defence, psychological mechanisms exist 
which try to numb the experience of the trauma. However, the tendency for completion 
(i.e. need to accommodate new information) means that cognitions automatically and 
uncontrollably break through the numbing system and intrude into consciousness in the 
form of intrusive cognitions, including memories of the event, thoughts and images. 
Such intrusions may be adaptive in aiding completion of processing, but if information 
processing continues to fail, (by continued inadequate integration of the trauma 
experience), individuals may experience chronic stress response reactions that require 
psychological treatments. Horowitz’s model (1986) is especially relevant to the present 
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discussion, because the widely used scale, the Impact of Events Scale (IES: Horowitz, 
Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) was developed to reflect the conceptualisation of stress 
response following trauma and has been consistently used in  cancer research (see 
section Intrusive thoughts and Cancer, p29).  
However, dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003) argued that although Horowitz provided a comprehensive model of 
stress response syndromes, there are several limitations of the approach. For example, 
Horowitz failed to explain the nature of existing schemata structures and the precise 
ways that integration of information fails. In particular, stress response theory does not 
address the differences between flashbacks and ordinary memories of trauma. Although 
the model emphasised the importance of processes such as social support, there is little 
explanation as to how these environmental processes operate. The model is also passive 
and therefore excludes the importance of individual subjective interpretation of stressful 
events.  
Brewin et al (1996) addressed these limitations by incorporating increased 
explanatory value into PTSD theory. In particular, dual representation theory 
distinguished between two different memory representations, one verbally accessible 
and one automatically accessible via significant situational cues. Verbally accessible 
memories (VAMs) about trauma refer to a person’s conscious experiences, such as 
sensory features of the trauma, emotional and physiological reactions to the trauma and 
perceived meaning, which are controlled, deliberately retrievable and easily edited. 
VAMs interact with autobiographical knowledge and are thus represented in a personal 
context reflecting past, present and future. Although these representations are available 
for verbal communication, the information that these representations contain are 
restricted due to the involvement of limited capacity resources such as attention 
(Brewin, 2001).  
On the other hand, situationally accessible memories (SAMs) refer to traumatic 
knowledge that is not consciously accessible, but has been processed at a lower 
perceptual level (e.g. visuospatial information that has received little conscious 
processing). These affect-laden representations are automatically triggered by 
contextual internal and external cues (e.g. consciously thinking about the trauma and 
hearing about the trauma from an external source) and are associated with emotions 
such as fear and helplessness, that were felt during the trauma, rather than later (as in 
the case of VAMs). SAMs are considered to be informationally encapsulated, so that 
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they do not necessarily interact with general autobiographical knowledge (Brewin, 
2001). 
 In addition to having different characteristics, and behaving in different ways, 
these two types of memory systems have different neural bases and respond to different 
types of treatment (Brewin, 2001). Based on neuroanatomical data of fear responses 
(e.g. LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti, & Reis, 1988), and the distinction/ dissociation between 
declarative  (e.g. explicit, conscious) and  non-declarative (e.g. implicit, automatic, 
outside of conscious recall) memory (Gabrieli, Fleischman, Keane, Reminger, & 
Morrell, 1995), Brewin (2001) argued that it may be possible to infer that the two 
memory representations described in dual representation theory may be processed in 
different ways within the brain. For example, it is suggested that the hippocampus 
(which has been implicated in the processing of declarative memory), may be 
responsible for the development of integrated representations of conscious experience, 
whereas different routes to the amygdala (e.g. the thalamo-amygdala route) may be 
responsible for information that is processed at a lower level and without conscious 
awareness or possibility for deliberate recall. Memories formed by less sophisticated 
routes in the brain may be automatically triggered by cues, such as perceptual cues 
central to original processing.  
Functional neuroimaging studies have found several trends in neural correlates 
of PTSD, including decreased medial prefrontal cortex activation, increased amygdala 
activation and decreased hippocampal activity in PTSD patients during symptom 
provocation (Hull, 2002; Francati, Vermetten, & Bremner, 2007). Symptom 
provocation or “script-driven imagery” is where PTSD patients are exposed to scripts or 
images of their trauma that they have previously provided and asked to vividly imagine 
the events as they are played (Brewin, 2007). Francati et al (2007) explained that the 
medial prefrontal cortex activates and modulates the initial threat response, but when 
activation is absent or depleted, the amygdala does not receive adequate inhibitory 
feedback, resulting in higher autonomic arousal found in PTSD patients. Higher 
amygdala activation is responsible for increased fear conditioning, sensitisation and 
trauma memories in PTSD patients (Elzinga & Bremner, 2002). Other consequences of 
decreased prefrontal cortex activation include decreased working memory capacity, 
decreased inhibition of emotions and increased intrusive cognitions (Elzinga & 
Bremner, 2002). Altered functional activity in the hippocampus is linked to decreased 
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declarative memory, increased fragmentation of memories and trauma-related amnesia 
(Elzinga & Bremner, 2002).  
Using Positron Emission Tomography (PET), Bremner et al (2004) found that 
women who had PTSD as a result of sexual abuse exhibited less anterior cingulate 
activation during an emotional stroop task requiring trauma-related processing 
compared to victims without PTSD. The anterior cingulate has been implicated in brain 
function associated with the medial prefrontal cortex which consists of several other 
related areas including the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior prefrontal cortex (Bremner 
et al., 2004). Their function is to mediate the extinction of fear response, which in PTSD 
is disrupted and results in SAMs (i.e. intrusive imagery). It has been argued that 
emotional stroop studies have provided evidence consistent with reports of trauma-
related intrusive thoughts, as despite instructions to attend to word colour, the meaning 
of trauma-related words intrude, capture attention and slow colour naming (McNally, 
2006).  
In terms of adequate trauma processing, dual representation theory (Brewin, 
2001) argued that the activation of highly accessible and automatic SAMs initially 
functions to aid the process of cognitive processing of the trauma experience, by 
transferring information from the non-hippocampally dependent SAM store to the 
hippocampally-based VAM store. Adequate trauma processing would involve the 
integration and assimilation of information in SAM form, to information in VAM form. 
If this processing is successful, the individual is relieved from a sense of immediate 
threat and the trauma experience is placed within a complete and elaborated personal 
context. In order for trauma processing to occur and amygdala inhibition to be 
successful,  Brewin (2001) argued that repeated flashbacks and “hotspots” of the trauma 
may be necessary, due to limited processing resources of the VAM system. . 
According to dual representation theory (Brewin et al, 1996), maladaptive 
coping strategies, such as sustained avoidance of both SAMs and VAMs can result in 
“chronic emotional processing” and “premature inhibition of processing” (p 679). 
Chronic emotional processing may occur when integration is not possible, due to the 
severity or length of trauma exposure. If VAMs and SAMs are chronically processed, 
memories may not be integrated and thus individuals will continue to experience 
negative intrusive memories, with little change to existing representations (Brewin et al, 
1996). Further, chronic processing is linked to over-accommodation (Brewin, 2001), in 
which a person generalises their reaction to the specific trauma to a variety of other 
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harmless situations which also have the potential to trigger cognitions related to trauma 
and thus a sense of current danger. Premature inhibition processing is another possible 
outcome following trauma, where active emotional processing is stopped, or restricted 
to a minimised and potentially distorted version of events (Brewin, 2001). Rather than 
over-accommodation, premature inhibition may result in over-assimilation, where these 
existing knowledge structures are maintained and not integrated with VAMs and 
autobiographical knowledge.  
Evidence for a distinction in memory systems, and the importance of the visual 
system in trauma processing has come from research investigating the effects of 
distracter tasks on desensitization to emotive memories (Andrade, Kavanagh, & 
Baddeley, 1997; Kavanagh, Freese, Andrade, & May, 2001). Andrade et al (1997) 
found that participants reported less vivid negative images when concurrently engaging 
in visuospatial tasks involving eye movements,  such as identifying a particular letter on 
a computer screen, but not when engaging in a task involving another component of 
working memory, the phonological loop (e.g. counting). It was suggested that the 
reduction in imagery vividness was due to the disruption of the visuospatial sketch pad 
(a component of working memory used to process visual information) and that such 
distraction could aid treatment of PTSD.  
Kavanagh et al (2001) provided further support for the finding that competing 
visuospatial tasks have a potential role in therapy. In a within subjects design, 18 
participants were initially asked to recall three situations in which they were happy (e.g. 
meeting romantic partners) and three situations in which they were fearful or distressed 
(e.g. illness or death or family of friends). Participants were required to rate these 
images at baseline, for vividness (ranging from 0 = no image at all to 10 = perfectly 
clear, as vivid as normal vision) and emotional response (ranging from -10 extremely 
negative to +10 extremely positive). Participants then completed three distracter 
(visuospatial) task conditions, including eye movement, visual noise and exposure alone 
(control) in order to assess the effects of concurrent eye movements on the distress 
associated with repeated exposure to emotive memories. Kavanagh et al (2001) found 
that when participants engaged in rapid eye movements while creating images of 
emotive experiences, the subjective vividness of the image was reduced and participants 
reported less extreme emotion than when recalling an image without a concurrent task. 
The application of distracter techniques to reduce distress in patients could be 
appropriate both within and outside the therapy environment. For example, distressing 
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images of the trauma could be made easier to confront and process if vividness and 
associated negative emotional response were reduced and further, patients could be 
helped to control intrusive images outside of the therapy session (Kavanagh et al., 
2001). A recent study has replicated the finding that concurrent rapid eye movements 
reduced vividness and emotional intensity of visual images (Kemps & Tiggemann, 
2007).   
Whilst investigating the appropriateness of dual representation theory for 
understanding PTSD, Brewin & colleagues (e.g. Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004) 
have  provided support for the importance of the visuospatial sketchpad for trauma 
processing. Holmes et al (2004) investigated traumatic processing in a non-clinical 
population asked to view traumatic films of road traffic accidents, including images of 
trapped victims, dead bodies and body parts among car wreckages. They showed that 
competition from one specific kind of distraction task (visuospatial tapping task), while 
watching a traumatic film significantly reduced the extent to which distressing images 
from the film intruded in the following week but other kinds of distraction task actually 
increased the intrusions (e.g. counting backwards in threes). The findings were 
explained using dual representation theory’s conceptualisation of memory as two 
distinct systems, verbal (VAMs) and visual (SAMs). Visuospatial tapping tasks may 
reduce SAM representations, as they compete for the same resources, culminating in a 
reduction of intrusive images over the following week. Conversely, competition for 
verbal processing resources may impoverish VAM representations and reduce their 
ability to suppress SAMs in the following week. Subsequent research replicated the 
disruptive effects of a concurrent visuospatial task on intrusive images using a within-
subjects design and an alternative task, moulding plasticine (Stuart, Holmes, & Brewin, 
2006).  
Other research with PTSD patients supported these findings. Hellawell & 
Brewin (2002) found that PTSD patients performed less well on specific tasks when 
they were interrupted during narratives of intrusive vivid images and asked to complete 
a visuospatial task (trail-making) compared to a verbal task (counting backwards in 
threes). This same disruption to performance was not found when patients were 
interrupted during a narrative of ordinary autobiographical memories (Hellawell & 
Brewin, 2002). A comparison of flashbacks and ordinary autobiographical memories 
found a greater number of sensory and motion words associated with involuntary 
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compared to voluntary memories (Hellawell & Brewin, 2004), providing further support 
for their independence (Brewin, 2007).  
Other models of PTSD, such as the cognitive model, also emphasised the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory systems (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
According to Ehlers & Clark (2000), the nature of traumatic memories is influenced by 
encoding processes including conceptual encoding and data-driven encoding. 
Conceptual encoding is focused on meaning and contextualising the traumatic event 
which facilitates integration of trauma information with the autobiographical memory 
system. Data-driven processing, on the other hand, is focussed on sensory stimuli and 
leads to memories that are hard to retrieve deliberately. Resulting intrusive memories 
are visual, uncontrollable, lack elaboration and contextualisation and are accompanied 
by physical and emotional sensations experienced during the actual event. Individuals 
thus experience a sense of reliving, as though the event were happening all over again, 
right now. A wide variety of cues may trigger the experience of intrusive memories, 
including cues that are temporally (e.g. spatial, olfactory cues), rather than semantically 
associated with the event.  
The experience of repetitive intrusive memories, and the negative appraisal of 
these memories, is thought to contribute to the persistence of PTSD. The formation of 
intrusive memories is explained within the dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin 
et al, 1996), where inadequate processing of the initial trauma and subsequent 
maladaptive behaviour (e.g. suppression, rumination, avoidance) in response to 
intrusive memories, leads to their formation and persistence. Other problems in 
persistent PTSD include the strength of associations between stimulus-stimulus (S-S) 
and stimulus-response (S-R) and the lowered perceptual threshold for temporally 
associated stimuli. S-S and S-R associations may develop between stimuli present 
shortly before or during the trauma and the feeling of current danger and these 
associations may not be consciously accessible and thus trigger intrusive recollections 
unexpectedly.  Lowered perceptual threshold refers to a form of implicit memory, where 
stimuli that are temporally associated with the trauma trigger traumatic memories 
because they are more likely to be noticed (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
 Ehlers & Clark (2000) suggested that a sense of current threat is crucial for 
PTSD to develop and there are two possible ways that current threat is realised; 
individual differences in appraisal of trauma and individual differences in the nature of 
memory of the event. Strategies intended to avoid current threat paradoxically lead to 
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feelings of current danger because of subsequent negative appraisal of trauma and 
poorly processed memories of trauma. Negative appraisal of trauma include the inability 
to see the event as time-limited, over-generalisation of event to other neutral activities 
and the appraisal of self as someone that bad things happen to. In addition to negative 
appraisal of the traumatic event, idiosyncratic appraisals of subsequent stress responses 
may also contribute to the persistence of PTSD. For example, patients may interpret 
flashbacks and intrusive recollections as a sign they are going mad, and high arousal 
(e.g. irritability) as a sign that their personality has fundamentally changed or they can 
no longer relate to close family and friends. Individuals may also negatively appraise 
other people’s reactions, for example, positive reactions as a sign that they are unable to 
cope on their own, or negative reactions as a sign that nobody is there to support them. 
Steil & Ehlers (2000) described negative self-appraisals as a frame of mind termed 
“mental defeat” and suggest that it is a risk factor for negative appraisal of trauma and 
trauma-related factors and thus ultimately a risk factor for the feeling of current threat 
and ensuing maintenance of PTSD (Steil & Ehlers, 2000).  
The psychological treatment of PTSD aims to address two elements of the 
experienced trauma; repeated exposure to traumatic information to aid integration and 
modification of maladaptive beliefs developed from inadequate processing (Brewin, 
2001). Thus therapy may involve acting upon different types of memory representation, 
using therapeutic techniques such as reliving (Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs, & Murdock, 
1991) and eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR; Shapiro, 2001). 
Reliving involves confronting flashbacks, rather than avoiding them, so that information 
in the SAM becomes recoded in the VAM and given a temporal context. After repeated 
sessions, information in SAM may be matched with information in the VAM, which 
indicates that immediate threat is not imminent, but rather, located in the past. In terms 
of neural activity, Brewin (2001) suggested that when the VAM system is activated, 
inhibitory pathways from the prefrontal cortex prevent inappropriate amygdala 
activation and the accompanying feelings of fear. EMDR is a method where individuals 
are asked to visualise the worst moments of trauma whilst holding a negative cognition 
concerning the trauma and attending to a concurrent stimulus such as the therapist’s 
finger movement in front of the face at the same time. Patient’s attempts to distance 
themselves from the trauma and associated cognitions allows for more thoughts and 
images to be integrated and processed (Brewin, 2001).  
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In contrast to other contemporary theories of PTSD (Brewin & Holmes, 2003), 
dual representation theory does not assume that trauma memories are extinguished 
altogether but can be contextualised and incorporated into a more complex framework. 
In particular, Brewin (2006) suggested that recovery is seen as introducing retrieval 
competition between new and old memories, where new trauma memories are 
developed during therapy and are given a retrieval advantage because the new memories 
are well rehearsed and distinctive (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). Therapies for patients 
experiencing traumatic intrusive memories include imagery rescripting (Hackmann, 
1998; Arntz, Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007) which involves developing a competing image 
which has strong associations to the negative image, will effectively compete with the 
distressing image and involves positive affect and less toxic meaning (Wheatley et al., 
2007).  It is important to recognise that in this account, SAM memories remain intact 
and can still be retrieved with the right set of cues. However, therapy aims to reduce the 
possibility of negative intrusive memories winning the retrieval competition (Brewin, 
2006).  
In summary, PTSD is caused by the onset of an extreme stressor and has a 
complex aetiology with core symptoms of intrusion (e.g. flashbacks), avoidance and 
arousal (e.g. hyperresponsivity). Theories of PTSD development and maintenance posit 
the presence of two distinct memory systems which are central to understanding the 
disorder. Therapies aimed at alleviating PTSD symptoms focus on exposure and 
integration of the trauma and modification of maladaptive beliefs and appraisals in order 
to aid inadequate processing.  
1.2. PTSD and cancer  
1.2.1. Incidence of cancer-related PTSD  
Psychological trauma is caused by events that are sudden, unexpected and which 
the individual perceives as a dramatic loss of personal control and personal safety 
(Ehlers & Steil, 1995). Cancer can be encompassed within this definition (Brennan, 
2001) because such an extreme life event threatens core assumptions about the world 
including the belief that a) the world is benevolent; b) the world is meaningful and c) 
the self is worthy (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Since the introduction of life-threatening 
illness as a potential PTSD stressor in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994), the application of posttraumatic stress disorder 
 20 
models to the cancer experience has been the focus of considerable research interest 
(Kangas et al., 2002). In terms of dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin et al., 
1996), individuals diagnosed with cancer may be at risk of developing pathological 
stress response symptoms due to a potentially severe and prolonged stressor. Individuals 
diagnosed with cancer may have existing assumptions about health and well-being 
violated and struggle to incorporate new, traumatic information into pre-existing 
schemata.  Indeed, the types of events that Brewin et al (1996) included within their 
trauma framework involve signals that the world is unpredictable and uncontrollable 
and includes “major illness or disability” (p675). Kangas et al (2002) also noted that 
denial as part of the response process may represent the avoidance aspect of models of 
PTSD and further inhibit emotional processing via maladaptive information integration.  
Prevalence rates for cancer-related PTSD vary according to when and how 
PTSD is assessed. For studies using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
(SCID; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 2002), estimates of current PTSD vary from 
0 (Mundy et al., 2000) to 6% (Andrykowski, Cordova, Studts, & Miller, 1998). 
Participants had been diagnosed with breast cancer and were assessed 12 months post-
treatment, 6-72 months post-treatment respectively. A study investigating PTSD in a 
sample of breast cancer patients 3-15 months post-surgery reported prevalence of 
current cancer-related PTSD at 3.9%, also using the SCID (Matsuoka et al., 2005) and 
2.4% of post-surgery breast cancer patients (N=127)  met criteria for cancer-related 
PTSD (Mehnert & Koch, 2007).  
Other measures of PTSD include the PTSD Civilian Version Checklist (PCL-C: 
Weathers, Huska, & Keane, 1991), which is a 17 item inventory of PTSD 
symptomatology, including measures of avoidance (e.g. “avoiding activities or 
situations because they reminded you of the cancer experience”), re-
experiencing/intrusion (e.g. “suddenly acting or feeling as though the cancer experience 
was happening again”), numbing (e.g. “trouble remembering important parts of the 
cancer experience”) and  hyper-arousal (e.g. “having difficulty concentrating”). There 
are two methods to determine a PTSD diagnosis, the cut-off method (where cut-off 
score must be greater than 50) and the symptom method (where at least moderate 
ratings are given for one re-experiencing symptom, three avoidance-numbing symptoms 
and two arousal symptoms). 
Studies using the PCL-C and cut-off method have reported current cancer-
related prevalence rates of 5% (Andrykowski et al., 1998; Cordova et al., 1995; Smith, 
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Redd, DuHamel, Vickberg, & Ricketts, 1999a), 12% (Jacobsen et al., 1998) and 17% 
(Levine, Eckhardt, & Targ, 2005). Studies using the symptom method have reported 
current PTSD prevalence rates of 6% (Andrykowski et al., 1998), 13% (Smith et al., 
1999a), 19% (Jacobsen et al., 1998) and 26% (Levine et al., 2005).  
Some studies have used the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale-Structured 
Interview (CAPS-I: Blake et al., 1995) to assess the prevalence of PTSD in cancer 
patients. Prevalence reports ranged from 14% (Pitman et al., 2001) to 22% (Kangas, 
Henry, & Bryant, 2005) and 32% (Naidich & Motta, 2000).  
In addition to the prevalence rates of current cancer related PTSD, studies have 
retrospectively estimated lifetime prevalence rates of PTSD, where patients are asked if 
they have experienced any PTSD symptoms since their cancer diagnosis. Mundy et al 
(2000) reported the highest rates of lifetime PTSD with 35% prevalence in their breast 
cancer patient sample. However, when the criteria were made more stringent, by 
excluding, for example, the symptom “sense of foreshortened future”, the prevalence 
rate in this sample dropped to 24%. This is similar to another study of female cancer 
patients, which reported 22% of the sample meeting criteria for lifetime PTSD (Alter et 
al., 1996). One other study considering lifetime rates of PTSD found much lower 
prevalence of 3% (Green et al., 1998) and this was also with more stringent criteria (e.g. 
intrusive thoughts concerning fear of recurrence were excluded). 
 Green et al (1998) elaborated on the observed discrepancy between their finding 
and Alter et al’s (1996) finding, by reporting that although arousal and re-experiencing 
symptoms were at similar levels in both samples, the percentage of each sample that 
met full avoidance/numbing criteria was 8% and 30% respectively. Green et al (1998) 
argued that avoidance may therefore have been assessed quite differently in both 
studies. Alternatively, the time of assessment may have had an impact, as Green et al 
(1998) assessed patients at 4-12 months post-treatment and Alter et al (1996) assessed 
patients at 3 years post-treatment.  
Based on the low prevalence rates reported, Green and colleagues suggested that 
having cancer may not truly “fit” a trauma model (Green, Epstein, Krupnick, & 
Rowland, 1997; Green et al., 1998). However, this does not preclude the possibility that 
cancer patients may experience PTSD symptomatology. Indeed, several studies have 
reported a significant number of patients endorsing at least one, and often more 
symptom clusters (e.g. Amir & Ramati, 2002: 56% of women endorsed 2/3 symptom 
clusters). Also, studies that have reported low prevalence rates of current PTSD (e.g. 
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Matsuoka et al., 2005: 3.9%; Palmer, Kagee, Coyne, & DeMichele, 2004: 4% ), have 
also reported that 63% and 67% of their samples reported recurrent, intrusive and 
distressing recollections.  
1.2.2. Predictors of PTSD symptoms in cancer patients. 
 Kangas et al (2002) reviewed predictors of PTSD symptomatology, which 
included individual risk factors and trauma-related factors (Smith, Redd, Peyser, & 
Vogl, 1999b). Individual risk factors include previous negative life stressors 
(Andrykowski, Cordova, McGrath, Sloan, & Kenady, 2000), increased psychological 
distress prior to diagnosis (Epping-Jordan et al., 1999), female sex (Hampton & 
Frombach, 2000; Deimling, Kahana, Bowman, & Schaefer, 2002), younger age at 
diagnosis (e.g. Green et al., 1998; Tjemsland, Soreide, & Malt, 1998), fewer financial 
resources (Cordova et al., 1995) and poor social support (Andrykowski & Cordova, 
1998; Butler, Koopman, Classen, & Spiegel, 1999). However, studies have also 
reported mixed findings (e.g. gender and younger age as risk factors) and the relative 
contribution of various risk factors has not been assessed (Gurevich, Devins, & Rodin, 
2002). In terms of previous stress levels affecting PTSD symptoms, Gurevich et al 
(2002) suggested this may be due to a diminished stress tolerance, whereas social 
support may lead to a reduction in PTSD symptoms due to facilitated affect regulation 
and information integration (Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000). 
In terms of trauma-related risk factors, Gurevich et al (2002) and Kangas et al 
(2002) suggested that greater proximity to treatment (e.g. Andrykowski et al., 1998), 
greater treatment intensity (e.g. aggressiveness, duration: Smith et al., 1999b) and 
recurrence (e.g. Cella, Mahon, & Donovan, 1990) have been associated with more 
severe symptoms of PTSD. Stage of disease has also been considered and found to be 
positively related to PTSD symptomatology (Andrykowski et al., 1998; Andrykowski & 
Cordova, 1998; Epping-Jordan, Compas, & Howell, 1994), although others have not 
found such an association (Alter et al., 1996).  
 An important consideration when discussing risk factors associated with PTSD 
development in cancer patients is a possible overlap of vulnerability factors for PTSD 
and cancer, such as excessive smoking and alcohol use (Kangas et al., 2002). Further 
limitations of cancer-related PTSD research will now also be addressed.  
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1.2.3. Limitations of cancer-related PTSD research  
 Although the PTSD framework may apply to cancer patients in some respects 
(e.g. sudden and unexpected news about having cancer, traumatic treatment options, 
denial about having cancer), the experience of having cancer may be qualitatively 
different from other PTSD stressors (Green et al., 1997; Gurevich et al., 2002). Reviews 
by Kangas et al (2002), Gurevich et al (2002), Green et al (1997) and limitations from 
studies investigating prevalence rates of PTSD in cancer patients will be considered in 
order to provide a summary of theoretical and methodological issues of using a PTSD 
framework for understanding the cancer experience. 
I. Application of PTSD models 
Although the incidence of cancer-related PTSD has been extensively investigated, 
there has been limited application of PTSD models to cancer patients. As previously 
mentioned, functional neuroimaging trends in neural correlates of PTSD seemingly map 
two distinct memory systems described within dual representation theory of PTSD 
(Brewin, 2001). In line with functional neuroimaging studies conducted with other 
PTSD populations,  research investigating the volumes of hippocampus (Nakano et al., 
2002) amygdala (Matsuoka, Yamawaki, Inagaki, Akechi, & Uchitomi, 2003) and 
medial prefrontal cortex (orbitofrontal cortex; Hakamata et al., 2007) have found that 
these brain areas are significantly smaller in breast cancer survivors with a history of 
intrusive recollections compared to breast cancer survivors with no such history and 
healthy controls (Hakamata et al., 2007). These brain areas are implicated in the 
activation and modulation of the initial threat response (Francati et al, 2007). For 
example, decreased prefrontal cortex activation leads to decreased working memory 
capacity and decreased inhibition of emotions, which are associated with increased 
intrusive cognitions (e.g. Holmes et al, 2004). However, altered brain activity does not 
necessarily imply abnormal function and thus research linking symptom severity with 
brain function would demonstrate a clearer relationship between specific brain areas and 
intrusive cognitions (Matsuoka et al., 2003). 
The emotional stroop task has also previously been used to elucidate brain areas 
relevant to processing in PTSD (Bremner et al., 2004). The only study to use the stroop 
paradigm in relation to intrusive cognitions in cancer patients (Naidich & Motta, 2000) 
found that breast cancer patients responded significantly slower to trauma related words 
(e.g. breast, sick) compared to other emotional stroop words (e.g. dirty, filthy). 
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However, the same pattern of results was observed in the control group of women 
without breast cancer and others have suggested that the stroop task measures 
hyperresponsivity to threat rather than intrusive cognitions (Vythilingam et al., 2007). 
Although functional imaging studies using script-driven imagery have yet to be 
conducted with cancer patients, physiological measures such as heart rate, skin 
conductance and corrugator electromyogram responses were elevated for PTSD patients 
compared to non-PTSD patients presented with personal scripts of their breast cancer 
experience (Pitman et al., 2001). This paralleled previous findings previously reported 
in other PTSD populations, including combat veterans (Shalev, Orr, & Pitman, 1993), 
victims of terrorist attacks (Orr, Pitman, Lasko, & Herz, 1993) and motor vehicle 
accidents (Blanchard & Hickling, 1997).  Pitman et al (2001) argued that this provides 
evidence of a characteristic physiological response found in PTSD and thus evidence 
that a PTSD framework is applicable to cancer patients (Pitman et al., 2001). However, 
caution could be taken in interpreting the results of this study, as sample sizes were 
small (N=37), and the PTSD group’s larger mean physiological responses during breast 
cancer imagery was heavily influenced by two patients. 
Kangas et al (2002) emphasised the importance of placing cancer within the 
PTSD framework as informed by PTSD models (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996). Previous 
research investigating PTSD in cancer patients has often failed to take this model, and 
other theoretical directions into account. It is suggested that future research should 
conceptualise psychological distress in response to cancer using models such as dual 
representation theory to guide research and facilitate specific hypotheses-testing. For 
example, it may be necessary to identify and distinguish SAMs and VAMs and to show 
that, as with previous research in PTSD populations, the hotspots (the moments in the 
trauma associated with the highest amount of emotional distress) of trauma are 
associated with more perceptual characteristics (e.g. perceptual words such as "red" and 
mention of fear; Hellawell & Brewin, 2004). Also, research identifying whether 
concurrent visuospatial tasks cause more interference during flashbacks than during 
ordinary memory description, as found in other samples of PTSD patients (Hellawell & 
Brewin, 2002),  would provide evidence for the existence of PTSD processes in cancer 
patients and allow for cross-study comparison.  
Another application issue of PTSD and cancer research is how appropriate 
existing treatment approaches are for cancer patients with PTSD (Kangas et al., 2002). 
For example, exposure therapy may unnecessarily provoke, rather than alleviate 
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anxiety, and challenging negative thoughts about the future may be inappropriate if 
future cognitions are rational. 
II. Type of stressor 
One of the main issues regarding the use of a PTSD framework for the cancer 
experience is the qualitatively different type of stressor that cancer itself presents 
(Kangas et al., 2002; Green et al., 1997). Cancer is a chronic, rather than acute stressor 
(Gurevich et al., 2002) and presents a series of different traumatic events over time, 
including diagnosis, disease progression, treatment, adverse physical effects (e.g. 
disfigurement) and recurrence (Kangas et al., 2002).  However, although the nature of 
cancer as a stressor may be distinctive, Smith et al (1999b) argued that some 
characteristics may not be unique to the cancer experience. For example, combat 
veterans may experience a number of stressful events over a long period of time, and 
fear of recurrence may also be true of other victims, such as victims of floods or 
hurricanes (Smith et al., 1999b). 
 However, as well as being prolonged, Green et al (1997) argued that the cancer 
experience is different because it represents an internal, rather than external threat (e.g. 
in the case of a natural disaster such as a Tsunami), where the threat arises from within 
rather than from an outside source and is thus impossible to separate from oneself. 
Green et al (1997) also suggested that the cancer experience can be conceptualised as an 
informational as well as an immediate threat, so that initial emphasis may be on 
thinking about the future and information pertaining to prognosis, and later experiences 
(e.g. surgery to remove cancer) may represent more immediate threat to the self.  
III. Assessment considerations 
 There are several assessment issues concerning the measurement of PTSD in 
cancer populations including the lack of theoretical underpinning, the use of prospective 
studies, self-report and retrospective data, inconsistent methodology, small sample 
sizes, lack of adequate control groups, and lack of detail with respect to clinical 
significance of PTSD prevalence rates.  
 For example, Kangas et al (2002) recognised that although cross-sectional 
research may be useful, it limits the causal inferences that can be made concerning 
prevalence of PTSD in cancer patients and the demarcation of the importance of various 
stressors. Kangas et al (2005) subsequently conducted a prospective study of Acute 
Stress Disorder (ASD) and PTSD in 82 patients with head and neck or lung malignancy. 
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ASD is a diagnosis used to identify traumatic symptoms in the month following trauma 
and its purpose was to find people at risk of developing PTSD.  However, Kangas et al 
(2005) found that although 53% of individuals diagnosed with ASD went on to develop 
PTSD at six months follow-up, 36% of patients with PTSD at six months follow-up, 
were not given an initial diagnosis of ASD.  
 Another key issue is the differential use of assessment tools, in particular the 
PCL-C, which can be used to diagnose PTSD in two different ways, one of which (cut-
off method) leads to lower prevalence rates than the other (symptom method). Also, 
specific assessment items, such as questions pertaining to a foreshortened future and 
intrusive symptoms such as fear of recurrence or dreaming about dying (i.e. future, 
rather than past-oriented intrusions) have been omitted in some studies (e.g. Green et al, 
1998) but not in others (Alter et al., 1996) and this makes studies difficult to compare 
(Kangas et al, 2002). Further, scales such as the PCL-C do not measure criterion A2 of 
the DSM-IV PTSD diagnosis: “intense fear, helplessness and horror”, and when this 
criterion is assessed, it is not necessarily endorsed alongside symptoms of PTSD. For 
example, Palmer et al (2004) found that 41% of their breast cancer sample (N=160), 
endorsed this criterion, but 67% reported experiencing intrusive distressing thoughts. 
Further, the level of interference associated with reported symptoms (criterion F) is not 
measured using these scales. Others have specifically criticised the PCL-C as a method 
of screening for PTSD, arguing that it demonstrates low sensitivity and positive 
predictive power based on a high number of false negative and positive PTSD diagnoses 
(Widows, Jacobsen, & Fields, 2000). 
So far, studies investigating PTSD in cancer patients have not used another 
validated scale, the Posttraumatic Stress Symptom Scale (PSS: Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & 
Rothbaum, 1993). The PSS, like the PCL-C, is a 17-item scale corresponding to 
symptoms of PTSD including re-experiencing, avoidance and arousal. However, in 
addition, the PSS also assesses questions relevant to criterion A (i.e. describing the 
event), and includes questions pertaining to criterion F (how interfering symptoms are 
in daily life).  
Gurevich et al (2002) argued that another reason that PTSD studies are not 
comparable is because operationalisations vary dramatically. For example, time points 
labelled with the same name such as “post-treatment” reflected assessment at 6 weeks in 
some research (e.g. Tjemsland et al., 1998) and assessment at an average of 6.7 years 
post-treatment in other studies (e.g. Lewis et al., 2001) 
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 Kangas et al (2002) also referred to sampling issues, suggesting that the majority 
of studies have focused on female cancer patients, often with early to middle stage 
breast cancer. Perhaps different types of cancer and different stage of disease and 
prognosis would be associated with more severe PTSD reactions. Kangas et al (2002) 
also argued that the timing of assessment of PTSD is important, as individuals 
experience a range of stressful and varied events from diagnosis.  
Another important consideration is that individuals may perceive various stages 
of the cancer experience in different ways (Gurevich et al., 2002). For example, Mundy 
et al (2000) found that women who underwent bone marrow transplantation perceived 
the experience as life affirming rather than life threatening. Although in this case, PTSD 
theory was not used to explain this finding, it follows the proposition (Brewin et al, 
1996) that the appraisal of a stress provoking situation may be key to the development 
of stress response symptoms. Other issues include the suggestion that clinicians and 
researchers should be aware of comorbidity of PTSD with other disorders (e.g. anxiety, 
depression) and that specific symptoms of PTSD may overlap with symptoms 
associated with treatment (e.g. insomnia) and with typical grief reactions in response to 
a cancer diagnosis (Kangas et al., 2002). A study investigating symptom clusters in 
cancer patients according to the PCL-C (Shelby, Golden-Kreutz, & Andersen, 2005) 
concluded that 4 PCL-C items (“Feeling your future will be cut-short”; “Being super-
alert, watchful, on guard”; “Having physical reactions to reminders”; “Having 
difficulty concentrating”) confounded with illness and treatment related symptoms and 
vigilance for symptoms of recurrence (Shelby et al, 2005).  
IV. Symptoms associated with PTSD  
 According to Kangas et al (2002), symptoms associated with PTSD, including 
avoidance, intrusion and arousal may not have the same meaning when described by 
cancer patients, compared to other PTSD populations. For example, based on the 
suggestion that cancer represents an internal threat (Green et al., 1997), patients with 
cancer may be unable to avoid reminders of the trauma. Also, other external factors 
such as attending outpatient appointments and monitoring physical well-being present 
constant reminders of the trauma that may not occur in other trauma-related 
circumstance. A second avoidance symptom, dissociative amnesia, may also not be 
appropriate to cancer patients as protracted experience may make forgetting unlikely 
(Kangas et al., 2002). Alternatively, patients may forget aspects of their trauma but for 
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reasons such as concentration deficits and fatigue caused by treatment rather than due to 
a stress response reaction. Further, a “sense of foreshortened future” may not be an 
irrational fear for patients with cancer and may therefore be an inappropriate question to 
ask in order to assess PTSD and PTSD symptomatology. Kangas et al (2002) suggested 
that questions concerning avoidance symptoms need to be investigated for sensitivity 
and specificity as otherwise avoidance may be measured inaccurately, both in terms of 
underestimation and overestimation.  
Arousal symptoms present similar difficulties, as symptoms associated with 
PTSD such as concentration deficits, irritability and insomnia may also be side-effects 
of treatment and medication (Kangas et al., 2002; Gurevich et al., 2002). Green et al 
(1997) also emphasised that arousal symptoms may exist but take a different form in 
cancer patients. For example, rather than becoming hypervigilant to external 
surroundings, individuals with cancer may become hypervigilant to physical health and 
bodily sensations. Green et al (1997) drew a parallel between this type of hypervigilance 
and the type of hypervigilance found in people with hypochondriasis. For example, 
individuals may be checking for additional lumps far more often than would be 
necessary for routine examination.  
 Finally, Green et al (1997) suggested that a potential problem in assessing PTSD 
in cancer patients may relate to potential differences in intrusive thinking. Specifically, 
intrusive cognitions and re-experiencing symptoms assessed as part of PTSD usually 
apply to a specific traumatic event that has occurred in the past (Kangas et al., 2002). 
However, for patients with cancer, intrusive thinking (thoughts, memories, images), 
may not refer to actual recollections of an event, but to future oriented anxiety 
concerning fear of recurrence, possible physical problems, treatment-side effects and 
death (Brennan, 2001).    
V. General controversy in PTSD research 
As well as attending to issues specific to cancer-related PTSD, is may also be 
useful to consider more general criticisms of the PTSD framework. For example, 
McNally (2003) provided an extensive discussion of pertinent issues, including 
“conceptual bracket creeping” and “the dose-response model of trauma.” McNally 
(2003) suggested that the definition of trauma has broadened widely and increasingly 
more life events are considered traumatic. Broadening the definition of trauma is 
problematic in several ways such as undermining chances of understanding 
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psychobiological mechanisms underlying PTSD and assigning causal significance to the 
stressor (McNally, 2003). In terms of cancer, this may be important because there are 
several different types of stressor associated with cancer (e.g. financial concerns, job 
loss) which are not necessarily equated with the perception of cancer as a life-
threatening event. The difference between traumatic stressors and critical life events 
was defined in recent PTSD research (Birrer, Michael, & Munsch, 2007), where critical 
life events were considered normative experiences that naturally happen to individuals 
(e.g. divorce, job loss), whilst traumatic events were considered non-normative; rare or 
unexpected experiences (e.g. life-threatening illness).  
Further, the dose-response model assumes that PTSD symptom severity 
increases as the severity of the stressor increases. For cancer patients, the severity of the 
stressor is difficult to operationalise as it may relate to disease prognosis, severity of 
treatment, risk of recurrence and other social factors such as impact of diagnosis on 
family and work.  
1.2.4. Summary 
 Major limitations of using a PTSD framework to understand the cancer 
experience include the qualitatively different nature of stress response in patients with 
cancer compared to other trauma groups (in particular, the importance of future as well 
as past events), assessment considerations such as inconsistent approaches and 
inadequate measurement tools and symptom and psychological disorder overlap. 
Although relatively low prevalence rates of PTSD have been documented in cancer 
patients (e.g. Palmer et al., 2004), these do not necessarily imply a lack of clinically 
significant distress (Green et al., 1998). As Green et al (1998) argued- having cancer 
may precipitate a specific stress reaction but that this does not necessarily fit with a 
PTSD trauma model. Thus, it may be important to consider symptoms of PTSD in 
cancer patients, rather than full PTSD diagnoses. Previous research has also considered 
the incidence, course and importance of intrusive and avoidance symptomatology in 
cancer patients and this research will now be discussed in relation to cancer patients. 
1.3. Intrusive thoughts and cancer  
1.3.1. Prevalence and impact on psychological functioning 
 Several studies have considered the prevalence of intrusive thoughts in cancer 
populations, mainly using the IES (Horowitz et al., 1979). The IES is a 15-item self-
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report scale, developed to measure subjective distress in relation to a specific event. 
There are two sub-scales representing avoidance (8 items, e.g. “I stayed away from 
reminders of it”) and intrusive thoughts (7 items, e.g. “I thought about it when I didn’t 
mean to.”) Estimates of the frequency of intrusive thoughts in cancer populations have 
varied from 10-43%, (see Kangas et al., 2002 ), according to time of measurement (e.g. 
immediately post-diagnosis vs. 3 month follow-up) and gender (females generally 
report significantly higher numbers of intrusive thoughts than males; Kaasa et al., 1993; 
Hampton & Frombach, 2000). Additionally,  research using questions from the SCID 
(First et al., 2002) in a sample of breast cancer patients 3 years post-surgery, found that 
46% of women had reported experiencing intrusive thoughts at some time (Matsuoka et 
al., 2002). 
 Moreover, cross-sectional studies on people with cancer have found intrusive 
thoughts to be associated with psychological distress (Baider, Denour, & Kaplan, 1997), 
anxiety (Kelly et al., 1995; Nordin & Glimelius, 1998), depression (Primo et al., 2000), 
maladaptive adjustment (e.g. anxious preoccupation: Matsuoka et al., 2002), spouse 
avoidance (Manne, 1999), social constraint (Cordova, Cunningham, Carlson, & 
Andrykowski, 2001) and worse physical functioning (Kaasa et al., 1993). Thus, 
intrusive thoughts may negatively impact on both mental and physical functioning 
(Devine, Parker, Fouladi, & Cohen, 2003).  
 Prospective studies have found that intrusive thoughts contribute to 
psychological distress longitudinally. For example, level of intrusive thoughts in women 
with breast  cancer two months post-surgery predicted psychological distress at 2 years 
post-diagnosis (Bleiker, Pouwer, van der Ploeg, Leer, & Ader, 2000) and intrusive 
thoughts were associated with anxiety and depression at baseline, 3 month and 6 month 
follow ups in mixed stage breast cancer patients (Epping-Jordan et al., 1999).  In a 
prospective study of ovarian cancer patients, perceived social support and intrusive 
thoughts were associated with anxiety at 3 month follow-up after chemotherapy, whilst 
disease stage and measures of physical functioning post-treatment were not associated 
with worse psychological outcome (Hipkins, Whitworth, Tarrier, & Jayson, 2004).  
 Explanations for the contribution of intrusive thoughts to psychological distress 
include a moderating role of support seeking (Lepore & Helgeson, 1998; Lepore et al., 
2000). Based on the assumption that intrusive thoughts are a marker of incomplete 
cognitive processing (Lepore, Silver, Wortman, & Wayment, 1996), and experiences of 
such intrusions signifies maladaptive coping to a stressful event (in this case, the 
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experience of coping with cancer), social support may reduce levels of reported 
intrusions by facilitating effective psychological processing of the event. For cancer 
patients, there is not an isolated incident that needs adequate processing but a number of 
ongoing and highly stressful experiences, including diagnosis, disclosure of diagnosis to 
family and friends, uncertainty about the future, treatment side-effects and fears of 
recurrence.  
 The recognition of social support as a mediating factor in the relationship 
between intrusive thoughts and psychological distress has led to intervention research 
(e.g. Scott, Halford, & Ward, 2004). Scott et al (2004) found that a couple coping 
intervention for adjustment to breast or gynaecological cancer led to a reduction in 
avoidance of negative intrusive cognitions in the intervention group. Understanding 
cognitive processes underlying psychological distress in patients with cancer may lead 
to improved interventions and thus effective positive change in quality of life. Other 
possible treatment strategies aimed at reducing distress associated with negative 
intrusive thoughts may include thought stopping and distraction techniques or cognitive 
restructuring (Lewis et al., 2001).  
1.3.2. Intrusive thoughts and prostate cancer patients 
Although most research concerning intrusive thoughts has been with breast 
cancer patients (e.g. Bleiker et al., 2000), research has looked at intrusive thoughts in 
other patient groups, including prostate cancer patients. For example, Lepore & 
Helgeson (1998) found that for men who felt socially constrained in terms of talking 
about cancer (e.g. “some of my friends or relatives avoided talking with me about 
cancer”), intrusive thoughts were significantly associated with decreased mental health. 
Further, social support was found to be inversely related to level of intrusive thoughts in 
men with localised prostate cancer (Roberts, Lepore, & Helgeson, 2005). Specifically, 
baseline social support was related to mental functioning at 3 month follow-up and this 
relationship appeared to be mediated by cognitive processes including, intrusive 
thoughts. Roberts et al (2005) suggested that social support may aid complete cognitive 
processing, and thus increase mental functioning. In a sample of 420 men with prostate 
cancer, for each intrusion item on the IES the percentage of men who responded 
sometimes or often was between 24 and 27% (McBride, Clipp, Peterson, Lipkus, & 
Demark-Wahnefried, 2000).  
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McBride et al (2000) were also interested in how the impact of cancer diagnosis 
affects health related behaviours. It was found that men with a lower impact score 
(impact referring to total score on IES), exercised more frequently. Although the 
directionality of this relationship could not be determined (McBride et al., 2000), the 
relationship may be important for several reasons. For example, exercise may provide a 
beneficial distraction technique from negative intrusive thoughts. On the other hand, 
having avoidant cognitions may lead to avoidance of behaviours aimed at improving 
physical quality of life and confronting the disease. Support for this explanation comes 
from the finding that high scores on the IES in male prostate, colon and lymphoma 
patients was associated with behavioural avoidance (Hampton & Frombach, 2000). 
Also, as McBride et al (2000) suggested, the cancer diagnosis may have led to greater 
distress in patients who were not engaging in positive health behaviours and who felt 
that their behaviours had contributed to their diagnosis.  
As yet, the importance of intrusive thoughts in prostate cancer patients has not 
been established and further, little is known about the subjective experience of prostate 
cancer patients generally (McBride et al., 2000). Also, previous research investigating 
intrusive thoughts in prostate cancer patients and in other cancer populations has several 
limitations, which will now be considered. 
1.3.3. Limitations of intrusive thoughts research with cancer 
patients. 
Universal criticisms of the IES  include the suggestion that the scale may be an 
inaccurate measure of subjective distress as some items can be perceived as neutral 
(e.g., item 6, "I had dreams about it": Joseph, 2000). Moreover, the IES may be an 
ineffective way of measuring negative intrusive thoughts specifically, not only because 
of the existence of more neutral items, but also because the IES was originally 
developed as a measure of general subjective trauma-related distress. However, it has 
been suggested that the main usefulness of the IES is as a measure of intrusive and 
avoidant symptoms, that mediate between trauma experience and subsequent 
adjustment (Joseph, 2000). Yet due to lack of content measurement, it is not clear 
whether intrusive thoughts are positively, negatively or neutrally valenced in nature 
(Raphael, 1997) and further, the IES does not allow for the possibility that there may be 
more than one type of intrusion (e.g. automatic versus controllable: Joseph, 2000; 
Brewin et al., 1996). It has been suggested that in order to establish the frequency, 
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nature and content of idiosyncratic thoughts, interview methods may be most 
appropriate (Clark & Purdon, 1995).  
Other limitations of the IES to measure intrusive thoughts include, lack of 
content information concerning reported intrusions, and lack of separation between type 
of intrusions that may occur. For example, within the posttraumatic stress disorder 
literature it has been argued that few studies distinguish between type of intrusive 
cognition such as verbal versus imaginal intrusions or thoughts versus memories 
(Reynolds & Brewin, 1998). Others (e.g. Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000) have argued that describing intrusive memories as thoughts is misleading, 
as intrusive memories mainly consist of brief sensory fragments of the traumatic 
experience. 
Previous research that has delineated different intrusions in a non-clinical 
population (Brewin, Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996) found that both intrusive 
thoughts and memories were common (with thoughts being most frequent), but the most 
intrusive thought was more often associated with fear and the most intrusive memory 
was most often associated with sadness or happiness. The different emotions found to 
be associated with different types of cognition supports the notion that different types of 
cognitions should be defined and investigated separately.  
There are also specific problems that arise due to the use of the IES to 
investigate intrusive thoughts in cancer patients. For example, attempting to make cross-
study comparisons on intrusive thoughts frequency may be futile, as studies 
documenting the frequency of intrusive thoughts in a wide range of cancer patients (e.g. 
breast cancer, acute leukaemia, prostate cancer, ovarian cancer) have administered the 
IES at different time stages of the disease, for example, two months post-surgery and 2 
years post-surgery in breast cancer patients; (Bleiker et al., 2000);  post-recurrence 
(Cella et al., 1990); and five year post-treatment (Green et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 
1997). Often studies have very different initial research questions (e.g. predictors of 
psychological distress in cancer patients, cancer recurrence as a traumatic event and 
assessing trauma related disorders in medical settings for the aforementioned studies).  
Further, across clinical populations, intrusions may not concern a specific event 
that has occurred, but rather, concern future-oriented cognitions. This is particularly 
pertinent to cancer patients, as the cancer experience spans a wide time scale and 
involves several different types of stressor. For example, one study, looking at 
intrusions in cancer patients within a posttraumatic stress disorder framework (Cordova 
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et al., 1995) found that reported intrusive memories and dreams were related to fears of 
recurrence, as well of fears of surgery and treatment side-effects. Further, Greenberg et 
al (1997) found that scores on the IES significantly correlated with fears of recurrence, 
indicating that although the IES was developed to measure subjective distress to a 
specific event, the specific event (e.g. diagnosis of cancer) has implications for possible 
future negative events that may also trigger a stress response reaction featuring negative 
intrusive cognitions. 
More generally, it has been argued that although unwanted distressing memories 
of trauma are considered a core symptom of PTSD, relatively little is known about their 
phenomenology (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005). Phenomenology refers to 
the nature of intrusive cognitions, including for example, content (e.g. specific versus 
general memories, form (e.g. thoughts, images, flashbacks) and other characteristics 
such as accompanying emotions/physical sensations and vividness (Reynolds & 
Brewin, 1998; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999).  
1.3.4. Intrusive memories and cancer patients  
One exception to studies that have failed to address details surrounding the 
nature of intrusions has shown that depression in cancer patients is associated with 
negative intrusive memories (Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, & Dayson, 1998a). 
Following from research that found a high frequency of intrusive memories in 
depressed patients (e.g. Kuyken & Brewin, 1994; Brewin, Hunter, Carroll, & Tata, 
1996), Brewin et al (1998a) suggested that a more stringent confirmation of the 
conclusion that intrusive memories are specifically related to depression itself, rather 
than present life stresses in general, would require the inclusion of a control group to 
compare matched samples of depressed and non-depressed patients who have 
experienced a common stressor.  
Brewin et al (1998a) interviewed matched samples of depressed and non-
depressed cancer patients about life events and identified intrusive memories concerning 
illness, injury and death which were more frequently reported in the depressed group 
compared to controls. Intrusive memories qualified if they consisted of visual images of 
a specific scene that had taken place. Participants were matched on age, sex, type of 
cancer and stage of disease. Not only were there more frequent reports of intrusive 
memories in the depressed group, in general, when depression was controlled for, 
greater numbers of intrusive memories were associated with maladaptive adjustment 
 35 
(measured by the Mini-Mental Adjustment of Cancer Scale: Watson et al., 1994). For 
example, higher numbers of intrusive memories were associated with more anxious 
preoccupation, more cognitive avoidance, more fatalism and more hopelessness and 
helplessness. Further, memories were usually reported to be vivid, lasted for minutes, 
occurred once a week or less and 76% of the memories reported were related to illness, 
injury and death and 44% of all memories concerned cancer specifically (Brewin et al., 
1998a).   
When examined longitudinally 68% of patients who had experienced intrusive 
memories at diagnosis (23%) continued to experience intrusive memories six months 
later (Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, & Dayson, 1998b).  Experiencing intrusive 
memories at Time 1 was associated with greater anxiety at follow-up, especially if there 
was high avoidance of the initial memories. Brewin et al suggested that one possible 
explanation for this finding is that the existence of highly accessible specific memories, 
mainly about illness and death, exacerbates feelings of anxiety and makes negative 
outcomes seem more likely. Brewin et al (1998b) also noted that intrusive cognitions 
predicted anxiety but not depression at follow-up, suggesting that memories may 
revolve to a greater extent around future threat than around past loss. 
1.3.5. Summary 
 Although research has shown that the prevalence of PTSD is low in cancer 
patients, evidence suggests that intrusive thoughts are common and contribute 
significantly to psychological distress. Limitations of intrusion research with cancer 
patients include over-reliance on the Impact of Events Scale to measure intrusive 
symptomatology and the sampling of limited cancer populations, mainly women with 
breast cancer. Future research following Brewin et al (1998a) is required to further 
understand the phenomenology of intrusive cognitions, including distinguishing 
between different forms of intrusion (e.g. verbal versus visual) and intrusion time scales 
(e.g. past oriented versus future oriented). In particular, the present research aimed to 
address the following questions: 
1. Do anxious cancer patients experience repeated intrusive thoughts and images and is 
their content in some way related to the disease? 
2.  Is the presence of intrusive cognitions associated with anxiety and maladaptive 
adjustment?  
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3. What are the characteristics of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients and how do 
they compare to clinical and non-clinical populations?  
4. How do cancer patients cope with intrusive cognitions; do they use beneficial or 
ineffective distraction techniques?  
5. Can therapeutic interventions targeted at intrusive cognitions help alleviate their 
frequency and impact?  
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Chapter 2  
 
Intrusive cognitions and anxiety in prostate cancer 
patients. 
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In order to extend previous research investigating intrusive thoughts and memories 
in cancer patients, this chapter introduces intrusive imagery as a form of intrusive 
cognitions distinguishable from thoughts and memories and so far unexplored in cancer 
patients. The relationship between imagery (which includes both images and memories) 
and emotion is discussed and the identification of intrusive imagery in anxiety is 
described. Finally, the chapter presents a cross-sectional study conducted with prostate 
cancer patients at the Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust.  
2.1. Intrusive images 
2.1.1. Intrusive images and anxiety 
Based on the premise that future oriented cognitions may be at least as important 
as past oriented cognitions in patients with cancer, further research is required to assess 
whether future oriented intrusive images are reported in cancer populations (Matsuoka, 
Nagamine, & Uchitomi, 2006). Intrusive images are distinguishable from intrusive 
memories because i) they can be future oriented and ii) they may represent a 
“snapshot”, rather than a contextualised autobiographical memory (Patel et al, 2007). 
Although the importance of imagery in precipitating and perpetuating emotional 
disorders has been recognised for some time (e.g. Beck, 1976; Lang, 1977), until 
recently, imagery in the context of anxiety disorders has received very little attention 
(Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). 
 Research suggests that imagery has an important role in representing 
emotionally charged material (Kosslyn, 1994). For example, verbal thoughts about 
emotional material evoked little cardiovascular response compared to images of the 
same material (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). Further evidence was provided in a 
series of studies by Holmes and colleagues (e.g. Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Holmes & 
Mathews (2005) compared reactions to threatening information in a group asked to 
focus on verbal text and a group asked to imagine the event. Participants in the imagery 
condition reported more anxiety and rated new descriptions as more emotional than 
those in the verbal condition (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). This finding was replicated 
when positive images where shown to have a greater impact on emotion that verbal 
representations of the same material (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 
2006).  
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One potential criticism of previous research was that both verbal and imagery 
conditions provided verbal descriptions and thus the effect of imagery on emotion may 
be due to the additional method of representation provided in the imagery condition. A 
recent study addressed this concern, by combining pictures and words at the initiating 
event and requiring participants to combine them in a single image or sentence 
(Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh, & Dalgleish, 2008). Two studies were conducted 
where participants saw a series of pictures, each accompanied by a word designed to 
yield a negative or neutral meaning when combined. In Study 1, participants were free 
to combine pictures and words as they desired and in Study 2, participants were 
instructed to integrate them using either a descriptive sentence or mental image. In 
Study 1, greater self-reported use of imagery was associated with a greater emotional 
response than verbal processing of the same material. In Study 2, increases in anxiety 
due to negative picture-word combinations were greater following imagery than verbal 
encoding instructions. Conversely, decreases in anxiety due to neutral picture-word 
combinations were greater following imagery than verbal encoding instructions. Study 2 
provided the first evidence that imagery causes changes in emotion, rather than the 
reverse and this extends beyond negatively valenced material (Holmes et al, 2008).  
 One possible explanation for the emotional effect of imagery is that imagery 
copies real-life perceptual events (Kosslyn, 1994) and thus has access to representations 
of related emotional states stored in autobiographical memory (Conway, 2001).  Images 
may therefore be particularly effective cues for re-activating related episodes in memory 
and associated emotions (Holmes et al, 2008). Indeed, Holmes et al (2008) found that 
integrating word-picture stimuli using imagery was associated with greater self-
involvement and stronger associations with autobiographical memories.  
Research in anxious populations has found that people with anxiety report 
experiencing negative intrusive imagery  (e.g. social phobia: Hackmann et al., 2000; 
health anxiety: Wells & Hackmann, 1993; agoraphobia: Day, Holmes, & Hackmann, 
2004; obsessive compulsive disorder: Speckens, Hackmann, Ehlers, & Cuthbert, 2007). 
According to Hackmann & Holmes (2004), imagery in other anxiety disorders is similar 
to imagery found in PTSD, as images are often vivid, persistent, distorted and 
uncontrollable and occur in various modalities (e.g. visual, bodily sensations, sounds, 
touch, taste and smell). Also, across anxious populations, intrusive imagery may not 
only be future-oriented but often representative of specific abstracted aspects of 
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memories which hold important meanings to the individual (e.g. a negative childhood 
experience such as being bullied or feeling rejected).  
Hackmann et al (2000) studied the frequency and nature of intrusive imagery in 
22 social phobic individuals and found that all participants reported intrusive negative 
imagery in various modalities, including visual, body sensations and sounds. Of these 
participants, all but one reported having a particular memory which they felt was closely 
linked to the recurrent image (e.g. being bullied) and the majority (82%) of recurrent 
images were rated as a clear visual picture by the interviewer. One limitation of 
previous research was the lack of a control group. However, studies including a control 
group have shown almost identical patterns of results. For example, Day et al (2004) 
compared a group of agoraphobic patients (n= 20) with a group of non-anxious matched 
controls (n= 20) and found that all patients with agoraphobia and no control participants 
reported having negative intrusive images in agoraphobic situations. Moreover, images 
involved several sensory modalities (including, visual and body sensation perceptions) 
and, in most cases, were linked with unpleasant memories.  
The link between memories and current imagery may be explained by the 
conceptualisation of images as goals, either goals referring to the past or goals referring 
to the future (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004). Conway et al (2004) suggested that 
images may reflect self-defining moments when goals have been challenged and a 
discrepancy exists in the self-memory system. Conway et al (2004) utilised Carver & 
Scheier’s (1998) behavioural self-regulation theory to explain how such a discrepancy 
occurs. Self-regulation is based on the assumption that behaviour is defined by 
individual’s concrete and abstract goals. Goals determine action because goals serve as 
reference values for feedback processes (Scheier & Carver, 2003). A feedback loop 
consists of four elements; an input function (perception), a reference value (goal), a 
comparator (compares input and referent) and an output function (behaviour). There are 
two types of feedback loop, discrepancy reducing (negative feedback loops) and 
discrepancy enhancing (positive feedback loops). Carver & Scheier (1998) suggested 
that for negative feedback loops, the referent is what is intended to be reached and thus 
decreasing discrepancy, by doing well, leads to feelings of elation and doing poorly 
leads to feelings of depression. For positive feedback loops, the referent is what is to be 
avoided and thus doing well, by increasing the discrepancy between input and referent 
leads to feelings of relief, whilst doing poorly is associated with anxiety (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998).  
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By conceptualising intrusive images as goals (referents), Conway et al (2004) 
suggested that such images form the basis of positive feedback loops. For example, a 
patient diagnosed with cancer may have goals about physical well-being challenged and 
thus have negative intrusive imagery of themselves in hospital, looking weak and frail 
after receiving chemotherapy. The image of the self as weak is an undesirable goal and 
thus one to be avoided. According to Conway et al (2004) intrusive imagery leads to 
distress because positive feedback loops have no boundaries; the referent is to be 
avoided as far as possible. However, in many circumstances, positive feedback loops 
are constrained by negative feedback loops which helps the loop become more stable. 
Conway et al (2004) suggested that problems may arise when discrepancy enhancing 
systems are not constrained by discrepancy reducing systems. They proposed that 
therapies aimed at augmenting the process of constraining positive feedback loops may 
lead to a reduction in negative intrusive imagery. For example, imagery rescripting 
therapy which introduces positively-valenced imagery associated with positive affect 
provides an avenue for negative imagery to be associated with new desirable goals. 
Further, adopting new goal-referents through imagery rescripting can lead to positive 
emotions due to recalibration of the affect-generating systems described above.  
Some (Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison, 2003; Hirsch, Meynen, 
& Clark, 2004) asserted a causal role of negative imagery in the maintenance of anxiety. 
Hirsch et al (2003, 2004) manipulated the use of negative imagery in participants with 
low and high social anxiety in order to investigate whether imagery has a causal role in 
the maintenance of social phobia. Participants with low social anxiety (Hirsch et al, 
2003) were allocated to either a negative image or control condition and required to read 
six long descriptions of being interviewed about a job. At certain time points, 
participants were required to perform lexical decisions on ambiguous threatening or 
non-threatening information. Compared to the control group, participants holding a 
negative image in mind lacked non-threatening inferential bias and also experienced a 
higher level of anxiety.  
Participants with high social anxiety had two conversations with another 
volunteer, one where they held a negative image in mind and one where they held a less 
negative self-image in mind (Hirsch et al, 2004). For the negative image, participants 
recalled a situation where they felt socially anxious and for the control image, 
participants recalled a situation where they felt relaxed. The study showed that holding a 
negative image in mind was associated with higher levels of state anxiety and greater 
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use of safety behaviours such as avoiding eye contact. Also, when holding a negative 
image in mind, participants with high social anxiety were more likely to report poor 
perceived behavioural (e.g. “sweating”, “hands trembling”) and conversational (e.g. 
uncomfortable pauses) performance which were partially confirmed by partner ratings 
of performance. However, socially anxious volunteers were likely to overestimate how 
poorly they performed compared their conversational partner. 
 These findings are consistent with research emphasising the causal influence of 
imagery on emotion (Holmes et al, 2008) and fit with previous prospective research, 
which has suggested that intrusive negative cognitions may help maintain 
psychopathological disorders, including posttraumatic stress disorder (Jones, Harvey, & 
Brewin, 2007) and depression (Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999). For example, Brewin 
et al (1999) found that at 6 month follow-up in a sample of 62 depressed patients, the 
amount of intrusion and avoidance associated with intrusive memories predicted 
subsequent depression, after controlling for initial depression severity.  
Hackmann & Holmes (2004) argued that intrusive images may maintain anxiety 
due to the failure to update goals and integrate new and possibly contradictory 
information. They suggested that following appraisal of an intrusive image, individuals 
may engage in behaviours intended to reduce the imminent threat, and in doing so, fail 
to update the original and negative content of the image. This approach is consistent 
with dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin et al, 1996) and the cognitive model 
of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), where intrusions are conceptualised as a failure of 
adequate processing of the trauma and avoidance is considered a maladaptive process to 
integration and thus a contributor to recurrent negative intrusions. This failure of 
updating also corresponds to Conway et al (2004) conceptualisation of images as goals. 
Failure to update negative imagery leads to positive feedback loops aimed at enlarging 
perception-referent discrepancies. When this fails, individuals may experience anxiety. 
By changing the meaning of intrusive imagery and thus changing the referent to one 
that is desirable, the positive feedback loop is constrained by a negative feedback loop 
which, if successful leads to positive affect (Carver & Scheier, 1998).  
 As imagery has a causal relationship with emotion and is important in other 
anxious populations, perhaps the existence of intrusive images, in addition to intrusive 
thoughts is associated with psychological distress in cancer populations. The abundance 
and consensus of recent findings in the anxiety literature (see Hackmann & Holmes, 
2004) means that investigating whether there are increased reports of negative intrusive 
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imagery in anxious cancer patients is an important next stage in formulating treatment 
strategies aimed at improving quality of life.  
2.2. Study 1  
The general aim of the present research was to investigate to what extent the 
insights gained from the study of intrusive cognitions in other clinical groups (e.g. 
anxiety disorders) are relevant to anxious cancer patients and can be used to improve 
their quality of life. Additionally, the present study aimed to address some of the issues 
that have arisen in previous research concerning intrusive cognitions and cancer 
patients.  
In addition to interviewing anxious cancer patients, the present research aimed to 
interview matched non-anxious patients in order to specifically relate intrusive 
cognitions to anxiety. This research not only extends the cancer literature by 
investigating future-oriented intrusive imagery in this population for the first time, but 
also extends research that has found a higher frequency of intrusive images in anxious 
patients. Although some previous research has included a control group (e.g. Day et al., 
2004), the control group in the present study is more appropriate, as control patients 
have experienced the same stressor, without developing clinical levels of anxiety. 
 
Key research questions included: 
1. Do anxious cancer patients experience intrusive thoughts and memories and how 
frequent/vivid/controllable/interfering are they, how long do they last, how 
distressing are they and what are the major themes?  
2. Are there a higher number of intrusive images experienced by patients with high 
anxiety scores? What is the nature of these images? Specifically, how 
frequent/vivid/controllable/interfering are they, how long do they last, how 
distressing are they and what are the major themes?  
3. Are intrusions associated with more maladaptive adjustment? 
2.2.1. Summary of background literature  
Previous research found that cancer patients experience negative intrusive 
thoughts, which were associated with marked distress (Kangas et al., 2002). However, 
studies have rarely explored the content or nature of intrusions. In addition to verbal 
intrusions, intrusive memories of illness have been reported in cancer patients  and 
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found to be associated with maladaptive adjustment (Brewin et al., 1998a; Brewin et al., 
1998b). More recently, intrusive imagery has been found in populations of anxious 
patients (e.g. Hackmann et al, 2000). Intrusive imagery can be distinguished from 
intrusive memories, as an intruding image is not of a specific event from the past, but a 
future-oriented image, or de-contextualised image related to a specific memory. 
Investigating the presence of intrusive imagery more broadly is important as it has been 
suggested that imagery may have a causal role in the maintenance of anxiety (Hirsch et 
al., 2004). Based on the recognition of cancer as a protracted experience involving 
several different stressors (Kangas et al., 2002), future oriented visual intrusions, as well 
as intrusive memories and thoughts may play a crucial role in psychological 
functioning. The present investigation was designed to ascertain more detailed 
information pertaining to verbal intrusions reported by cancer patients and to investigate 
for the first time, whether intrusive imagery is also important.  
Brewin and colleagues (e.g. Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; Reynolds & Brewin, 
1999) have investigated the characteristics of intrusive memories in non-clinical, 
depressed and PTSD samples. In both depressed and PTSD groups, reports of vivid, 
frequent and distressing memories have been found, which have unusual characteristics 
such a sense of reliving (Brewin, 1998). When depression was controlled for, greater 
numbers of intrusive memories were associated with maladaptive adjustment, including 
anxious preoccupation, cognitive avoidance, fatalism and hopelessness and helplessness 
in cancer patients (Brewin et al, 1998a). More recently, research has found that large 
numbers of patients with various types of anxiety disorder report the presence of 
negative intrusive imagery, which is not of a specific autobiographical event from the 
past, but a fragment of sensory information relating to the past, present or the future 
(Hackmann et al., 2000; Day et al., 2004). Identifying intrusive imagery in anxious 
populations is important, because of its suggested role in the maintenance of anxiety 
(Hirsch et al., 2004) and the possibility that psychological treatments tailored to target 
intrusive imagery may help to reduce anxiety (e.g. imagery rescripting; Arntz et al, 
2007).  
Although relatively low prevalence rates of PTSD have been documented in 
cancer patients (Mundy et al, 2000; Andrykowski et al, 1998), these do not necessarily 
imply a lack of clinically significant distress (Green et al, 1998), as intrusive symptoms 
are often reported in the absence of full PTSD criteria (Palmer et al, 2004, Matsuoka et 
al, 2005). Previous research has found that cancer patients also experience negative 
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intrusive thoughts (Kangas et al., 2002), which are related to psychological distress, 
anxiety  and maladaptive adjustment (Kangas et al., 2002; Baider et al., 1997; Matsuoka 
et al., 2002; Nordin & Glimelius, 1998). Further, the presence of  intrusive thoughts and 
memories predicts anxiety and depression at follow-up (Brewin et al, 1998b; Epping-
Jordan et al., 1999; Hipkins et al., 2004).The consensus is that intrusive cognitions have 
a significant role in the psychological distress reported by cancer patients; therefore, 
evaluation of and intervention of these symptoms may have significant implications for 
psycho-oncology services (Matsuoka et al., 2006).  
Although most research investigating intrusive thoughts in cancer patients has 
been with women, prostate cancer patients have been studied. For example, intrusions 
were found to be associated with poor mental health in men with prostate cancer 
(Lepore & Helgeson, 1998). Social support in prostate cancer patients has been related 
to mental functioning (vitality and/or energy level/ role limitations due to emotional 
health, problems in social functioning and mental health) and this relationship was 
mediated by cognitive processes, including intrusive thoughts (Roberts et al, 2005).  
Almost all studies investigating the presence of intrusive thoughts in cancer 
patients have used the IES (Horowitz et al., 1979), which was developed to measure 
subjective distress associated with a traumatic event and includes intrusion and 
avoidance items. One limitation of the IES is that it does not distinguish between types 
of intrusion or provide further information on the content or nature of intrusions. 
Another issue surrounding intrusion research and one that is important for 
ethically sound research practice is whether it is acceptable for patients to be questioned 
about their intrusions. Previous research has investigated the ethical implications of 
asking about trauma, including participant attitude towards childhood maltreatment 
trauma questions (Newman, Walker, & Gefland, 1999; Walker, Newman, Koss, & 
Bernstein, 1997) and domestic abuse trauma questions (Johnson & Benight, 2003). A 
review summarising the findings of twelve trauma-related studies and their assessment 
of reaction to research (Newman & Kaloupek, 2004) concluded that patients from 
various populations reported benefits from participating in trauma related studies, 
moderately low distress levels and lack of regret in participating.  It is not known 
whether cancer patients interviewed about intrusions find the experience distressing, or 
whether there are positive outcomes.  
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I. Aims and hypotheses  
Although intrusive thoughts and memories have been assessed in patients with 
cancer, investigations have typically involved female cancer patients, and lacked detail 
surrounding intrusions. The present study aimed to investigate the presence of intrusive 
cognitions in prostate cancer patients, as men are understudied in this area of research. 
Looking at the presence of intrusions in people diagnosed with cancer also provides 
important insights into cognitive processes in those dealing with an ongoing sense of 
threat.  
This investigation sought to obtain more detailed information about intrusive 
thoughts and memories and for the first time, to ask patients about future-oriented 
intrusive imagery. In this study it was predicted that there would be a higher number of 
intrusive thoughts, memories and images in anxious patients compared to non-anxious 
matched controls, and all intrusions were expected to be associated with maladaptive 
adjustment. Based on previous research (Newman et al., 1999), it was also predicted 
that asking participants about intrusive phenomena would not be associated with 
elevated levels of distress.  
2.2.2. Method 
I. Patients 
Of 764 prostate cancer patients approached in urology clinics at the Royal 
Marsden NHS Foundation Trust, 574 (75%) completed and returned the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale. Patients who scored ≥ 8 or above on the anxiety sub-
scale (15.8%), were categorised as anxious (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and selected for 
the second interview stage of the study. For each anxious patient interviewed, a control 
patient was selected, based on a score of ≤ 4 or below on the anxiety sub-scale. Controls 
were matched on age, stage of disease, current treatment and time since diagnosis. 
Where more than one patient was suitable for control they were selected at random. 
At the screening phase of the study, 14 (1.8%) patients declined to participate: 
three felt too ill, two were recently widowed and were too upset to participate, one 
person felt too anxious to take part, three did not like filling in questionnaires and five 
did not give a reason. A further 176 (23%) patients failed to return the screening scale; 
thus the overall response rate for screening was 75%. There were no significant 
difference between responders and non-responders on age [t(762)=0.22, P= .83] time 
since diagnosis [t(751)=1.00, P= .32] and disease stage [χ2(1) =2.00, P = .16].  
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However, non-responders were significantly more likely to come from a different ethnic 
origin than be White British [χ2(2) = 42.59, P < .01]. 
Among 219 patients invited to the second interview 15 (7%) declined to 
participate; 1 did not want to talk about their illness, 3 did not have enough time and 11 
did not specify a reason for their refusal. A further 53 patients (26%) did not respond to 
invitations to interview and the overall take-up rate for interviews was 67%. There were 
no significant differences between responders and non-responders on age [t(217) =0.44, 
P = .66], time since diagnosis [t(217)=0.92, P = .93] or ethnic origin [χ2(1) = 0.04, P = 
.84]. Responders were significantly more likely to have early-stage or advanced disease 
than locally advanced disease [χ2(2) = 14.87, P < .01], and responders were more likely 
to be anxious than non-responders [χ2(1) =12.02, P < .01].  
A priori power calculations indicated that to detect a medium effect size between 
two groups (d = 0.50) at  α = .05, a total of 130 patients yields statistical power of 0.88 
(Cohen, 1988).   One hundred and forty six patients were interviewed , but 5 non-
anxious patients were excluded as they did not match patients in the anxious group, 10 
anxious patients were excluded from the sample as they no longer met criteria for 
anxiety on the HAD scale and 1 anxious patient was excluded due to incomplete 
interview data. The final sample consisted of 65 anxious patients and 65 controls.  
II. Measures 
 Screening  
The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a 14-item self report scale which was 
developed specifically for the measurement of depression and anxiety in physically ill 
populations. The scale has two subscales consisting of 7 items, one for anxiety and one 
for depression, with a score range of 0-21. Items overlapping with possible physical 
symptoms (e.g. problems sleeping) are excluded in order to provide an unbiased scale. 
A large scale validation study of the HADS (Spinhoven et al., 1997) was conducted on 
various age groups of Dutch participants (N= 6165) and revealed a clear 2 factor 
solution corresponding to anxiety and depression sub-scales. Across age groups (e.g. 
18-65 years, 57-65 years, >65 years), the reliability of the scale was high with 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient ranging from .82-.84 for the anxiety subscale, .71-.79 on 
the depression subscale and .84-.88 on the total HAD score. The scale also showed high 
test re-test reliability (after a mean interval of 22 days) with a Pearson product moment 
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correlation coefficient of .89, .86 and .91 (P < .001) between test and retest subscale 
scores for anxiety, depression and total score respectively.  
The subscale scores of depression and anxiety have also been validated in cancer 
patients. For example, principal components analysis in a sample of 568 cancer patients 
revealed a 2 factor solution corresponding to anxiety and depression and high internal 
consistency (α > .70) (Moorey, Greer, & Watson, 1991). The HADS has also been 
found to be an effective screening instrument and measure of psychological distress 
when compared to the SCID (Payne, Hoffman, Theodoulou, Dosik, & Massie, 1999).  
 Interview session 
 Mini-Mental Adjustment of Cancer Scale (Mini-MAC) 
The Mini-MAC (Watson et al., 1994) is a 29-item self report scale used to assess 
patients coping responses to a cancer diagnosis. It has 5 sub-scales: helplessness-
hopelessness, cognitive avoidance, fighting sprit, anxious preoccupation and fatalism. 
The scale reveals good construct validity with an inverse correlation between 
helplessness and hopelessness (R = -.50) and fighting spirit and a positive association 
between helplessness-hopelessness and anxious preoccupation (R = .52). Thus although 
the subscales are associated to some extent, they do not measure identical dimensions 
(Watson et al, 1994). Internal consistency was also acceptable with Cronbach’s alpha 
for subscales as follows; helplessness-hopelessness, α= .87, anxious preoccupation, α= 
.88, cognitive avoidance, α=.74, fighting spirit, α= .76 and fatalism, α =.62. 
 A more recent study validating the use of the Mini-MAC in an Italian sample 
(N= 157, sub-sample of 430 patients; Grassi et al., 2005), has also found high test re-test 
reliability after a 3 month period (all correlations were significant at P < .001 and there 
were no significant differences between any of the scales between the two time 
intervals, P > .05). Factor analysis, using Varimax rotation confirmed the use of a 5 
factor solution and this has also been supported by validation of the scale in a Greek 
sample using structural equation modelling (Anagnostopoulos, Kolokotroni, Spanea, & 
Chryssochoou, 2006). In the present study Cronbach’s alpha for subscales were; 
hopelessness/helplessness, α=.81; anxious preoccupation, α=.85, cognitive avoidance, 
α=.86; fighting spirit, α=.62 and fatalism, α=.48. 
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  Impact of Events Scale  
The IES (Horowitz et al., 1979) is a 15-item self report scale which examines 
subjective distress as a result of a specific event. The IES is made up of two sub-scales 
of intrusion and avoidance and each item is rated on a four-point scale from not at all, 
rarely, sometimes or often. The intrusion subscale measures a traumatic response type 
which involves forbidden thoughts and images, strong feelings and repetitive behaviour. 
The avoidance subscale measures a traumatic response type involving ideational 
constriction, denial of meanings, blunted sensation and awareness of emotional 
numbness (Horowitz et al, 1979).  
Sundin & Horowitz (2002) statistically analysed 23 studies which have 
evaluated the psychometric properties of the IES. In terms of reliability, internal 
consistency is high, with Cronbach’s alpha of α= .86 for IES intrusion and α=.82 for 
avoidance. Stability of the IES is also sound, with high test re-test reliability (.87 and 
.79 for intrusion and avoidance sub-scales respectively). Content and construct validity 
is acceptable, with the majority of published studies suggesting an underlying structure 
of two factors (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002). Further, in the initial report on the IES 
(Horowitz, 1976), the correlation between intrusion and avoidance was .41, indicating a 
substantial level of variable independence. In more recent studies, the mean correlation 
was .63, which still suggests that each subscale is measuring a different type of stress 
reaction (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002).   
 Following Brewin and colleagues, participants in the present study were asked 
to complete the IES in response to the most intrusive memories, thoughts and images 
(e.g. Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; Brewin et al, 1998a). According to Sundin & Horowitz 
(2002), the IES is a useful measure of stress reactions after a range of traumatic events 
and thus conceptualising intrusive cognitions as a traumatic stressor in their own right 
still lends itself to the use of the IES.  
 Intrusive Cognitions 
 A structured interview (Patel et al., 2007) was employed for the assessment of 
intrusive cognitions over the past week. Intrusive cognitions were defined as consisting 
of memories, images and thoughts that occurred repeatedly. “Memories” were defined 
as visual pictures of specific event that occurred to the individual in the past. Memories 
were elaborated and contextualised (e.g. a memory of being in hospital on a particular 
day with a family member who is dying) (Patel et al, 2007). “Images” were defined as 
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specific visual pictures relating to the past, present or future. Unlike memories, images 
from the past consisted of brief snapshots with no surrounding context (e.g. of a family 
member’s ill face). Visual intrusions were coded as either memories or images, and 
there was complete agreement between two independent raters (κ = 1.00). “Thoughts” 
was defined as verbal content referring to the past, present or future. If more than two 
intrusions were reported, patients were asked to identify and concentrate on the two 
most distressing intrusive cognitions.  
Questions asked in relation to all intrusive cognitions  included a description of 
the intrusion, associated emotions (i.e. sadness, guilt, shame, anger, anxiety and 
helplessness; 0 = not at all, 100 = very much so), frequency (0 = none of the time, 100 =  
all of the time), duration (1= seconds, 2 = minutes, 3 = hours), interference with daily 
life (0 = not at all, 100 = severely), uncontrollability (0 = not at all, 100 = completely) 
and associated distress (0 = not at all, 100 = severely).  
A validity check was conducted for intrusive thoughts, to ensure that repetitive 
intrusive thoughts were being reported, rather than general rumination and worrying 
with regards to the cancer experience. Patients were asked to rate whether the intrusive 
thought they were reporting was always the same or whether it varied; 0 = always 
different, 100 = always the same. Overall, participants reported that the intrusive 
thoughts were nearly always the same (mean = 83.68, S.D. = 19.21), and no individual 
report, was lower than 60 (mostly the same).  
For memories and images, participants were asked how vivid the image was (0 = 
hazy memory, 100 = clearest and vividest memory). For images of past events, patients 
were asked whether it felt as though they were reliving the memory (0 = not at all, 100 
= very much so) and accompanying emotional and physical sensations (0 = not at all, 
100 = very much so). For images that were not past events, patients were asked if the 
image was related to an event that had actually happened.  
 The Research Participation Questionnaire (RPQ) 
The RPQ used in the present study was based on the reactions to research 
participation questionnaires for Parents (RRPQ-P; Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002), 
comprising 12 items ranked on a 5 point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree. Examples of questions include “Being in this study made me feel upset or sad”, 
“I am sorry I was in this study” and “I knew I could stop at anytime”. The possible 
range of scores was from 0 (very poor feedback) to 60 (completely positive feedback). 
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The RRPQ-P had an internal consistency of between α= 0.78 and α =0.80 and factor 
analysis revealed factors including knowing one’s rights and making a contribution 
through research practice and other positive or negative appraisals of participating in 
research. Adults reported high acceptability and comprehension of the questionnaire 
(Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002) . 
III. Procedure 
 Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Local Research Ethics 
Committee. A consecutive series of outpatients attending follow-up urology clinics 
were invited to participate. Patients were given the HADS to complete in clinic, or to 
complete at home and return by mail. Patients subsequently identified as anxious were 
contacted and invited to participate in an interview, either on the telephone or at the 
Royal Marsden Hospital. Control patients matched on age, stage of cancer, treatment 
and time since diagnosis, using information from the hospital computer systems, were 
selected for interview. If a time lapse of more than 21 days had passed since the initial 
screening, participants were asked to repeat the HADS questionnaire, to ensure 
eligibility. Patients interviewed also completed the IES in response to any reported 
intrusions (see Reynolds & Brewin, 1998).  Participants were asked to complete the 
Mini-MAC scale and RPQ.   
2.2.3. Results 
I. Characteristics of the groups 
The demographic, clinical and psychological characteristics of the total sample, 
non-anxious group, and anxious group are presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2 Demographic, clinical and psychological characteristics [n (%)], of the 
total sample (N=130), non-anxious (n=65) and anxious groups (n=65).  
 
Characteristic Total sample 
 
Non-anxious 
group  
Anxious 
group  
Difference between 
anxious and non-
anxious groups 
Age 67.07 (6.70) 67.34 (6.10) 66.80 (7.29) t(128) = 0.45, P = .65 
Ethnic Origin 
White British 
Other 
 
123 (94.6) 
    7   (5.4) 
 
64 (98.5) 
1 (1.5) 
 
59 (90.8) 
6 (9.2) 
 
χ2(1) = 3.78, P = .06 
Marital status 
Married/Living with a 
partner 
Other 
 
105 (80.8) 
 
   25 (19.2) 
 
56 (86.2) 
 
9 (13.8) 
 
49 (75.4) 
 
16 (24.6) 
 
χ2(1) = 2.43, P = .12 
Education 
Left school before 15 
Secondary education 
College or specialised 
training 
University or equivalent 
Unknown 
 
19 (14.6) 
34 (26.2) 
30 (23.1) 
 
40 (30.7) 
7 (5.4) 
 
 
9 (13.8) 
13 (20.0) 
16 (24.6) 
 
25 (38.5) 
2 (3.1) 
 
10 (15.4) 
21 (32.3) 
14 (21.5) 
 
15 (23.1) 
5 (7.7) 
 
χ2(3) = 4.50, P = .21 
Employment 
Employed full-time 
Employed part-time 
Retired 
Unknown 
 
11 (8.5) 
27 (20.7) 
91 (70) 
1 (0.8) 
 
6 (9.2) 
14 (21.5) 
45 (69.2) 
0 (0) 
 
5 (7.7) 
13 (20.0) 
46 (70.8) 
1 (1.5) 
 
χ2(2) = 0.13, P = .94 
Occupation 
Manual 
Non-manual 
Unknown 
 
18 (13.8) 
65 (50) 
47 (36.2) 
 
10 (15.4) 
35 (53.8) 
20 (30.8) 
 
8 (12.3) 
30 (46.2) 
27 (41.5) 
 
χ2(2) = 1.66, P = .44 
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Table 2 continued (clinical and psychological variables) 
Characteristic Total sample 
 
Non-anxious 
group  
Anxious 
group  
Difference between 
anxious and non-
anxious groups 
Time since diagnosis 
(months) 
39.98 (33.04) 40.35 (32.88) 39.60 (33.44) t(128) = 0.13, P = .90 
Cancer Stage 
Early 
Locally advanced 
Advanced 
 
89 (68.5) 
14 (10.7) 
27 (20.8) 
 
45 (69.2) 
7 (10.8) 
13 (20) 
 
44 (67.7) 
7 (10.8) 
14 (21.5) 
 
χ2(2) = 0.05, P = .98 
Treatment 
Active surveillance 
On treatment 
Post-treatment 
Undecided 
 
35 (26.9) 
45 (34.6) 
44 (33.8) 
6 (4.6) 
 
19 (29.2) 
25 (38.5) 
19 (29.2) 
2 (3.1) 
 
16 (24.6) 
20 (30.8) 
25 (38.5) 
4 (6.2) 
 
χ2(2) = 1.60, P = .45 
Interview type 
In-person 
Telephone 
 
60 (46) 
70 (54) 
 
30 (46) 
35 (54) 
 
30 (46) 
35 (54) 
 
Time since HAD 
completion (days) 
 
7.63 (6.90) 
 
7.90 (6.86) 
 
7.66 (6.99) 
 
t(128) = 0.05, P = .96 
 
HADS- depression  3.71 (3.55) 1.43 (1.42) 5.98 (1.42) t(128) = 9.53,  
P < .01, d=1.67 
 
HADS- anxiety  
 
6.06 (4.81) 
 
1.69 (1.39) 
 
10.43 (2.42) 
t(128) = 25.21, 
 P < .01, d= 4.44 
 
II. Number and type of intrusive cognitions 
Thirty patients (23%) reported an intrusive cognition, of whom four reported at 
least one additional intrusion. Of these, two patients reported an additional intrusion 
which was the same type as the first, one patient reported an intrusive memory and an 
intrusive image and one reported an intrusive memory and an intrusive thought. Of the 
34 intrusions reported in total, 8 were intrusive memories, 7 were intrusive images, and 
19 were intrusive thoughts. There was no significant difference in whether patients 
reported intrusive cognitions according to whether patients were interviewed on the 
telephone or in person [χ2 (1) = 0.23, P = .63].  
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III. Content of intrusions 
Twenty-five (74%) of the intrusive cognitions related to the person’s own 
experience of having cancer and five (15%) of the intrusions were in relation to a 
relative’s illness, injury and death (three specifically from cancer). In total 82% of 
reported intrusions were specifically related to cancer. Four (11%) of the intrusions 
were unrelated to illness and death but were all related to feelings of past or future 
failures. The presence of intrusive cognitions was not related to disease stage [R=.00, P 
= .98]; thus, cancer-specific intrusions may represent more general subjective threats of 
the disease rather than threats specific to prognosis.  For intrusive imagery, four of 
seven reported images were related to a past event. Of the three reported images that 
were not related to past events, all were future oriented. For intrusive thoughts, the 
majority (12 of 19) of intrusions were future oriented, 3 were related to past events, 2 
were related to present concerns, and 2 were both past oriented and future oriented (see 
Table 3 for type, content, and timescale of each intrusion).  
Table 3 Description type, content and time-scale of intrusive cognitions. 
Intrusive  Memories Timescale 
Father lying in bed, dying of cancer Past oriented 
Being informed of mother’s death Past oriented 
Being trapped in a magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) scanner 
Past oriented 
Watching two men dying of cancer while staying 
in a hospice for treatment 
Past oriented 
Stomach operation going wrong, and stomach 
bursting open 
Past oriented 
Girlfriend leaving him over 50 years ago Past oriented 
Sitting in the doctor’s surgery and reading a 
newspaper article about misdiagnoses.  
Past oriented 
Being told that sister had suffered a stroke and 
was severely ill 
Past oriented 
Intrusive Images/ “Snapshots” Timescale 
Self in hospital  Past oriented 
Self having a biopsy Past oriented 
Self as an old man sitting at desk at school Past oriented 
His own face as his fathers face, who died from Past oriented 
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prostate cancer  
House falling apart Future oriented 
Self dying, deteriorating health Future oriented 
Self being ill, and cancer spreading Future oriented 
Intrusive Thoughts Time-scale 
 Prostate specific antigen (PSA) level and 
worrying about health, concerns about what the 
doctor will say at next 3 monthly meeting 
Future oriented 
 Health concerns and fears about the future Future oriented 
 Wife, who recently died of cancer Past oriented 
 How things will be further down the line, if 
disease progresses.  
Future oriented 
 “I am going to die” Future oriented 
 Uncertain future and worries concerning cancer 
and implications 
Future oriented 
 Money and the future Future oriented 
 Recurrence of cancer, cancer getting worse and 
the possibility of dying.  
Future oriented 
 Telling his daughters about the illness, fear of 
things getting worse.  
Future oriented 
 Cancer and progressing, worries about wife, 
can't imagine her without him 
Future oriented 
 Death Future oriented 
 “I am going to die” Future oriented 
 Dying, the ultimate end. Described it as “a 
blockage called death”. 
Future oriented 
 The future, how treatment seems to have failed 
and fear of death. Thoughts about brother, who 
died of prostate cancer.  
Past & future oriented 
 Operation and problems with having a catheter  Past oriented 
 Being a failure and not achieving in life and 
feeling frustrated with health 
Past oriented 
 Recent treatment for radiotherapy and feeling 
weaker than before, fears of dying. Thoughts 
surrounding friend's death from  prostate cancer 
Past & future oriented 
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 Leg pain and what cancer must be doing in order 
to cause the pain 
Present oriented 
Treatment options;  concerns about aches and 
pains and cancer spreading 
Present oriented 
 
IV. Characteristics of intrusive cognitions 
Of the 34 intrusive cognitions 6 lasted only seconds, 23 lasted minutes and 5 
lasted hours. Intrusions were reported to occur just over half the time in the past week 
(mean = 55.00, S.D. = 24.59) and interfere moderately with daily life (mean = 47.20, 
S.D. = 33.62). Intrusions were reported to be severely uncontrollable (mean = 70.00, 
S.D. = 35.40), and moderately-severely distressing (mean = 58.53, S.D. = 32.44). Mean 
subjective distress associated with intrusions, measured by the IES was 17.76 (S.D. = 
8.88) for avoidance, 18.06 (S.D. = 7.41) for intrusion and 35.82 (S.D = 12.70) for total 
IES score.  Analyses investigating the difference between visual and verbal intrusions 
on impact of intrusions found no significant differences (P > .05) for frequency, 
interference, uncontrollability, associated distress or IES scores.  
 For the 30 patients reporting intrusive cognitions, it was investigated to what 
extent certain emotions were associated with the intrusions (Table 4). A repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. For patients reporting two 
intrusive cognitions, one intrusion was chosen at random to be included in the analysis. 
There was a significant difference between how strongly various emotions were 
associated with intrusive cognitions [F(2, 145) = 25.14, P < .01, ηp2 = 0.46]. Sadness, 
anxiety and helplessness were most strongly associated with intrusive cognitions and 
least significant difference (LSD) pair wise comparisons revealed that there were no 
significant differences between these three emotions. Guilt and shame were least 
strongly associated with intrusive cognitions and LSD pair wise comparisons revealed 
that these were not significantly different from each other. All other LSD pair wise 
comparisons were significant at P < .01, although the difference between sadness and 
anger was significant at P < .05.  
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Table 4 Emotions associated with intrusive cognitions (n=30) 
Emotion Mean (S.D.)  
Sadness 56.83 (31.03)a 
Guilt 13.83 (25.31)c 
Shame 8.00 (19.72)c 
Anger 35.50 (32.55)b 
Anxiety 64.17 (29.04)a 
Helplessness 58.17 (34.05)a 
Range, 0 (not at all associated) to 100 (very much so associated). Means followed by 
different letters differ significantly, according to how much they are associated with 
intrusive cognitions (P < .05) 
V. Specific characteristics of intrusive memories and images 
Intrusive memories were reported to be vivid (mean = 88.75, S.D. = 21.00; 0 = 
hazy memory, 100 = clearest and vividest memory). In addition, patients reported that 
when they experienced the memory, it felt as though it was not just a past event but 
happening all over again (mean = 70.00, S.D. = 36.65; 0 = not at all, 100 = very much 
so). Patients reported “somewhat” (mean = 62.50, S.D. = 33.70) re-experiencing 
emotions the same as or very similar to those reported during the actual event, whilst re-
experiencing of physical sensations was rare, (mean = 27.50, S.D. = 36.55; 0 = not at all 
and 100 = very much so). Intrusive images were also reported to be vivid (mean = 
70.71, S.D. = 23.00).  
VI. Intrusive cognitions and anxiety 
Fisher’s Exact Tests were conducted in order to assess differences in the 
likelihood of anxious and non-anxious patients reporting each type of intrusive 
cognition. These confirmed that anxious patients reported significantly more intrusive 
imagery (7 of 65), than non-anxious patients (0 of 65) (P < .01), significantly more 
intrusive thoughts (18 of 65) than non-anxious patients (1 of 65), (P < .01) and 
significantly more intrusive memories (7 of 65) than non-anxious patients (1 of 65), (P 
< .05).  
In order to investigate any linear relationship between the number of intrusive 
cognitions and anxiety level, the total sample was divided into 3 groups; non-anxious (n 
= 65, HADS ≤ 4), mildly anxious (n = 41, HADS ≤10) and moderate to severely 
anxious (n = 24, HADS > 10). This classification follows Snaith and Zigmond’s (1994) 
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criteria for identifying mild (8-10), moderate (11-14) and severe (15-21) cases of 
anxiety using the HADS (Snaith & Zigmond, 1994). A one-way ANOVA indicated a 
significant overall effect of anxiety category on number of intrusive cognitions reported 
[F(2,127) = 22.63, P < .01, ηp2 = 0.26]. A polynomial contrast analysis revealed a 
significant linear trend (contrast estimate = 0.48, P < .01) of intrusive cognitions across 
ordered levels of the anxiety variable.  
VII. Intrusive cognitions and coping with cancer 
Biserial correlations between the presence and the absence of intrusive 
cognitions and Mini-MAC score for adjustment to cancer showed that, when anxiety 
was statistically controlled for, the presence of intrusive cognitions was significantly 
correlated with helplessness-hopelessness and anxious preoccupation (Table 5).  
 
Table 5 Correlations between the presence and the absence of intrusive cognitions 
and coping with cancer (N=130) 
Mini-MAC subscales Presence/absence of 
intrusive cognitions 
Presence/absence of 
intrusive cognitions 
(controlling for anxiety) 
Helplessness-hopelessness 0.47** 0.27** 
Anxious pre-occupation 0.55** 0.34** 
Fighting spirit 0.06 0.15 
Cognitive avoidance 0.35** 0.14 
Fatalism 0.03 0.04 
**P < .01, one-tailed 
VIII. The RPQ 
Of 130 participants, 129 completed the RPQ; feedback was positive, with a 
range of scores from 44 to 60 (mean = 55.71, S.D. 3.71), out of a maximum score of 60. 
There was no significant difference on average RPQ score [t(127) = 0.11, P =  .91, 
between anxious (mean = 55.75, S.D. = 3.94) and non-anxious (mean = 55.68, S.D. = 
3.50) patients and no significant difference on average RPQ score [t(127) = 0.99, P =  
.32] between those reporting intrusive cognitions (mean = 56.30, S.D. = 2.77) and those 
not reporting intrusive cognitions (mean = 55.54, S.D. = 3.94).   
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2.2.4. Discussion 
In this study, the presence of intrusive cognitions in prostate cancer patients was 
shown to be related to higher levels of anxiety, and not to stage of disease. The 
frequency of intrusions in the present study is similar to the frequency of intrusive 
memories found in a matched sample of depressed and non-depressed cancer patients 
(Brewin et al, 1998a). Moreover, the content of intrusive cognitions matches the pattern 
of results described by Brewin et al (1998a).  Intrusive cognitions were most often 
related to personal experience of illness or were related to a relative’s illness, injury or 
death. The most common type of intrusion reported was thoughts, supporting previous 
research in a non-clinical population, which also found that intrusive thoughts were 
more common than intrusive memories (Brewin et al., 1996). Although it is unclear 
why intrusive thoughts are most common, the finding that there are differences in the 
amount that different types of intrusion were reported supports the utility of 
distinguishing between them. The finding also contrasts with research in PTSD samples, 
where intrusive imagery is more common than intrusive thoughts (Ehlers & Steil, 
1995). This is important, because firstly intrusive thoughts were initially investigated in 
cancer patients following the inclusion of cancer as a stressor that could precipitate 
PTSD and thus it is unclear why other research has failed to assess the presence of 
intrusive imagery in cancer patients. Secondly, if the types of intrusive cognitions 
reported by cancer patients are different from individuals with PTSD, this may be 
further evidence for moving away from a strict PTSD framework to understand 
psychological distress in cancer patients. Rather, research could focus on the 
phenomenology of intrusive cognitions in order to understand how these intrusions are 
similar as well as different from intrusive symptoms reported by other populations, 
including psychiatric and non-psychiatric samples.  
 The findings that patients reported future oriented intrusive imagery and that the 
majority of intrusive thoughts were future oriented also have significant implications for 
clinical practice and for research investigating cancer-related distress within a PTSD 
framework (Kangas et al, 2002). Asking about future-oriented intrusions is equally as 
important as asking about intrusive distressing recollections and flashbacks of events 
that have occurred in the past.  
In line with previous findings, the experience of intrusive memories was 
associated with feelings that the memory was not just a past event but was happening all 
over again, “right now” (e.g. Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004). Hackmann 
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et al (2004) suggested that the subjective feeling of “nowness” is consistent with the 
notion that intrusive memories result from a lack of information updating, as described 
by theories of PTSD and intrusive phenomena (Brewin et al, 1996; Horowitz, 1986). 
The characteristics found to be associated with intrusive images paralleled previous 
work (e.g. Hackmann et al., 2000) which found across several anxious groups  that 
intrusive imagery is extremely vivid and, whilst lacking context, can be related to 
meaningful events such as a past episode of bullying (Hackmann et al, 2000). In the 
present study, the majority of reported images were related to a meaningful event in the 
past such as a parent’s death or previous negative experiences of hospitals. 
Importantly, the correlations between intrusive cognitions and aspects of coping 
were similar to results reported elsewhere (Brewin et al, 1998a), where anxious pre-
occupation and helplessness/hopelessness were associated with an increased number of 
intrusive memories. Previous research has also found in a sample of depressed women 
that reporting intrusive memories of negative events from childhood was significantly 
associated with avoidant coping (Kuyken & Brewin, 1999). This implies that targeting 
intrusions using distraction (e.g. Andrade et al., 1997) or imagery techniques (Arntz et 
al, 2007) may alleviate their impact  and reduce psychological distress.  
In addition to the similarities, there were also some differences between the 
present findings and previous research. For example, while prostate cancer patients in 
the anxious group reported significantly more intrusions than prostate cancer patients in 
the non-anxious group, overall, anxious patients reported fewer intrusions than found in 
other populations and reported less overall impact of intrusions (Reynolds & Brewin, 
1998). This is consistent with research on intrusive memories in cancer patients (Brewin 
et al, 1998a), which emphasised that depressed cancer patients did not report intrusive 
memories as often as depressed psychiatric patients (Brewin, 1998).  
A possible explanation may be that patients in the anxious group were less 
anxious compared to patients in the psychiatric populations previously studied. The 
significant linear trend in this sample between the number of intrusive cognitions and 
level of anxiety suggests that highly anxious cancer patients would report equivalent 
levels of verbal and visual intrusions as other anxious groups.  
Another possible explanation for the reduced frequency and impact of intrusive 
cognitions is that the perceived meaning of intrusive cognitions may be qualitatively 
different for patients with cancer, compared to other anxious groups. For example, it has 
been suggested that the patient’s interpretation of intrusive cognitions determines 
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intrusion-related distress and negative intrusion appraisal can lead to increased intrusion 
frequency due to associated maladaptive coping and inadequate processing of trauma 
related information (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). Future research investigating intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients should take intrusion appraisal into account in order to 
clarify this further. Further research may also be required to illuminate whether there is 
a difference in the impact of intrusive cognitions between visual and verbal intrusions, 
as the reported non-significant difference may have been due to small numbers.  
Another notable difference was that individuals reporting intrusive memories in 
the present study did not appear to re-experience physical sensations experienced during 
the traumatic event. A possible explanation for this unexpected response is that the 
traumatic experience may be different from other stressors and thus patients may not 
have experienced accompanying physical sensations at the time of the reported memory 
and so do not re-experience them later. Some of the memories reported were of an event 
that was happening to someone else, for example, of watching someone else suffering 
from cancer. In addition, some of the memories related to experiences of hospitals, 
where physical sensations may have been inhibited due to pain killers or other 
medication. This account requires clarification with further research, as a relatively 
small number of memories were reported overall. Another possible explanation for 
relatively low levels of reexperiencing in cancer patients is provided by Holmes & 
Bourne (2008), who suggested that the fleeting nature of typical stressors (e.g. physical 
assault) leads to intense focus on sensory components experienced at the time of 
trauma. For cancer patients, the ongoing nature of the stressor may not allow for this 
intense focus, so subsequent reexperiencing of sensations is rare. 
The present study was not without its limitations. For example, the sample was 
demographically homogenous; including mainly White British, married, retired and 
well educated men and thus it is unclear whether the results are applicable to more 
diverse populations. Particularly, previous research has suggested that women are more 
likely to experience PTSD symptomatology (Hampton & Frombach, 2000; Deimling et 
al., 2002) and thus there is a possibility that female cancer patients would report higher 
numbers of intrusive cognitions than prostate cancer patients.  These limitations should 
be addressed by sampling more diverse groups of cancer patients. It may also be that 
intrusive symptoms are more common in different groups of patients such as advanced 
cancer patients compared to early stage cancer patients. Previous research has reported 
mixed findings in terms of the impact of disease stage on PTSD symptoms (e.g. 
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Cordova et al., 1995; Kelly et al., 1995) and this remains an issue for future research. 
Another limitation is the use of a cross-sectional design as prospective research is 
important for elucidating causal relationships between intrusive symptoms, anxiety and 
maladaptive adjustment. Furthermore, the present study did not assess the participants’ 
psychiatric history of PTSD and depression, both of which have been shown to be 
associated with intrusive memories and thoughts. Finally, future research may benefit 
from making a distinction between cancer-related distress and anxiety unrelated to the 
cancer experience.  
In conclusion, the present study confirmed the link between intrusive cognitions 
and psychological morbidity in an under-researched group; men with cancer. The study 
extended previous findings by providing further information on the nature and content 
of these intrusions and by illuminating the potential role of intrusive imagery and 
future-oriented intrusive thoughts in psychological distress among cancer patients. 
Consistent with previous trauma-related research (Newman et al., 1999), there was no 
evidence to suggest that participants found being questioned about their intrusions 
distressing; indeed the interview was often perceived as beneficial.  The results show 
that treatment approaches targeted at various types of intrusive cognitions, such as 
imagery rescripting, may have a useful part to play in the management of some anxious 
cancer patients.  
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The role of negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions and 
coping in cancer patients 
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Study 1 found that anxious cancer patients experienced negative intrusive 
cognitions, including thoughts, memories and images which were often associated with 
feelings of sadness, helplessness-hopelessness and were interfering and difficult to 
control. However, intrusions were less common than found in psychiatric populations 
(e.g. Hackmann et al., 2000) and were associated with less distress. Possible 
explanations for the finding that intrusive cognitions were less impacting for anxious 
cancer patients include the relatively mild levels of anxiety reported in the sample 
population and the possibility that patients with cancer appraised cognitions in a 
qualitatively different way from other groups.  Negative appraisal of intrusive 
cognitions has been identified as a key cognitive mechanism that mediates the 
management of intrusive cognitions in PSTD (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000) and depression (Starr & Moulds, 2006).  In Study 1, cancer patients reported 
experiencing negative intrusive cognitions, often about illness, injury or death. 
However, because cancer patients have the concrete and ongoing stressor of a physical 
illness, intrusions may be appraised as a normal stress response reaction, rather than a 
sign of mental fragility. It is important to further apply cognitive models (e.g. Ehlers 
and Steil, 1995) of intrusive symptoms to cancer patients, in order to ascertain whether 
intrusive cognitions are qualitatively different for physically ill patients, compared to 
patients with depression or anxiety disorders. As the present research has shown that 
experiencing intrusive cognitions is related to anxiety in cancer patients, understanding 
the mechanisms involved in their maintenance is key to uncovering ways to alleviate 
intrusive cognitions and associated psychological distress.  
 The present study aimed to further investigate intrusive cognitions in a group of 
anxious cancer patients by investigating a larger, more diverse sample of intrusions and 
by investigating, for the first time, how cancer patients appraise and cope with intrusive 
cognitions.  
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3.1. Study 2  
3.1.1. Negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions 
I. Negative appraisal of intrusions in PTSD 
Although intrusive thoughts have been extensively investigated in cancer 
patients (Kangas et al., 2002) and the presence of intrusive imagery has now also been 
considered in more detail in Study 1, the appraisal of such cognitions has yet to be 
investigated. Understanding appraisal of intrusions is important for therapeutic reasons, 
because modifying negative appraisals may be a successful treatment approach for 
reducing anxiety (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). The concept of intrusion appraisal was first 
discussed by Ehlers & Steil (1995) in their cognitive approach to posttraumatic stress 
disorder. Based on previous research, (e.g. Mayou, Bryant, & Duthie, 1993), it was 
suggested that in addition to the frequency of intrusive cognitions, the idiosyncratic 
meaning of intrusions may have an impact on the development of PTSD and PTSD 
severity (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). For example, Mayou et al (1993) found that if patients 
described their intrusive cognitions of road traffic accidents as “horrific”, they were 
likely to meet criteria for PTSD at 1 year follow-up. According to Ehlers & Steil (1995) 
the meaning attributed to the experience of intrusive recollections determines how 
distressing the intrusions are (e.g. “horrific” is taken as a sign of distress in the previous 
example) and the extent to which patients engage in coping strategies to control the 
intrusions. Coping strategies are implicated in symptom maintenance, as they prevent a 
change in the meaning of the trauma and subsequent recollections. 
Negative appraisal of intrusive recollections is described as the belief that the 
presence of uncontrollable intrusions indicates something negative about the self (e.g. “I 
am going mad”), or the world.  In particular, Ehlers & Steil (1995) suggested that 
although some patients view intrusive cognitions as a normal stress response reaction to 
trauma, other patients interpret intrusions in a negative way, for example as an 
indication that they cannot cope.  Further, they suggested that patients who appraise 
intrusive cognitions negatively are more likely to engage in maladaptive behaviour such 
as avoidance. In turn, maladaptive coping strategies maintain intrusive symptoms in 
patients with PTSD by preventing adequate processing of trauma related information 
and thus increasing intrusion frequency (Ehlers & Steil, 1995).  
Research supporting the notion that appraisal is an important factor in the 
maintenance of intrusive symptoms includes several cross-sectional and prospective 
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studies. Clohessy & Ehlers (1999) found that 49% of ambulance workers reported 
experiencing intrusive memories and negative interpretation of intrusions (e.g. “some 
day I will go out of my mind”) was significantly associated with PTSD severity and 
general psychiatric symptoms. Negative appraisal was also associated with distress 
reported in relation to intrusions, even when intrusion frequency was controlled for. 
Further, negative appraisal was significantly associated with rumination (e.g. “I dwell 
on it”, “I think about what I could have done differently”), suppression (e.g. “I try to 
push it out of my mind”) and dissociation (how detached or numb they felt when the 
memories occurred), after controlling for intrusion frequency (Clohessy & Ehlers, 
1999). Research assessing the prevalence of PTSD in staff working in an accident and 
emergency department found that negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions was 
associated with PTSD severity (Laposa & Alden, 2003).   
A cross-sectional study investigating the cognitive factors involved in the onset 
and maintenance of PTSD was conducted with individuals who had experienced a 
physical or sexual assault in the past 3 months (Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 1999). 
Individuals were interviewed and divided in to two groups, according to whether they 
currently met criteria for PTSD or not. Questionnaires were devised to assess 
participant’s appraisal of various aspects of the assault, including their appraisal of 
PTSD symptoms, such as intrusions (e.g. “Something terrible will happen if I do not try 
to control my thoughts about the assault”). In terms of intrusion appraisal, it was found 
that the PTSD group reported significantly more negative appraisals of their symptoms 
in the month after the assault compared to the no PTSD group. Negative appraisal of 
symptoms was shown to be associated with both the onset and maintenance of PTSD.  
Prospective research was also conducted by assessing fifty seven victims of 
physical or sexual assault for cognitive factors at 4 months, 6 months and 9 month 
follow-up (Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2001). As predicted, negative appraisal of PTSD 
symptoms predicted PTSD severity and this relationship remained significant when 
gender and perceived assault severity were statistically controlled. Other cognitive 
factors implicated longitudinally in the onset and maintenance of PTSD were cognitive 
processing style (e.g. detachment) during assault, appraisal of perceived negative 
responses from others, negative beliefs about the self and the world and maladaptive 
coping strategies such as avoidance. Dunmore et al (2001) argued that the role of 
negative appraisal of post-trauma symptoms in PTSD severity has been an especially 
robust finding.  
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Further prospective research also supported the importance of intrusion appraisal 
as an indicator of subsequent psychological distress. For example, a prospective 
longitudinal study investigated psychological factors that could predict chronic PTSD 
after a motor vehicle accident (MVA) (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998). A large cohort 
of patients who had attended an emergency clinic after a MVA were assessed for 
various factors including, PTSD, trauma severity, emotional response during trauma, 
negative interpretations of intrusive cognitions, rumination and thought suppression and 
anger. Negative appraisal was measured with the mean of two items; “I must be going 
out of my mind” and “I will never get over it”. Participants also completed 
questionnaires at 3 months and 1 year follow-up. Ehlers et al (1998) found that 
participants assigning negative meaning to their intrusive symptoms were more likely to 
suffer from PTSD symptoms at 3 month and 1 year follow-up and rumination and 
suppression of intrusive cognitions at 3 months and 1 year follow-up were correlated 
with PTSD diagnosis and severity. Overall intrusion appraisal, maladaptive coping, 
anger and persistent health and financial problems were the key predictors of PTSD at 1 
year. Also, negative appraisal of intrusions predicted a proportion of the variance at 1 
year that could not be explained by PTSD severity at 3 months, underlying the 
importance of appraisal as a maintaining variable. A further 3 year follow-up conducted 
on this sample (Mayou, Ehlers, & Bryant, 2002) found that negative interpretations of 
intrusions, rumination and thought suppression and anger cognitions remained 
important predictors of PTSD persistence at 3 year follow-up.  
Steil & Ehlers (2000) found that negative idiosyncratic meaning (e.g. “I might 
go crazy”) of posttraumatic intrusion symptoms was significantly related to intrusion-
related distress, avoidance strategies and PTSD severity in large samples of MVA 
survivors. Correlations between negative meaning, distress, avoidant behaviours and 
PTSD severity remained significant when intrusion frequency, accident severity and 
general anxiety related cognitions were controlled for. Steil and Ehlers (2000) argued 
that if intrusions are seen as a normal reaction to trauma and part of recovery, distress is 
less likely than if a person interprets intrusive symptoms as a sign that they are mentally 
unstable or incompetent. Avoidant strategies are adapted if someone perceives their 
reaction as indicative or poor adjustment, but the strategies paradoxically lead to 
persistent intrusive symptoms and more severe PTSD reactions. Steil and Ehlers (2000) 
suggested that interventions aimed at identifying, restructuring and changing 
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idiosyncratic meaning of intrusive symptoms may prevent the use of maladaptive 
coping and help alleviate distress.  
II. Negative appraisal of intrusions in bereavement and depression 
Besides research investigating negative appraisal of intrusions in PTSD patients,  
the role of appraisal has also been considered in bereavement research (Boelen, van den 
Bout, & van den Hout, 2003). In a sample of bereaved participants, Boelen et al (2003) 
found that negative interpretation of grief reactions (e.g. “I am going crazy”) was 
strongly related with associated distress, avoidance strategies such as rumination and 
overall traumatic grief and depression. Further, recent research has emphasised the 
importance of negative appraisal in the maintenance of intrusive symptoms in 
depression and subsequent depressed mood (Starr & Moulds, 2006). Eighty-four non-
clinical participants were interviewed about intrusive memories and asked to complete 
the Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ, Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999). The RIQ 
measured intrusive memory frequency, associated distress, the meaning attributed to 
intrusive memories and the extent of avoidant coping strategies. Starr & Moulds (2006) 
found that 83% of the sample reported an intrusive memory of an unpleasant event 
within the past seven days. Negative appraisal was related to intrusion associated 
distress, after controlling for intrusion frequency. Negative appraisal was also related to 
maladaptive and avoidant coping strategies, including rumination and suppression. 
Finally, negative appraisal was related to depression, even when intrusion frequency 
and memory severity were statistically controlled for. Further multiple regression 
analyses revealed that negative appraisal of intrusions was the best predictor of 
depression over and above intrusion frequency. 
Williams & Moulds (2007) presented a replication and extension of Starr & 
Moulds’ (2006) findings by assessing the presence of intrusive memories in a sample of 
250 students and including a broader array of cognitive avoidance and appraisal 
measures. Of the sample, 60% of participants reported a negative intrusive memory. 
Negative appraisal of intrusive memories was positively associated with intrusion-
related distress, level of depression and cognitive avoidance mechanisms (Williams & 
Moulds, 2007).  
  Research investigating the role of negative appraisal of intrusions as an 
important factor predicting psychological outcome illuminates the possible need for 
appraisal-targeted treatments. For example, a recent study investigating the efficacy of 
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an imaginal reliving intervention on changing the frequency and of intrusive memories 
associated with PTSD found that negative interpretation of PTSD symptoms was one of 
several factors predicting poorer outcome in patients (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, & 
Clark, 2006). Poorer outcome referred to a smaller reduction in intrusion frequency with 
reliving. Speckens et al (2006) suggested that although overall reliving showed a 
positive and gradual change in intrusive memory frequency, vividness sense of 
“nowness” and associated distress in patients with PTSD, people who interpreted 
intrusions as indicative of mental weakness may be more unwilling to participate in 
reliving and thus show a poorer response (Speckens et al., 2006).  
3.1.2. Negative appraisal and cancer 
Although intrusion-appraisal has not yet been considered in cancer patients, the 
cognitive model of adjustment (Moorey & Greer, 2002) predicted that negative 
appraisal (i.e. negative meanings that individuals assign to the cancer experience) may 
influence emotional responses, which include experiences such as intrusive cognitions. 
In line with this, the meaning of events to an individual with cancer has been 
highlighted as key to understanding anxiety (Stark & House, 2000) and previous 
research has found a link between the negative appraisal of disease-threat and severity 
of stress response scores (Hampton & Frombach, 2000; Stuber, Meeske, Gonzalez, 
Houskamp, & Pynoos, 1994; Widows et al., 2000). Also, it was found that it was not the 
presence of cancer related concerns but threat- appraisal that was predictive of later 
affective disorders (Parle, Jones, & Maguire, 1996).  
In the previous study investigating the presence of intrusive cognitions in 
anxious prostate cancer patients (Study 1), it was found that although intrusions were 
reported, they were associated with less distress than in other clinical populations. One 
possible explanation for this finding was that patients were mildly anxious compared to 
other groups. However, another explanation is that patients with cancer may appraise 
intrusive cognitions in a less negative way, and thus report less associated distress. No 
research to date has examined cancer patient’s appraisals of intrusive cognitions and 
thus the present study aimed to investigate the presence of intrusive cognitions in an 
anxious group of cancer patients and for the first time, ask patients how they appraise 
intrusive cognitions.  
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3.1.3. Coping strategies and intrusive cognitions. 
Coping strategies implicated in the maintenance of anxiety disorders have 
included suppression and neutralising (e.g. Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher, & Blais, 
1995) (Salkovskis, 1985; Salkovskis, 1989). Freeston et al (1995) interviewed non-
clinical participants about the strategies used to control intrusive thoughts and found 
that seven types of strategy were used frequently included physical action, thought 
replacement, analyse, talk about, replace, thought stopping and trying to convince 
oneself that the thoughts are unimportant.   
Research investigating the types of coping strategies used in patients with 
depression, PTSD or non-clinical groups (Reynolds & Brewin, 1998) found that 
depressed and PTSD patients were most likely to use suppression and distraction 
techniques, whilst non-clinical participants were most likely to use thinking through and  
talking. Overall, participants reported that they used coping strategies from 40-60% of 
the time. Differences were found in reported effectiveness of coping strategies, where 
patients with depression or PTSD rated all strategies as less effective than the non-
clinical group. For the clinical groups, talking through, distraction and writing were the 
most effective techniques and suppression was the least effective. Reynolds & Brewin 
(1998) argued that findings were consistent with previous research which has shown 
that distraction is associated with a decrease in reported intrusions (Salkovskis & 
Campbell, 1994) and suppression is associated with an increase in intrusion frequency 
(the rebound effect: Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Although very few 
participants reported the use of writing as a coping strategy, the finding that writing was 
an effective method of dealing with intrusions is in line with research conducted by 
Pennebaker and colleagues (e.g. Pennebaker, 1992; Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker, 
Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1998), which has shown that disclosure through writing is an 
effective method of reducing distress (Smyth, 1998).  
Research considering negative appraisal of intrusions has also investigated 
cognitive strategies used in order to control intrusions (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Strategies 
such as rumination, suppression, distraction and avoidance of accident reminders were 
all significantly related to PTSD severity in a large sample of motor vehicle accident 
survivors (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Starr & Moulds (2006) found that negative 
interpretation of intrusive memories was significantly related to depression severity and 
cognitive avoidance (e.g.  suppression and rumination) in a non-clinical group of 
participants. Williams & Moulds (2007) replicated this finding and reported a 
 71 
significant positive relationship between dysphoria and cognitive avoidance 
mechanisms employed in response to negative intrusive memories. Specifically, coping 
strategies such as suppression (“I try to push the intrusions out of my mind”), 
rumination (“I dwell on it”) and dissociation (“I feel numb”) were associated with 
depression level after taking account of intrusion frequency. Research with high 
dysphoric individuals (Moulds, Kandris, Williams, & Lang, 2008) explored the use of 
safety behaviours in response to intrusive memories and concluded that cognitive and 
behavioural safety behaviours were common (particularly distraction) and these 
prevented negative interpretations of intrusive memories from being challenged and led 
to increased intrusion frequency.  
In cancer patients, previous research has found that the number of reported 
intrusive memories is significantly associated with maladaptive adjustment such as 
helplessness-hopelessness, cognitive avoidance, anxious pre-occupation and fatalism 
(Brewin et al, 1998a). Study 1 showed that the presence of intrusive cognitions was 
significantly associated with helplessness-hopelessness and anxious pre-occupation in 
anxious prostate cancer patients. However, the Mini-MAC (Watson et al., 1994) was 
designed to ascertain how cancer patients are coping in general and patients have yet to 
be asked to describe their ways of coping with intrusions specifically. Further research 
is required in order to identify whether other types of cognitive strategy that have been 
identified in other clinical groups such as depressed or PTSD patients are associated 
with intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. 
3.1.4. Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of this study was to broaden our understanding of the presence and 
phenomenology of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. To do this, negative appraisal 
of intrusive cognitions in anxious cancer patients was assessed for the first time and 
patients were asked how they cope with intrusive cognitions. The secondary aim was to 
further explore the relationship between intrusive cognitions and maladaptive 
adjustment in cancer patients.  
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Key research questions included: 
1. Is the linear relationship between anxiety and intrusions replicable in an anxious 
sample of cancer patients? 
2. How do anxious cancer patients appraise intrusive cognitions? 
3. Is negative appraisal associated with intrusion-related distress and anxiety severity?  
4. Is negative appraisal related to the extent to which patients engage in maladaptive 
coping strategies? 
5. Is the relationship between the presence/absence of intrusions and maladaptive 
adjustment replicable? 
It was predicted that in an anxious group of cancer patients there would be a 
positive linear relationship between the number of intrusions reported and anxiety 
severity. Following previous research, it was predicted that there would be a significant 
positive association between negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions and anxiety 
severity and negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions and intrusion associated distress 
after controlling for intrusion frequency. It was also predicted that negative appraisal of 
intrusive cognitions would be associated with the extent to which patients engaged in 
coping strategies and engaging in cognitive avoidance mechanisms would be associated 
with higher levels of psychological distress. Finally, it was predicted that there would be 
a positive relationship between the presence of intrusive cognitions and maladaptive 
adjustment. 
3.1.5. Method  
I. Patients 
 Outpatient screening 
Of 870 cancer patients approached in outpatient clinics at the Royal Marsden 
NHS Foundation Trust, 506 (58%) completed and returned the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale. Sixteen (2%) patients declined to participate at the screening stage; 1 
was recently widowed, 1 had poor English, 2 patients were too distressed and 12 did not 
specify a reason for their refusal. A further 348 (40%) of patients did not return the 
HADS. At the screening phase, there were no significant differences between 
responders and non-responders on time since diagnosis [t(856) =0.37, P=.71] or sex [χ2 
(1) = 1.22, P = .30]. However, non-responders were significantly younger than 
responders [t(865) =3.19, P<.01] and were significantly more likely to come from a 
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different ethnic origin than be White British [χ2 (1) = 16.36, P <.01]. Patients who 
scored 8 or above on the anxiety sub-scale (28%), were categorised as anxious 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and selected for the interview stage of the study. Of these 
141 patients, 66 (47%) responded and were interviewed. For the interview stage, 
responders and non-responders did not differ on time since diagnosis [t(139)=-1.21, 
P=.23], age [t(139)=0.62, P=.53], ethnic origin [χ2 (1) = 0.32, P=.57] or disease stage 
[χ2 (2) = 0.49, P=.78]. However, responders were significantly more likely to be female 
than non-responders [χ2 (1) = 4.53, P <.05].Responders and non-responders did not 
differ on anxiety [t(139)=-0.89, P=.32], or depression [t(139)=-1.83, P=.07].  
 Psychological Medicine Invitations 
 Of 278 cancer patients approached through Psychological Medicine Referrals, 
97 (35%) completed and returned the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Twenty 
four (8%) were not eligible on the HADS and thus a total of 73 patients from 
Psychological Medicine were interviewed. Twenty-eight (10%) declined to participate; 
two felt too ill, two didn’t want to talk about their illness, two didn’t feel anxious, 1 
person did not have enough time and 21 did not give a reason for their refusal. A further 
153 patients (55%) did not respond to invitations to interview. There were no significant 
differences between responders and non-responders on age [t(273) = -0.55, P=.58], time 
since diagnosis [t(272) = 0.50, P=.62], ethnic origin [χ2 (1) = 3.39, P = .07] or sex [χ2 
(1) = 0.36, P = .22]. 
 Final interview sample 
 A priori power calculations indicated that to detect a medium effect size (r = 
0.30, α = .05) with 0.80 power requires a sample size of 64 participants (Cohen, 1988) 
and therefore at least 64 patients were required to report intrusive cognitions. From 
outpatient screening and psychological medicine referrals, 139 patients were 
interviewed and 67 participants reported intrusive cognitions.  
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II. Measures 
 Screening  
The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a 14-item self report scale consisting of 
two subscales; anxiety and depression (see Chapter 2, p 47).  
 Interview session 
 Anxiety and depression 
Anxiety and depression were assessed in the interview using the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 2002). At the beginning of the 
interview, all patients were asked whether their anxiety/concerns were related or 
unrelated to the cancer diagnosis. Following this, generalised anxiety disorder, major 
depression, and adjustment disorder were assessed using sub-sections of the SCID. The 
diagnosis of adjustment disorder was made based on predominant symptoms; 
adjustment with depressed mood, adjustment with anxiety or adjustment with mixed 
anxiety and depression. 
 Intrusive Cognitions 
The structured interview (Patel et al., 2007) used in Chapter 2 was employed for 
the assessment of intrusive cognitions in the present study. The validity check 
conducted for intrusive thoughts showed that participants reported that the intrusive 
thoughts were nearly always the same (mean = 98.81, S.D. = 4.53). Visual intrusions 
were coded as either memories or images, and there was complete agreement between 
two independent raters (κ = 1.00).  
 Impact of Events Scale (IES; Horowitz et al., 1979)  
The IES (Horowitz et al, 1979) is a 15-item self report scale which examines 
subjective distress as a result of a specific event and consists of two subscales, intrusion 
and avoidance. Further information on the scale is reported in Chapter 2 (p 49). 
 Appraisal of intrusive cognitions  
 Six items measuring negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions from the 
Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ; Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) were used 
including ‘Something is wrong with me’, ‘I am inadequate’, ‘I cannot cope’, ‘Some day 
I will go out of my mind’, ‘I have a psychological problem’ and ‘I will not achieve 
goals that are important to me.’ This latter statement replaced ‘I will not be able to do 
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my job well’ following Starr & Moulds (2006). Patients were required to rate from 1 
(totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) for each item.  In the present study, internal 
consistency for the scale was high (α =.86).  
 Coping with intrusive cognitions 
Patients were asked to rate on a 100-point scale (0 = not used at all, 100 = used 
very much) the extent to which they engaged in three coping strategies- distraction (‘I 
try to distract myself’), suppression (‘I try to push the intrusions out of my mind’) and 
rumination (‘I dwell on it’). The items were adopted from previous research (Reynolds 
& Brewin, 1998; Ehlers et al., 1998; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). In line with Reynolds & 
Brewin (1998), patients were also asked to rate how effective each coping strategy was 
(0 = not at all effective and 100 = very effective).  
 Mini-Mental Adjustment of Cancer Scale (Mini-MAC) 
The Mini-MAC (Watson et al, 1994) is a 29-item self report scale used to assess 
patients coping responses to a cancer diagnosis. Psychometric properties of the scale are 
reported in Chapter 2 (p 48). In the present study Cronbach’s alphas for subscales were; 
hopelessness/helplessness, α=.87; anxious preoccupation, α=.77, cognitive avoidance, 
α=.81; fighting spirit, α=.65 and fatalism, α=.20. The low internal consistency for the 
fatalism subscale can be explained using principal component analysis (Varimax 
rotation with Kaiser normalization) revealing two principal factors underlying fatalism; 
the items “At the moment I take one day at a time” and “I’ve put myself in the hands of 
God” comprised one factor and “I am very optimistic”, “I’ve had a good life, what’s left 
is a bonus” comprised the other. Due to the low reliability of the fatalism subscale, this 
aspect of coping is not reliably measured and thus will be excluded from further 
analyses.   
 The Research Participation Questionnaire (RPQ) 
The RPQ (Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002) is a 12-item scale used to assess 
reactions to research participation (see Chapter 2, p 50). 
III. Procedure 
 Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Local Research Ethics 
Committee. Two groups of patients were approached. A consecutive series of patients 
attending outpatient clinics were invited to participate. Patients were given the HADS to 
complete in clinic, or to complete at home and return by mail. Patients subsequently 
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identified as anxious (=>8) were contacted and invited to participate in an interview, 
either on the telephone or in person at the Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust, 
Sutton.  
At the same time, a second group of patients who had been referred to the 
Psychological Medicine Service at the hospital were sent an invitation pack inviting 
them to take part in a study aimed at understanding experiences of worry. The pack 
included the HADS to send back with the reply form expressing an interest in taking 
part. Patients identified as anxious (=>8) were contacted by telephone to arrange an 
interview, either on the telephone or in person. Patients who expressed an interest in 
taking part, but did not meet criteria for anxiety, were contacted by telephone to inform 
them that they weren’t eligible to take part. For all participants, if a time lapse of more 
than 21 days had passed, they were asked to repeat the HADS questionnaire, to ensure 
eligibility.  
Patients interviewed also completed the IES, RIQ items and coping scales in 
response to any reported intrusions (see Reynolds & Brewin, 1998).  Participants were 
asked to complete the Mini-MAC scale and the RPQ.  
3.1.6. Results 
I. Participant characteristics 
The demographic, clinical and psychological characteristics of the total sample 
are presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6 Demographic, clinical and psychological characteristics of total sample 
(N=139) 
 
Characteristic N (%) 
Age 52.22 (12.18) 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
43 (31) 
96 (69) 
Ethnic origin 
White British 
Other 
 
101 (72.7) 
 38  (27.3) 
Marital status 
Single 
Married/living with a partner 
Separated/divorced 
Widowed 
 
20 (14.4) 
95 (68.3) 
20 (14.4) 
4 (2.9) 
Education 
Left school before age of 15 years 
Secondary Education 
College or specialised training 
University or equivalent 
Unknown 
 
7 (5.0) 
38 (27.3) 
35 (25.2) 
37 (26.6) 
22 (15.8) 
Employment 
Employed full time 
Employed part time 
Retired 
Unknown 
 
21 (15.1) 
47 (33.8) 
37 (26.6) 
34 (24.5) 
Occupation 
Manual 
Non manual 
Unknown 
 
16 (11.5) 
79 (56.8) 
44 (31.7) 
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Table 6 continued (clinical and psychological variables) 
Characteristic N (%) 
Time since diagnosis (months) 38.88 (50.45) 
Cancer type 
Testicular 
Prostate 
Lymphoma 
Lung  
Breast  
Ovarian 
Cervical 
Gastrointestinal 
Head & Neck 
 
12 (8.6) 
8 (5.8) 
30 (21.6) 
9 (6.5) 
55 (39.6) 
4 (2.9) 
2 (1.4) 
11 (7.9) 
8 (5.8) 
Cancer stage 
Early 
Locally advanced 
Advanced 
Unknown 
 
71 (51.1) 
20 (14.4) 
35 (25.2) 
13 (9.3) 
Treatment 
On treatment 
Post-treatment 
Undecided 
 
65 (46.8) 
69 (49.6) 
5 (3.6) 
Interview type 
In person 
Telephone 
 
68 (48.9) 
71 (51.1) 
Time since HADS completion (days) 7.14 (6.70) 
HADS anxiety  score 11.97 (3.05) 
HADS depression score 7.14 (4.03) 
Type of distress 
Cancer related 
Unrelated 
 
124 (89.2) 
15 (10.8) 
DSM-IV  
Doesn’t meet criteria  
Anxiety 
Depression 
Adjustment disorder-depression 
Adjustment disorder- anxiety 
Adjustment disorder- mixed 
 
89 (64) 
5 (3.6) 
5 (3.6) 
5 (3.6) 
24 (17.3) 
11 (7.9) 
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II. Number and type of intrusive cognitions 
 Sixty seven patients (48%) reported an intrusive cognition, of whom fourteen 
patients reported at least one additional intrusion. Of these, three patients reported two 
intrusive memories, seven patients reported an intrusive memory and an intrusive 
thought, one patient reported an intrusive image and an intrusive thought and three 
patients reported an intrusive memory and an intrusive image. Of the 81 intrusions 
reported in total, 31 were intrusive memories, 8 were intrusive images and 42 were 
intrusive thoughts.  
III. Recruitment, demographic and clinical influence on reporting 
intrusive cognitions 
There was no significant difference in whether patients reported intrusive 
cognitions according to whether patients were interviewed on the telephone or in person 
[χ2 (1) = 0.36, P= .55]. However, patients recruited from Psychological Medicine were 
significantly more likely to report intrusive cognitions than patients recruited from 
outpatient screening [χ2 (1) = 5.36, P<.05, Cramer’s V=.20].  
Age, sex, ethnic origin, marital status, education and employment had no affect 
on whether patients reported intrusive cognitions (P>.05). However, occupation did 
influence whether patients reported an intrusive cognition [χ2 (2) = 8.06, P<.05, 
Cramer’s V=.24], with the unknown category significantly more likely to report 
intrusive cognitions than manual and non-manual employees. The unknown category 
included all patients who were currently unemployed or retired. Manual employees 
were the least likely to report intrusive cognitions. Independent t-tests revealed that time 
since diagnosis significantly affected whether patients reported intrusive cognitions 
[t(137)=-2.46, P<.05, r=.21]. The group of patients reporting intrusive cognitions were 
significantly longer post diagnosis (mean = 49.60 months, S.D. =58.67) than patients 
not reporting intrusive cognitions (mean =28.90 months, S.D. =39.22). Finally, the 
presence of intrusive cognitions was not related to treatment type [χ2 (1) = 0.00 P = .98] 
or disease stage [χ2 (2) = 3.21 P = .20]. 
IV. Content and timescale of intrusions 
 Fifty-eight (72%) of the intrusive cognitions related to the person’s own 
experience of having cancer, and thirteen (16%) of the intrusions related to a relative’s 
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illness, injury or death (three specifically from cancer). In total, 75% of reported 
intrusions were specifically related to cancer and ten (12%) were unrelated to illness or 
death. Fisher’s Exact Tests showed that intrusive cognitions unrelated to cancer were 
significantly more likely to be visual intrusions (21/23) than verbal intrusions (2/23) 
(P<.001) and cancer-related intrusions were equally likely to be visual (19/58) and 
verbal (21/58). Exploratory analyses investigating potential differences between 
whether intrusive cognitions were cancer-related or cancer-unrelated and intrusion 
qualities (e.g. frequency, distress, uncontrollability, interference, vividness, negative 
appraisal and coping) found no significant relationships (P>.05). For intrusive images, 
four of eight of the reported images were related to a past event and the four remaining 
intrusive images were future oriented. For intrusive thoughts, thirty-four (81%) were 
future oriented, 1 was related to past event, 1 was both future and present oriented and 1 
was both future and past oriented. See Table 7 and Table 8 for examples of different 
types of intrusive cognitions reported in the present study.  
Table 7 Content of cancer-related intrusive cognitions 
Intrusion type Timescale Content 
Memory Past Having high dose chemotherapy, smell of sweet 
corn and messing the bed because I am 
incontinent 
Image Future Looking down on myself at my own funeral 
and seeing my friend and family who are crying 
and hearing music playing 
Thought Future I am going to die, the cancer is not going to go 
away 
 
 
Table 8 Content of unrelated intrusive cognitions 
Intrusion type Timescale Content 
Memory Past Boss at work, going to attack me and feeling 
humiliated 
Image Future Horrific monster type faces with sharp horrible 
teeth, snarling and mutating coming towards 
me 
Thought Future Fears about flat being destroyed 
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V. Characteristics of intrusive cognitions 
Table 9 shows the mean characteristics of intrusive cognitions. Of the total 
sample of cognitions (n=81), intrusive cognitions were reported to occur just over half 
the time in the past week, to interfere moderately with daily life and to be moderately to 
severely distressing and severely uncontrollable. Intrusions most often lasted for 
minutes rather than being fleeting or lasting for hours. Analyses exploring the influence 
of clinical and demographic variables on the impact of intrusive cognitions, including 
distress, interference and uncontrollability found that there were almost no relationships 
(P>.05) except that age was significantly negatively correlated with intrusion-specific 
distress (R=-.28, P<.05); younger patients reported higher levels of intrusion-specific 
distress. This association remained even when anxiety severity and intrusion frequency 
were controlled for (R=-.31, P<.01).  
To investigate the difference between specific characteristics of visual and 
verbal intrusions for 67 patients reporting intrusive cognitions, independent t-tests were 
conducted. For patients reporting more than one intrusion, one intrusion was randomly 
selected be included in the analysis. Analyses investigating the difference between 
visual (n=33) and verbal (n=34) intrusions found that visual intrusions were associated 
with significantly more subjective distress, including intrusion and avoidance, according 
to the IES. Visual intrusions were also more uncontrollable than verbal intrusions, 
although this difference did not reach statistical significance. A Fisher exact test showed 
that visual intrusions were significantly shorter in duration than verbal intrusions, 
although both visual and verbal intrusions usually lasted for minutes. There was no 
association between whether intrusions were visual or verbal and each type of reported 
emotion (P>.05 for all).  
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Table 9 Characteristics of total sample of intrusive cognitions (n=81) and visual 
(n=33) and verbal intrusions (n=34) 
Characteristic Total 
intrusions 
Mean (SD) 
Visual 
intrusions 
Mean (SD) 
Verbal 
intrusions 
Mean (SD) 
Difference between 
visual and verbal 
intrusions 
Frequency 56.30 (24.05) 56.82 (24.17) 59.85 (19.95) t(65)=0.56,P=.58 
Interference 49.93 (32.43) 45.45 (34.45) 54.09 (31.40) t(65)=0.47, P=.29 
Uncontrollability 81.43 (23.83) 85.00 (24.01) 75.15 (23.69) t(65)=-1.70, P=.09 
Distress 69.94 (26.49) 70.00 (27.64) 69.85 (23.60) t(65)=-0.2, P=.98 
IES total 39.59 (14.31) 42.33 (12.93) 34.32 (13.28) t(65)=-2.50, P<.01,  
r=.30 
IES avoidance 18.69 (9.15) 19.64 (8.47) 15.68 (8.09) t(65)=-1.96, P<.05,  
r=.24 
IES intrusion 20.90 (7.81) 22.70 (7.37) 18.65 (7.39) t(65)=-2.25, P<.05, 
 r=.27 
Duration N (%) 
Seconds  
Minutes 
Hours 
 
17 (21) 
52 (64.2) 
12 (14.8) 
 
9 (27.3) 
20 (60.6) 
4 (12.1) 
 
1(3) 
26(78.8) 
6 (18.2) 
 
Fisher exact test <.05, 
Cramer’s V =0.34 
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For the 67 patients reporting intrusive cognitions, it was investigated to what 
extent emotions were associated with intrusions (Table 10). A repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. For patients reporting more than one 
intrusion, one intrusion was chosen at random to be included in the analysis. One person 
did not report emotions associated with intrusions and thus the analyses are for n=66. 
There was a significant difference between how strongly various emotions were 
associated with intrusive cognitions [F(5,325)=68.87, P=.001, ηp2 =.51]. Sadness, 
anxiety and helplessness were most strongly associated with intrusive cognitions, and 
least significant difference (LSD) pairwise comparisons revealed there were no 
significant differences between these three emotions. Shame was the least endorsed 
emotion and this was reported significantly less than all other emotions (P<.01). All 
other emotion comparisons were significant at P<.01. A cautionary note is required 
when interpreting the ANOVA described, as guilt and shame both had positively 
skewed distributions and anxiety and helplessness had negatively skewed distributions.  
 
Table 10 Emotions associated with intrusive cognitions (n=66) 
Emotion Mean (SD)  
Sadness 69.50 (34.81)a 
Guilt 20.61 (36.71)d 
Shame 8.64 (26.31)c 
Anger 40.53 (38.71)b 
Anxiety 78.56 (25.81)a 
Helplessness 75.59 (30.50)a 
Range, 0 = (not at all associated) to 100=( very much so associated).  
Means followed by different letters differ significantly according to how much they are 
associated with intrusive cognitions (P < .01).  
 
Post-hoc exploration of the emotion data for n=66 intrusions found that guilt 
was most strongly associated with other-focused (n= 17) events compared to self-
focused (n=49) events (R=.27, P=.03) and anxiety was most strongly associated with 
self-focused events compared to other-focused events (R=-.21, P=.08), although this 
just failed to reach statistical significance.  
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VI. Specific characteristics of intrusive memories and images 
Intrusive memories and intrusive images were reported to be extremely vivid 
(mean = 89.26, S.D. = 15.74 and mean = 85.63, S.D. = 21.45 respectively; 0 = hazy 
memory, 100= clearest and vividest memory). For intrusive memories, patients reported 
experiencing emotions the same as, or similar to those experienced during the actual 
event (mean = 82.10, S.D. = 27.57; 0=not at all, 100=very much so) and reported 
moderately reliving the memory (mean = 54.52, S.D. = 41.52; 0=not at all, 100=very 
much so), as though it were happening all over again, right now. Re-experiencing 
physical sensations was reported “a little” (mean = 37.74, S.D. =43.64; 0=not at all, 
100=very much so).  
VII. Intrusive cognitions and anxiety 
In order to investigate the relationship between number of intrusive cognitions 
and anxiety level, the total sample was divided into three groups according to Snaith & 
Zigmond’s (1994) criteria; mildly anxious (n=53, HADS =8-10), moderately anxious 
(n=55, HADS =11-14) and severely anxious (n=31, HADS = 15-21). A one-way 
ANOVA indicated a significant overall effect of anxiety category on the number of 
intrusive cognitions reported [F(2,136)=3.40, P<.05] and least significant difference 
(LSD) pairwise comparisons revealed that severely anxious patients reported 
significantly more intrusive cognitions, than mildly anxious patients (P<.01, r=.26), and 
there were no significant differences between moderately anxious and mildly and 
severely anxious patients (P>.05).  A polynomial contrast analysis showed that the 
mean number of intrusions increases (contrast estimate = 0.27, P<.05) as anxiety level 
increases. The linear relationship between anxiety and intrusive cognitions may explain 
why a higher number of patients from Psychological Medicine reported intrusive 
cognitions than patients screened in outpatient clinics. Patients recruited from 
Psychological Medicine referrals were significantly more anxious [t(137)=-3.67, P<.01, 
r=.30] and depressed [t(137)=-3.65, P<.01, r=.30] than patients meeting cut-off for 
anxiety via outpatient screening. Indeed, the association between recruitment type and 
presence/absence of intrusions [R=.20, P<.05] disappears when anxiety is statistically 
controlled [R=.14, P=.14].  
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VIII. Intrusion appraisal and coping 
Means and standard deviations for all measures for participants reporting 
intrusive cognitions are reported in Table 11. As would be expected, anxiety and 
depression were higher for those patients reporting intrusive cognitions than in the 
overall sample. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted which showed that there 
were significant differences according to how much three coping strategies were used in 
response to intrusive cognitions [F(2,132)=12.44, P=.01, ηp2 =.16]. Least significant 
difference (LSD) pairwise comparisons revealed that rumination was used significantly 
less frequently than both suppression and distraction (P<.01) and these did not differ 
from each other (P>.05). The reported effectiveness of coping strategies was also 
subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA and showed significant differences according 
to how effective strategies were [F(2,62)1 =16.16, P=.01, ηp2 =.34]. Least significant 
difference (LSD) pairwise comparisons revealed that distraction was considered more 
effective than suppression and rumination (P<.01 for both) and suppression was 
considered more effective than rumination (P <.05). 
 
Table 11 Means and standard deviations for self-report measures (n=67) 
Measure Mean Standard Deviation 
Anxiety (HADS) 12.67 3.11 
Depression (HADS) 8.07 3.97 
IES total 38.27 13.62 
IES intrusion 20.64 7.60 
IES avoidance 17.63 8.45 
RIQ negative appraisal 19.31 10.82 
Distraction 72.54 35.42 
Suppression 62.31 38.27 
Rumination 43.51 37.97 
Distraction effectiveness 64.34  31.50 
Suppression effectiveness 37.20 33.06 
Rumination effectiveness 20.12 24.23 
 
                                                 
1
 Note-due to success only reported for patients endorsing the coping strategy in the first place the total 
sample for this is n=321  
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IX. Negative intrusion appraisal and anxiety, depression and intrusion 
related distress. 
Table 12 contains the correlations between negative appraisal of intrusions, 
anxiety, depression and intrusion-related distress. Negative appraisal was positively 
correlated with anxiety, depression and intrusion-related distress (0=not at all, 100- 
severely distressing), even after controlling for intrusion frequency. Negative appraisal 
was mildly associated with subjective distress associated with intrusions (IES) and was 
not correlated with the intrusion sub-scale of the IES. However, negative appraisal was 
positively correlated with the avoidance sub-scale of the IES. After controlling for 
intrusion frequency, only the relationship between negative appraisal and IES avoidance 
remained. 
Table 12 Pearson correlations of negative meaning of intrusive cognitions and 
anxiety, depression, intrusion controllability and distress (n=67) 
 Negative 
appraisal (RIQ) 
Controlling for 
frequency 
Anxiety .37** .29** 
Depression .42** .31** 
Intrusion 
uncontrollability 
.31** .27** 
Intrusion 
distress 
.42** .34** 
Total IES score .22* .15 
Avoidance 
(IES) 
.28** .23* 
Intrusion (IES) .08 .01 
*P<.05, ** P<.01 (one-tailed) 
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X. Negative intrusion appraisal and intrusion-specific coping 
Table 13 shows the correlations between negative appraisal of intrusions and 
coping strategies used in response to the intrusions. Rumination was significantly 
associated with negative appraisal of intrusions and this remained significant after 
controlling for intrusion frequency. Table 14 shows the correlations between coping 
strategies used in response to intrusive cognitions and anxiety and depression severity. 
Although rumination is positively associated with depression severity, this relationship 
does not hold when intrusion frequency is controlled for. However, avoidance of 
intrusions as assessed by IES was significantly correlated with depression severity and 
this remained significant after controlling for intrusion frequency. Overall, subjective 
distress associated with intrusive cognitions was associated with anxiety and depression, 
after controlling for intrusion frequency. 
 
Table 13 Pearson correlations of negative meaning of intrusive cognitions and 
coping (n=67) 
 Negative 
appraisal (RIQ) 
Controlling for 
frequency 
Distraction .17 .08 
Suppression .19 .10 
Rumination .41** .33** 
*P<.05, ** P<.01 (one-tailed) 
Table 14 Pearson correlations of intrusion specific coping and anxiety and 
depression (n=67) 
 Anxiety Depression 
Distraction .08 (.03) .06 (-.02) 
Suppression -.02 (-.10) .02 (-.09) 
Rumination .04 (-.05) .21* (.10) 
Total IES score .25**(.21*) .40**(.35**) 
Avoidance 
(IES) 
.13 (.09) .32**(.28**) 
Intrusion (IES) .30**(.27*) .35**(.32**) 
*P<.05 (one-tailed). Partial correlations (controlling for intrusion frequency) in brackets  
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XI. Intrusive cognitions and adjustment to cancer 
Biserial correlations between the presence or absence of intrusive cognitions and 
the Mini-MAC score for adjustment to cancer showed that when anxiety was 
statistically controlled for, the presence of intrusive cognitions was significantly 
correlated with helplessness-hopelessness and anxious preoccupation (Table 15). An 
unexpected finding was that interview type (telephone vs. in person) was significantly 
associated with scores on the cognitive avoidance subscale of the Mini-MAC. Patients 
interviewed in person scored significantly higher on cognitive avoidance than those 
interviewed on the telephone [t(137)=-3.16,P<.01, r =.26]. It may be that patients who 
find it harder to talk about their illness prefer to be interviewed face to face rather than 
on the telephone. There were no other significant relationships between interview type 
and Mini-MAC scores (P>.05 for 4 other subscales). 
 
Table 15 Correlations between the presence or absence of intrusive cognitions and 
adjustment to cancer (N=139) 
Mini-MAC subscales Presence or absence 
of intrusive 
cognitions 
Presence or absence of 
intrusive cognitions 
(controlling for 
anxiety) 
Helplessness-hopelessness .27** .20** 
Anxious preoccupation .23** .16* 
Fighting spirit .12 .09 
Cognitive avoidance .02 .03 
*P<.05, ** P<.01 (one-tailed) 
 
In order to start unravelling the intrusion-coping relationship found in cancer 
patients, exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate whether specific 
characteristics of intrusive cognitions were related to specific aspects of adjustment to 
cancer. Table 16 shows that helplessness-hopelessness subscale of the Mini-MAC is 
significantly associated with several intrusion-specific characteristics, including 
uncontrollability, frequency, distress, interference and subjective distress associated 
with intrusions, specifically level of intrusion. Anxious preoccupation was associated 
with uncontrollability of intrusions. Fighting spirit was negatively associated with level 
of intrusion, so that the higher levels of intrusion were associated with lower levels of 
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fighting spirit. Cognitive avoidance was strongly associated with intrusion specific 
avoidance.  
 
Table 16 Correlations between intrusion characteristics and adjustment to cancer 
(n=67) 
Mini-MAC 
subscales 
Uncontrol- 
lability 
Frequency Distress Interfer-
ence 
IES 
total 
IES 
intrusion 
IES 
avoidance 
Helpless-
hopeless 
.35** .35** .35** .41** .28* .28* .19 
Anxious 
preoccupation 
.28** .18 .17 .06 .23 .18 .21 
Fighting spirit 
-.08 .04 -.07 .05 -.17 -.27* -.07 
Cognitive 
avoidance 
.12 -.00 -.00 -.12 .26* -.07 .48** 
** P <.01, * P<.05 (two-tailed) 
XII. The RPQ 
Of 139 participants, 135 completed the RPQ; feedback was positive with a range 
of scores from 42 to 60 (mean=56.01, S.D.=3.26), out of a maximum score of 60. There 
was no significant difference on average RPQ score [t(133, =1.16, P=.25] between 
those reporting intrusive cognitions (mean=55.68, S.D.=3.24) and those not reporting 
intrusive cognitions (mean=56.33, S.D.=3.27). 
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3.1.7. Discussion 
 The present study replicates and expands findings of Study 1, that anxious 
cancer patients experience frequent negative intrusive cognitions which are distressing, 
interfering, uncontrollable and commonly related to future concerns. It was also found 
that cancer patients appraised intrusive cognitions in a negative way, for example, as a 
sign that they could not cope or have a psychological problem. Mean negative appraisal 
of intrusive cognitions was in fact higher in cancer patients compared to ambulance 
workers and non-clinical populations (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Starr & Moulds, 2006) 
and equivalent to a depressed sample (Moulds et al, 2008). This contradicts the 
suggestion that one explanation for lower frequency and impact of intrusions in cancer 
patients is that they do not perceive intrusions as a sign of mental fragility. Rather, the 
linear relationship between anxiety and intrusive cognitions remains a robust finding 
and supports the notion that phenomenological experiences such as intrusive cognitions 
exist on a continuum from non-clinical (Brewin et al., 1996; Starr & Moulds, 2006) to 
clinical populations (Hackmann et al., 2004; Patel et al., 2007).  
 As predicted, negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions was related to general 
psychological distress including anxiety and depression severity and negative appraisal 
was also related to intrusion specific characteristics, including distress and 
uncontrollability. These relationships remained after controlling for intrusion frequency. 
This follows a pattern of results reported in PTSD samples (ambulance workers, 
Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; victims of sexual and physical assault, Dunmore et al, 2001; 
motor vehicle accident survivors, Ehlers et al, 1998) bereaved (Boelen et al 2003) and 
student samples (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2007). Rumination and 
intrusion avoidance were also associated with negative appraisal, irrespective of 
intrusion frequency. This is in line with the suggestion that cognitive avoidance and 
rumination used in response to intrusive cognitions paradoxically prevent the 
elaboration and integration of intrusive cognitions and help maintain negative appraisals 
(Michael et al, 2005). Thus, such strategies may serve to exacerbate rather than 
ameliorate intrusive cognitions which in turn lead to the maintenance of distress (Ehlers 
& Steil, 1995). In the present study, avoidance of intrusions was associated with 
depression severity after controlling for intrusion frequency. Overall the results support 
the notion that negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions plays a role in the development 
of emotional distress after cancer diagnosis.  
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In terms of coping with intrusive cognitions, distraction was the most common 
strategy and was considered the most successful, followed by suppression and 
rumination. The success of distraction as a technique for coping with intrusions parallels 
previous research which has found that distraction is associated with a decrease in 
intrusive cognitions (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994). Contrary to previous research (e.g. 
Steil & Ehlers, 2000) suppression and distraction were not associated with negative 
appraisal of intrusive cognitions. This may be because suppression and distraction were 
considered more successful than rumination, with distraction rated a successful coping 
strategy. In previous research which found distraction to be the most common coping 
strategy in response to intrusive memories (Moulds et al, 2008), it was suggested that 
distraction encompasses an array of different responses (e.g. use of positive image, 
listening to music) and thus closer screening of idiosyncratic responses may be required.  
A number of further unexpected findings also require explanation. For example, 
rumination, suppression and distraction were not associated with general distress in the 
present study. Previous research (Starr & Moulds, 2006) also found no relationship 
between the item “I dwell on it” and depression severity and suggested that it may 
reflect a combination of positive and negative types of rumination including experiential 
self-focus and conceptual-evaluative rumination (Watkins, 2004). Experiential self-
focus involves a non-evaluative focusing of attention on direct experience which 
facilitates emotional processing (e.g. “How did you feel moment-by-moment?), whereas 
conceptual-evaluative rumination (e.g. “Why did you feel this way?”) is more often 
linked to maladaptive outcomes (Watkins, 2004)). Starr & Moulds (2006) also found 
suppression to be unrelated to depression severity, whilst Clohessy & Ehlers (1999) did 
report a relationship. Thus, future experimental research may be required to resolve 
inconsistencies and elucidate the role of thought suppression on the frequency and 
impact of intrusive cognitions (Starr & Moulds, 2006). Finally, distraction may have 
been unrelated to psychological distress because it was often deemed an effective 
coping strategy for reducing the frequency and impact of intrusive cognitions.  
The present study replicated the finding (Study 1) that there is a positive 
relationship between the presence of intrusive cognitions and maladaptive adjustment to 
cancer, including anxious preoccupation and helplessness-hopelessness. Closer 
inspection of this relationship revealed that helplessness-hopelessness was significantly 
correlated with several key negative characteristics of intrusive cognitions; 
uncontrollability, frequency, distress, interference and level of intrusion. The link 
 92 
between individual characteristics of intrusive cognitions and helplessness-hopelessness 
is important, as this subscale of the Mini-MAC has been associated with 5 year 
(Watson, Haviland, Greer, Davidson, & Bliss, 1999) and 10 year (Watson, Homewood, 
Haviland, & Bliss, 2005) disease-free survival as well as psychological outcomes 
including anxiety, depression and emotional control (Watson et al., 1991).  Due to the 
correlational nature of this finding, it is not clear whether experiencing particularly 
frequent, uncontrollable, distressing intrusive cognitions leads to individuals feeling 
more helpless and hopeless about their disease or whether an overall sense of 
hopelessness makes it more difficult to cope with intrusive cognitions when they arise. 
Either way, it is important to address the relationship between the presence of intrusive 
cognitions and feelings of helplessness-hopelessness in psychological therapy.  
General cognitive avoidance of cancer was significantly related to avoidance of 
intrusive cognitions, which suggests that someone who is likely to avoid thinking about 
the overall implications of a cancer diagnosis, may also be likely to try avoiding specific 
intrusive cognitions about cancer, illness and death and vice versa. For these patients, 
cognitive avoidance strategies may prove unsuccessful and paradoxically lead to an 
increase in intrusions and maladaptive adjustment. As might be expected, fighting spirit 
was inversely related to level of intrusion so that higher levels fighting spirit (e.g. “I see 
my illness as a challenge”) were related to lower levels of intrusion. An unexpected 
relationship was the negative correlation between fatalism and level of intrusion, 
although low internal consistency on this subscale prevents clear interpretation. 
Although these are preliminary findings, the relationship between intrusive cognitions 
and maladaptive adjustment is clearly a complex one and merits further research. 
The content of intrusive cognitions was similar to content reported in Study 1, 
where intrusions were most often related to personal or family-related illness injury or 
death. Previous research with clinical populations (depression and PTSD) has found that 
the content of intrusions influences accompanying emotions (Reynolds & Brewin, 
1999). For example, sadness and guilt were mainly associated with other-focused events 
such as family deaths or illnesses and fear was mainly associated with self-focussed 
events such as personal injury. In the present study, guilt was associated with other-
focused intrusions and anxiety was associated with self-focused intrusions. Thus, 
another similarity between intrusive cognitions in cancer patients and those in clinical 
samples was found and future research could explore this further.  
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Comparison between cancer-related and cancer-unrelated intrusions revealed 
that unrelated intrusions were more likely to be visual than verbal. The majority of 
unrelated intrusions were intrusive memories of a friend or family member’s death. 
Experiencing physical illness including confiding in family and friends, frequent 
hospital visits and ongoing treatment may provide powerful triggers of these memories 
which become frequent, intruding and difficult to control. Very few intrusions were 
completely unrelated to illness, injury or death and these often included negative events 
where individuals felt humiliated or their life had failed in some way. This echoes the 
findings of Study 1, where four intrusions unrelated to illness, injury or death 
represented past or future failures.  There were no significant differences between 
cancer-related intrusions and unrelated intrusions in terms of qualities such as 
frequency, associated distress, uncontrollability, interference, vividness, accompanying 
emotions, negative appraisal and coping. The cognitive model of adjustment to cancer 
(Moorey & Greer, 2002) provides a potential explanation for the finding that intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients are not necessarily related to the cancer experience, or 
illness, injury or death. The model emphasised the extensive nature of concerns which 
may be disease specific (e.g. prognosis) or related more generally to appraisals of the 
self, others and the world. Following a cancer diagnosis, changes in personal and social 
roles may lead to negative beliefs about the self, for example that individuals can no 
longer work and provide financial support for the family or that they have failed in life 
and not fulfilled their potential.  
The relatively large sample of intrusions in the present study allowed novel 
comparisons to be made between visual and verbal intrusions in cancer patients. As 
with previous research (Study 1), intrusive images were relatively uncommon, unlike in 
some studies of patients with anxiety disorders (e.g. Hackmann et al, 2000). Instead, 
memories were more prominent, with the majority of patients describing contextualised 
imagery anchored in the past. Comparisons of visual and verbal intrusions revealed that 
visual intrusions were associated with significantly more subjective distress (intrusion 
and avoidance) than verbal intrusions and were more difficult to control. Also, intrusive 
imagery was more likely to last for seconds compared to intrusive thoughts. These 
findings support previous work which has emphasised the fleeting nature of intrusive 
imagery (Holmes, 2004; Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007) and the 
special relationship between imagery and emotion (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). 
Previous research found that imagery has a greater impact on emotion than verbal 
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representations of the same material because i) images are more like actual percepts 
(Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001) ii) images trigger episodes in autobiographical 
memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and iii) images often include personal 
involvement in events (Holmes et al., 2008).  
Holmes et al (2008) suggested that processing emotional properties and 
consequences of events happening in the immediate sensory environment is prioritised 
in the brain and thus mental operations (e.g. intrusive imagery) relying on the same 
brain regions may be given higher priority. The finding that intrusive imagery is often 
defined by a sense of “nowness,” the feeling that the intrusive memory is happening all 
over again, right now, is also in concordance with the finding that intrusive imagery is 
more intruding, less controllable and leads to greater avoidance. The sense of nowness 
reported in the present study matched levels reported in PTSD samples (Hackmann et 
al, 2004) and supports the argument that a sense of “nowness” may not be restricted to 
flashback experiences accompanied by a loss of awareness, but to other types of 
intrusive memories (Hackmann et al, 2004).  
Although these findings are post-hoc and require further investigation, the 
discovery that images and thoughts are distinguishable in this population supports 
previous research emphasising their independence (Brewin et al, 1996). For example, 
thoughts were more likely to be characterised by fear and memories were more likely to 
be characterised by sadness and happiness (Brewin et al, 1996). Brewin et al (1996) 
suggested that participants found it easy to distinguish between these two types of 
cognitions, which is an important point for future research investigating intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients. So far, research has focussed almost exclusively on the 
presence of intrusive thoughts in cancer patients (Kangas et al, 2002), leaving an entire 
category of intrusions unexplored. Future research investigating intrusive cognitions in 
cancer patients should consider the distinction between types of intrusions, including 
visual or verbal intrusions and past or future-oriented intrusions.  
Although the present study did not set out to assess risk factors for intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients, some exploratory analyses revealed some interesting 
findings. The finding that disease stage did not influence whether patients reported 
intrusive cognitions supports the suggestion in Chapter 2, that cancer-specific intrusions 
may represent general concerns regarding disease-threat rather than prognosis-specific 
threats. Contrary to previous research (e.g. Hampton & Frombach, 2000) female 
patients were not more likely to report intrusive cognitions than male patients. 
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However, occupation had a significant influence on whether patients reported intrusions 
or not, with patients within the “unknown” category more likely to report intrusions and 
patients with manual jobs the least likely to report intrusions. A possible explanation for 
this is that the unknown category included patients who were currently unemployed or 
retired and thus those less likely to have distraction as a potential tool for coping with 
intrusive cognitions when they arise. Another explanation could be that these patients 
have fewer financial resources, which has also been identified as a risk factor for PTSD 
symptomatology (Cordova et al, 1995). To date, although sociodemographic 
characteristics have been recognised as significant determinants in the severity of stress 
response symptoms (Gurevich et al., 2002) occupation has not been highlighted as a 
potential factor. Future research assessing risk factors for intrusive symptoms in cancer 
patients should take this into account.   
Surprisingly, time since diagnosis was higher in the group of patients reporting 
intrusive cognitions, than those not reporting intrusive cognitions. This contradicts 
previous research, where a greater proximity to diagnosis is associated with a higher 
frequency and severity of stress response symptoms (Gurevich et al, 2002). The finding 
that patients report intrusive cognitions after a substantial time since diagnosis 
highlights the prolonged nature of cancer as a stressor that can precipitate intrusive 
symptomatology throughout the course of the disease. Theories of trauma (Horowitz, 
1986; Brewin et al., 1996) recognised that experiencing intrusive symptoms can be an 
adaptive response aimed at integrating traumatic information into existing memory 
systems. However when integration fails, individuals can experience ongoing and 
severe stress response reactions that require psychological therapy (Horowitz, 1986). 
The adoption of maladaptive coping strategies (e.g. cognitive avoidance) and the 
severity and length of trauma all increase the likelihood of integration failure and 
ongoing intrusive symptoms (Brewin et al, 1996).  
For those patients reporting intrusive cognitions, younger age was associated 
with higher levels of intrusion specific distress, irrespective of anxiety severity and 
intrusions frequency. This is in line with previous research where younger patients 
reported higher rates of intrusive symptoms (Cordova et al., 1995; Green et al., 1998; 
Tjemsland et al., 1998).  
Limitations of the present study include the inability to draw conclusions about 
directionality. Prospective research is required to confirm the relationships as the cross-
sectional design precludes causal interpretation. Also, the number of correlations 
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conducted may increase the probability that relationships were encountered, although 
the consistent pattern found across correlations and concordance with previous research, 
means it is unlikely the findings were found by chance. Intrusion-specific coping was 
assessed with single-item measures which may have compromised the reliability of the 
assessment and underestimated the effect of intrusion-coping on negative appraisal and 
distress severity. Thus, further research investigating these concepts may benefit from 
longer scales. Also, dissociation was not included as a coping strategy in the present 
study and this should be rectified in subsequent research. Another area of potential 
interest not systematically explored in the present study was whether cancer patients 
report intrusive cognitions which include other sensory modalities such as hearing, 
taste, smell and pain (e.g. Hackmann et al, 2004; Whalley, Farmer, & Brewin, 2007). 
Descriptions given by patients often included a sensory component (e.g. smell of sweet 
corn, funeral music) which concords with the sensory component of intrusions reported 
in other samples (e.g. PTSD; Hackmann et al, 2004). Further, Hackmann et al (2004) 
raised the possibility that people who experience prolonged or repeated traumatic events 
may have additional or different types of intrusive cognitions, and to investigate these 
differences remains a question for future research.  
Although negative internal appraisals were considered, other appraisals may 
play a role in the presence and maintenance of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients 
(Fairbrother & Rachman, 2006; O'Donnell, Elliott, Wolfgang, & Creamer, 2007). For 
example, internal threat appraisal encompasses individual perceptions of the self as 
capable, acceptable and in control in general, in addition to how individuals perceive 
their reaction to intrusive cognitions (O’Donnell et al, 2007). External threat appraisals 
(e.g. disease-specific threat) are also important and have consistently played a role in 
psychological models of cancer such as the cognitive model of adjustment (Moorey & 
Greer, 2002) and found to be related to stress response symptoms (e.g. Hampton & 
Frombach, 2000). Others have suggested that future research should assess the content 
of intrusive cognitions to understand why some are more distressing than others and 
whether individual meaning may influence the content and type of intrusions (Vickberg, 
Bovbjerg, Duhamel, Currie, & Redd, 2000). Although the meaning of intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients has been assessed for the first time, this work could be 
extended to take other definitions of meaning into account (White, 2004), such as global 
meaning (e.g. global beliefs and expectations of the world) and situational meaning (e.g. 
interaction of global beliefs with personal-environment interaction). Also, positive 
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appraisal of events may play a role in the alleviation of emotional distress in cancer 
patients and it has been asserted that assigning positive meaning has been related to 
positive outcomes, including fewer intrusive thoughts (White, 2004).  
Overall, the present study adds to our understanding of the phenomenology of 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. The similarity between the types of intrusive 
cognitions found in cancer patients and patients with psychological disorders supports a 
transdiagnostic approach (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004) aimed at 
identifying experiences which are common across emotional disorders and across non-
clinical and clinical populations (Brewin et al, 1996).  The finding that the negative 
appraisal of intrusive cognitions plays a significant role in anxiety and depression 
severity and intrusion-specific distress strengthens the argument that intrusive 
cognitions are an important area of research in psychooncology. In particular, if the 
phenomenology of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients shows similarities to intrusive 
cognitions found in other clinical populations, psychological therapies developed to 
reduce the impact of intrusions in these samples may provide a reduction in distress for 
cancer patients reporting these experiences.  
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Besides work with PTSD populations (Hackmann, 1998), imagery has recently 
been neglected in psychological therapy (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). In Chapter 1, the 
utility of applying PTSD models to cancer patients was critically appraised. Two 
important implications for psychological therapy were noted. Firstly, it was recognised 
that although research has assessed the prevalence of PTSD in cancer populations, 
therapies developed to treat PTSD (e.g. reliving therapy) have rarely been applied. 
Secondly, cancer may not truly fit a PTSD model and thus these therapies may be 
inappropriate. Study 1 and Study 2 found that cancer patients reported negative 
intrusive imagery and it was associated with anxiety severity.  Importantly, in Study 2, 
intrusive images were as common as intrusive thoughts and were associated with 
increased intrusiveness and uncontrollability. Images were similar to those reported in 
other samples, including PTSD, depressed and other anxious groups. For example, 
imagery was frequent, interfering, associated with significant distress and a sense of 
nowness. Chapter 3 proposed adopting a transdiagnostic approach, where intrusive 
symptoms are identified as common experiences across emotional disorders and clinical 
and non-clinical groups. With this in mind, this chapter discusses the history of imagery 
in therapy, the application of imagery therapy to PTSD and a renewed interest in the use 
of imagery in therapy across clinical groups. Research using imagery in therapy for 
cancer patients is appraised and in line with a transdiagnostic approach, a modular view 
of therapy is presented. Finally, research supporting the effectiveness of a specific 
therapy, imagery rescripting, is reviewed in anticipation of its application to cancer 
patients in Study 3 (Chapter 5).  
4.1. An overview and history of the use of imagery in 
therapy 
The potential use of imagery in psychological therapy has been recognised since 
1889, where Pierre Janet described examples of imagery substitution, (i.e. replacing one 
image with another) in hysterical patients (Van Der Kolk & Van Der Hart, 1989). For 
example, Edwards (2007) described one of Janet’s cases of a woman, Marie with severe 
psychological problems including psychogenic blindness in the left eye (see Edwards, 
2007). Marie’s problems started following an incident when she was 6 years old and 
shared a bed with a child disfigured by impetigo on her face. Janet’s imagery 
substitution involved encouraging Marie to re-experience the memory and to imagine 
the girl as a friendly person and visualise stroking the girls face without fear. Following 
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therapy, Marie’s sight returned and associated psychological symptoms disappeared 
(Edwards, 2007).  
Other early use of imagery in therapy included work by Freud and Jung (see 
Hackmann, 1998 for a review). They both recognised that bringing memory images and 
imaginative images into awareness and reflecting on them could be therapeutic. For 
example, Jung developed a technique called active imagination (Jung, 1960), where 
under meditation, patients allowed any spontaneous images to emerge and watch them 
without intervening. These visualisations were discussed with the therapist and their 
symbolism analysed (Hackmann, 1998). Other more direct imagery techniques included 
Guided Affective Imagery (Leuner, 1969) where patients were given a scene such as a 
meadow and prompted to make a journey and deal with symbolic material as it 
appeared. The theory was that the material would demonstrate areas of conflict in the 
person’s life (Hackmann, 1998). Gestalt therapy developed by Fritz Perls also utilised 
mental imagery (Hackmann, 1998). An important strategy of Gestalt therapy was to 
increase the immediacy and completeness of information by bringing it into the here 
and now by describing the imagery in the present-tense. For example, patients were 
encouraged to work with imagery including memories and dreams by imagining 
themselves as each of the other characters in the image to provide alternative 
perspectives in various situations (Perls, 1971).   
Hackmann (1998) discussed the use of imagery in behaviour therapy, including 
systematic desensitisation (Wolpe, 1958),  covert conditioning (Cautela, 1977) and 
imaginal flooding (Stampfl & Levis, 1967). Systematic desensitisation (Wolpe, 1958) is 
a technique which involves pairing a feared stimulus (e.g. snake phobia) with a positive 
stimulus (e.g. relaxation). The feared response is approached in a graded way, via a 
series of imagined hierarchical scenarios (e.g. imagine being in the same room as a 
snake, imagine touching the snake). Over a number of trials (i.e. pairings), the fear 
evoked by the negative stimulus is reduced and there is an increase in the amount of 
approach behaviour (Hackmann, 1998). Covert conditioning, conceptualised within an 
operant conditioning model (Cautela, 1977) involved changing behaviour patterns by 
imagining them to be followed by positive or negative reinforcement or by punishment. 
The technique has been used to treat maladaptive behaviours and has been applied to 
smoking, drinking and obesity. For example, a smoker may be asked to imagine 
smoking without the taste or smell of the cigarette (Cautela, 1971). Imaginal flooding 
involves imagining a feared stimulus (e.g. snake) without associated punishment (e.g. 
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snake biting). Imaginal flooding is similar to reliving as imagining the feared item 
repetitively leads to the extinction of anxiety (Hackmann, 1998).  
 Beck also recognised the value of imagery when he first developed cognitive 
therapy (Beck, 1976). Based on the premise that the appraisal of events affects how 
people feel and can be the cause of psychological disorders, Beck (1976) suggested that 
underlying meaning could be accessed through imagery, including images, memories 
and dreams. Cognitive therapy may use imagery by unpacking the meaning of imagery, 
examining the beliefs associated with imagery and attempting to transform it 
(Hackmann, 1998). However, despite Beck’s early acknowledgement that imagery may 
be an important component of psychological therapy, there has been an emphasis on 
verbal thoughts in clinical psychology (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004).  
An exception is the therapeutic work conducted with PTSD patients, as intrusive 
memories are considered a hallmark of the disorder (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). 
Psychological therapy which has used imagery successfully with PTSD patients 
includes reliving, eye movement desensitisation (EMDR), and imagery rescripting 
(Hackmann, 1998; Arntz et al., 2007). Reliving involves asking participants to describe 
their traumatic experience aloud, in the first person whilst attempting to re-experience 
what happened (Foa et al., 1991). The method results in the account becoming more 
organised, complete and contextualised. EMDR is a technique where patients hold in 
mind negative imagery, associated cognitions and bodily sensations whilst tracking the 
clinician’s finger in front of their visual field (Shapiro, 2001). Theoretically, the success 
of EMDR is attributed to the role of saccadic eye movements in using visuospatial 
resources required for intrusive imagery (e.g. Andrade et al., 1997) although the method 
has remained controversial (Davidson & Parker, 2001). Imagery rescripting involves 
imagining the traumatic memory and subsequently trying to modify it (e.g. what would 
you have done differently in the image? Arntz et al, 2007). Imagery rescripting is 
described in more detail at the end of this chapter. 
4.2. Rationale for working with imagery in therapy 
 Previous research has shown that emotion-laden intrusive imagery can predict 
and possibly maintain depression (Brewin et al., 1999), anxiety (Hirsch et al., 2003; 
Hirsch et al., 2004) and posttraumatic stress disorder (Jones et al., 2007). Based on the 
assumption that negative intrusive imagery may maintain psychological distress by 
reinforcing avoidant and maladaptive coping strategies (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004) 
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treatments specifically targeted at these processes could provide an effective and rapid 
relief from anxiety. It has been argued that, in comparison to intrusive thoughts, images 
provide an alternative and quick route to accessing generic belief systems and meanings 
underlying emotional responses (Wells & Hackmann, 1993; Hackmann, 1998). 
Hackmann (1998) suggested that images condense a large amount of information and 
reveal layers of idiosyncratic meaning. Hackmann also emphasised that images are 
flexible because they represent perspectives of any time-scale (past, present, future) and 
can be literal or symbolic (Hackmann, 1998).  
Wells & Hackmann (1993) argued that investigating the existence and content of 
images experienced by patients with health anxiety provided an effective means of 
revealing complex individual beliefs and identifying their origins. The themes that 
emerged were those of misinterpretation of bodily symptoms and overestimation of the 
likelihood of death. Patients also had superstitious beliefs that just imagining illness or 
death could make it happen. Holmes et al (2007) made two key proposals regarding the 
use of imagery in therapy; 1) “Imagery has a more powerful impact on negative emotion 
than verbal processing of the same material, and therefore imagery should be examined 
during clinical assessment across disorders” and 2) “Imagery has a more powerful 
impact on emotion than verbal processing and cognitive behavioural techniques used to 
promote positive change should also employ positive imagery” (Holmes, Arntz, & 
Smucker, 2007, p3-4).   
Evidence for the suggestion that imagery has a more powerful impact on 
emotion than verbal processing has been reported using an interpretation training 
paradigm (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Participants were required to either imagine 
unpleasant events while listening to a description of these events, or think about the 
verbal meaning. Those in the imagery condition reported more anxiety and rated new 
ambiguous descriptions as more emotional than those in the verbal condition. It was 
concluded that negative imagery has greater effects on emotion than verbal processing 
of the same material. Research adopting a between-subjects design and manipulating the 
use of imagery or verbal thoughts provided causal evidence that negative imagery 
influences emotion rather than the reverse (Holmes et al, 2008). Working with imagery 
in therapeutic environments may thus be an effective method of accessing meaning and 
alleviating emotional distress.  
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Holmes et al (2007) categorised the use of imagery in therapy as imagery which 
is direct (‘imagery interactive’) or indirect (imagery-property’) and techniques which 
focus on alleviating negative imagery or promoting positive imagery (See Figure 1 for 
examples).  
 
Direct technique 
‘imagery-interactive’ 
• Imaginal exposure/systematic 
desensitisation 
• Imagery rescripting 
Indirect technique 
‘imagery-property’ 
• Mindfulness based stress reduction 
• Attentional training 
• Imagery competing tasks (e.g. 
EMDR) 
 
• Building compassionate mind 
imagery 
• Positive future self-imagery 
(e.g. guided imagery) 
 
• Positive interpretation bias training  
via imagery 
Figure 1 Examples of types of imagery technique on two dimensions 1) Addressing 
intrusive negative imagery to promoting positive imagery 2) working with image 
directly or indirectly (Holmes et al, 2007, p 6) 
 
In addition to the negative direct techniques that have briefly been described in 
relation to behaviour therapy (SD) and treatment of PTSD (imaginal exposure/reliving, 
imagery rescripting), other direct techniques utilise positive imagery. For example, 
building compassionate mind imagery is a technique based on Buddhist healing 
practices (Ringu & Mullen, 2005), where individuals are encouraged to practice warm, 
compassionate images. For example, self-reassuring imagery could involve imagining a 
self-supporting or compassionate part of yourself and to imagine this as a person with 
facial expressions and a voice (Gilbert, Baldwin, Irons, Baccus, & Palmer, 2006). 
Gilbert et al (2006) found that trait self-criticism (e.g. “ “I am easily disappointed with 
myself”) was associated with the ease in generating hostile self-critical images, while 
trait self-assurance (e.g. “I encourage myself about the future”) was associated with the 
ease in generating warm and supportive images of the self. A pilot study assessing the 
use of compassionate imagery with a depression support group (Gilbert & Irons, 2004) 
Address 
negative 
imagery 
Promote 
positive 
imagery 
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reported some success with encouraging patients to generate images in order to self-
soothe.  
Lee (2005) suggested that compassionate imagery can be directed to that of a 
“perfect nurturer” which has qualities to nurture the individuals personal needs (Lee, 
2005). For example, Lee (2005) described a case of a young woman, ‘Sylvie’ who had 
developed PTSD and depression following an emergency Caesarean and was informed 
that she had been 10 minutes from death. Sylvie had intrusive images concerning the 
birth of her son and also experienced self-critical thoughts and deep feelings of shame 
and self-loathing. After a series of cognitive therapy sessions the therapist and Sylvie 
identified that she felt unloved and the traumatic birth of her son was linked to her 
belief that she was unlovable and nobody cared about her. In subsequent sessions, 
Sylvie developed an image of a perfect nurturer who was calm, tranquil and warm. The 
image she developed was of a woman with soft linen clothing, a relaxed face and warm 
texture. The nurturer reassures Sylvie by providing her comfort and whispering in a 
soothing voice, “it’s OK, everything is going to be fine.” After repeated practice of the 
image, Sylvie developed a short cut where she just imagined a pair of arms outstretched 
and the smell of her skin. At the end of therapy, Sylvie felt strong and positive and at 
three month follow-up she no longer met criteria for depression (Lee, 2005).  
Indirect techniques that address negative imagery include mindfulness based 
stress reduction, attentional training and imagery competing tasks. Mindfulness is 
defined as “the awareness that emerges though paying attention on purpose, in the 
present moment, and non-judgementally to the unfolding of experience moment by 
moment.” (p 145, Kabat-Zinn, 2003). A core element of mindfulness is meditation, 
where individuals may be encouraged to focus on various experiences including internal 
experiences such as thoughts, images and bodily sensations and external experiences 
such as sights and sounds (Baer, 2003). Meditation within mindfulness based therapy 
emphasises a non-judgemental and detached approach in response to mental 
experiences. Baer (2003) described the most frequently cited method of mindfulness 
training, mindfulness based stress reduction which is conducted over 8-10 sessions and 
involves group courses of mindfulness training. The training is complex, and 
participants are encouraged to practice skills outside group meetings for at least 45 
minutes a day. When participants notice negative images or thoughts, they are taught to 
note the nature and content of the cognitions and then return attention to the present 
moment so as to not become absorbed in the content of the cognitions. The premise of 
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mindfulness based stress reduction is that it is not the presence of phenomena such as 
intrusive thoughts and images that are stress provoking but the tendency to become 
emotionally involved with them. Mindfulness based therapy is different from traditional 
cognitive behavioural techniques because rather than challenging negative cognitions 
with a specific goal in mind, individuals are taught to observe underlying processes in a 
dispassionate way (Kabat-Zinn, 2003).  Other interventions incorporating mindfulness 
training include acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Hayes et al (2006) suggested that rather than focussing on 
changing psychological events (e.g. intrusive images) approaches such as acceptance 
and cognitive defusion are used to change the function of those events and the 
individual’s relationships to them.  Acceptance involves actively embracing mental 
events and cognitive defusion involves creating contexts in which unhelpful functions 
of negative mental events are diminished.  
Attentional training is an approach developed by Wells (ATT, Wells, 1990) that 
is used to learn new ways of responding to negative imagery. The basic premise is that 
attentional selectivity and intensity govern the nature of individual experience and the 
control and availability of resources can influence the efficiency of processing and 
belief change (Wells, 2007). The aim of ATT is to increase flexible cognitive control 
(e.g. planning for intended actions), disrupt negative styles of thinking (e.g. intrusive 
images) and enhance metacognitive awareness (Wells, 2007). Metacognitive awareness 
refers to knowledge about thinking (Wells, 2007) and is involved in controlling thinking 
and subsequent choice of coping strategies. Wells (2007) suggested that metacognitions 
include the belief that worry is necessary for coping (“If I worry I’ll be prepared”) and 
the belief that controlling negative thoughts is desirable (“I must control my thoughts or 
I’ll go crazy”).  ATT consists of three categories; selective attention, attention switching 
and divided attention. Participants are asked to focus on a fixation point and remain 
visually focussed throughout. A number of competing sounds are introduced and 
identified in the environment. These stimuli must load heavily on attentional resources 
and participants are trained to focus their attention to these stimuli in a flexible way. 
This flexible approach is also applied to other internal stimuli, such as intrusive 
imagery. Participants are trained not to avoid negative internal events, but to respond to 
them in a constructive manner.  
  Imagery competing tasks refers to research which has started to investigate the 
effects of visuospatial distracter tasks (e.g. eye movements, tapping tasks) on 
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desensitization to emotive memories (Andrade et al., 1997; Kavanagh et al., 2001; 
Holmes et al., 2004). Participants are required to participate in a task (e.g. tapping out a 
pattern, moulding plasticine) that loads on the same resources required for intrusive 
imagery, thus reducing vividness, emotional intensity and intrusiveness of imagery.  
Finally, indirect imagery techniques focussed on positive imagery include 
positive interpretation training, which is a method aimed at the experimental 
modification of negative interpretation biases associated with anxiety and mood 
disorders (Holmes et al., 2006). Modification can be achieved by encouraging 
participants to more routinely use positive imagery when confronted with ambiguous 
situations (Holmes et al, 2007). An example of the potential success of positive 
interpretation bias training via imagery was presented in two recent studies (Holmes et 
al., 2006; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, in press). Participants were required to listen to and 
either a) imagine themselves in numerous ambiguous situations or b) focus on the 
verbal meaning of ambiguous situations. For positive interpretation training, the task 
constrained participants to resolve the outcome of a situation in a positive way. For 
example, “You are at home alone watching TV. You must have been dozing because 
you suddenly wake up. You have the impression that you heard a frightening noise and 
then realise with relief that it is your partner returning home.” The initial part of the 
sentence is ambiguous because it implies a negative outcome (e.g. intruder) and the 
positive resolution is in italics. Over 100 positive training scenarios were presented to 
participants in the imagery and verbal conditions. Participants in the imagery condition 
showed greater increases in positive affect and greater reductions in anxiety compared 
to those in the verbal condition. As well as providing evidence for the success of 
positive interpretation training via imagery, this work extended that of Holmes & 
Mathews (2005) to show that positive imagery, as well as negative imagery is 
associated with more emotion than verbal processing of the same material.  
Holmes et al (2007) demonstrated how in recent years there has been a 
rejuvenation of interest in the use of imagery in psychological therapy. Based on the 
finding that mental imagery has a special relationship with emotion (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2005), imagery may be a powerful tool for alleviating emotional distress 
(Holmes et al, 2007). The discussion will now turn to the use of imagery techniques 
with cancer patients.  
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4.3. Imagery in therapy and cancer  
4.3.1. Direct techniques  
Both direct techniques working on positive imagery (guided imagery) and 
negative imagery (systematic desensitisation) have been applied to cancer patients 
experiencing psychological distress. The most prevalent therapeutic technique that uses 
imagery in cancer patients is guided imagery. Guided imagery refers to the use of 
imagination to invoke one or more of the senses in order to ‘guide’ the individual 
through experiences in the mind. Individuals are encouraged to form positive mental 
representations of objects, places or situations (Roffe, Schmidt, & Ernst, 2005). 
Techniques vary but can include non-specific calming themes, such as imagining a 
bright healing light, and more specific disease-related themes such as the use of 
metaphor to visualise the body’s natural defences (Simonton et al., 2000). For example, 
patients may imagine a soldier with a bayonet attacking a cluster of cancer cells or 
visualising fish-like creatures swimming in blood and lymph looking for a primary 
tumour or hidden metastases (Walker, Sharp, Walker, & Walker, 2007). Patients have 
also used images such as PAC-men, an animated computer game where a small yellow 
shape follows and eats “bad monster” characters to represent the cancer being attacked 
by the immune system (Moore & Spiegel, 1999). Guided imagery techniques are used 
to enhance an individual’s ability to cope with stress and sense of control (Walker et al, 
1999) and encourage the general process of recovery (Simonton, Matthews-Simonton, 
& Creighton, 1978). Guided imagery may also encourage patients to distance 
themselves from inflexible or negative thought patterns (Post-White, 2002).   
One study investigated the psychological, clinical and pathological effects of 
relaxation training and guided imagery during primary chemotherapy (Walker et al., 
1999). Ninety-six women with newly diagnosed locally advanced breast cancer were 
randomly allocated to standard care (control group) or standard care plus relaxation 
training and guided imagery (experimental group). The intervention was aimed to 
reduce levels of stress and increase feeling of control (Walker, 2004).  Relaxation was 
taught via audiotape and imagery was encouraged using a portfolio of ten coloured 
cartoons to help visualise host defences killing cancer cells. Participants were asked to 
practice at least daily and document difficulties and vividness of imagery. Clinical, 
pathological and psychological responses to chemotherapy were assessed using standard 
measures (e.g. size of tumour, histology of breast tissue, mood, coping and quality of 
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life). Beneficial psychological effects of the intervention were reported; women in the 
experimental group were more relaxed, had fewer psychological symptoms and had 
higher self-rated quality of life. There were no significant differences between the 
experimental and control group on measures of clinical and pathological response, 
although, there was a significant correlation between ratings of imagery vividness and 
clinical response, in terms of host defences. Specifically, the more vivid the imagery 
reported, the higher the natural killer (NK) cell and lymphokine activated killer (LAK) 
cell activity after chemotherapy and 12 weeks after radiotherapy (Walker, 2004). 
Although Walker et al (1999) found no significant effect of intervention on pathological 
and clinical response, follow-up over 68 months did show a trend for prolonged survival 
in the intervention compared to control group and this was statistically significant for 
tumour size (Walker et al., 2000). The question remains how psychological intervention 
may lead to survival in cancer patients, although it has been suggested that intervention 
may offset stress-induced immunosuppression (Walker, 2004). Walker et al (2000) 
suggested that it may be premature to evaluate the effect of intervention at 68 months 
and longer-term follow-up is necessary. 
Others have supported the potential positive effects of guided imagery on the 
immune system. For example, a clinical study of visualisation on depressed white blood 
cell count in medical patients, including cancer patients found a significant effect of 
mental imagery on immune response. Specifically, white blood cell count increased 
over a 90 day period, indicating a “strengthening of the immune system” (Donaldson, 
2000, p124). Others also reported a significant increase in NK cell activity in early stage 
breast cancer patients following guided imagery (Bakke, Purtzer, & Newton, 2002).  
 Another recent study with 28 early stage breast cancer patients (Lengacher et al., 
2008) found that visualisation of immune cells destroying cancer cells over a 4 week 
period had beneficial immunological effects on NK cell activity. However, these studies 
were not randomised controlled trials, as they utilised repeated-measures designs and 
thus other important variables were not controlled. For example, Bakke et al (2002) 
admitted that their design did not allow the conclusion that imagery enhances immune 
function because psychological benefit of personal support was not controlled. Further, 
they reported that although guided imagery remained successful for reducing depression 
at 3 month, the increased NK activity was not maintained (Bakke et al., 2002). Another 
recent study testing the efficacy of guided imagery in breast cancer patients found that 
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although there were significant effects on depression and anxiety there were no effects 
on immunosuppression (Nunes et al., 2007).  
The effect of guided imagery and relaxation on pain in cancer patients has also 
been studied (Wallace, 1997). A systematic review of the literature analysed the 
efficacy of guided imagery and relaxation on pain relief in nine studies from 1982 to 
1995 (Wallace, 1997). Although there were mixed findings for the usefulness of guided 
imagery for cancer pain (e.g. Arathuzik, 1994; Ferrell, Ferrell, Ahn, & Tran, 1994), it 
was concluded that there was significant evidence that imagery reduces the 
physiological experience of pain in cancer patients, as measured by self-report. 
However, it was argued that there is little evidence that relaxation and imagery 
interventions are able to change affective states, feelings of control and quality of life. 
Wallace (1997) suggested that research focussing on the effect of guided imagery on 
pain in cancer patients should make explicit the description of pain experience being 
studied, to study single interventions rather than mixed interventions, take measures of 
patient compliance with the treatment and conduct longitudinal studies where possible.  
One study that wasn’t included in the systematic review (Syrjala, Donaldson, 
Davis, Kippes, & Carr, 1995) investigated the effect of relaxation and guided imagery 
compared to training in a package of cognitive behavioural coping skills (which 
included relaxation and guided imagery) on self-reported pain. Ninety-four patients 
receiving bone marrow transplants were randomised to one of four conditions: therapist-
control, no-treatment control, relaxation and guided imagery and cognitive behavioural 
coping skills package. Relaxation was induced using progressive muscle relaxation 
(PMRT) and imagery involved imagining descending a staircase and visualising a 
pleasant place. The cognitive behavioural package included imagery and relaxation 
training, the use of self-statements (re-training self-defeating thoughts), distraction 
(focussing attention away from noxious physical sensations) and setting and attaining of 
short-term goals (e.g. playing a game). Patients in the two treatment groups reported 
significantly less pain than patients in the control groups, although the cognitive 
behavioural group did not provide any additive beneficial effects compared to the 
relaxation and guided imagery group. Syrjala et al (1995) concluded that relaxation and 
imagery have a positive impact on pain coping in cancer patients. Although they did 
specify the type of pain experience being studied (oral mucositis pain), they suggested 
that more research is required to ascertain which patient groups benefit and which 
groups don’t benefit from imagery interventions.  Also, although it was shown that 
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cognitive behavioural coping skills training did not provide any additive effects beyond 
imagery and relaxation, it is not clear whether using guided imagery alone would be as 
beneficial as using imagery in combination with relaxation.  
Others have examined the long-term effects of relaxation and guided imagery on 
psychological distress in cancer patients (e.g. Baider, Peretz, Hadani, & Koch, 2001). 
One hundred and sixteen patients were randomly allocated to an intervention (PMRT 
and guided imagery) or control group (same standard of care but no specific 
intervention). Dependent measures to assess psychological distress (at 1 month, 3 
months-just before intervention and 6 months after intervention) included the Brief 
Symptom Inventory (BSI) and the Impact of Events Scale (IES). Baider et al (2001) 
reported a small but significant positive effect of the behavioural intervention on 
psychological distress. In addition to the small effect size, there were several 
limitations, such as high drop out rates, use of mixed interventions, failure to include 
low distress patients in the experimental group and failure to measure effectiveness of 
behavioural treatment directly. In a subsequent study, Sloman (2002) investigated the 
effect of single interventions on psychological distress in cancer patients. Twenty-six 
women and thirty men with advanced cancer, who were experiencing depression and 
anxiety, were randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions: PMRT, guided 
imagery training, both of these treatments and therapist control. The Hospital and 
Anxiety Depression Scale and the Functional Living Index Cancer scales were 
administered to all patients pre and post test phase. All three treatment conditions failed 
to produce significant improvements for anxiety but they all produced significant 
improvements for depression and quality of life. However, no one treatment proved to 
be superior and due to the small sample sizes used in the study, firm conclusions could 
not be drawn (Sloman, 2002).  
A systematic review of the literature assessing the efficacy of guided imagery on 
outcome measures including pain, treatment side effects, psychological well being and 
immunodeficiency (Roffe et al., 2005) concluded that although there was no compelling 
evidence for the positive effect of guided imagery on physical symptoms such as nausea 
and vomiting, studies showed significant effects for emotional response during 
chemotherapy (Troesch, Rodehaver, Delaney, & Yanes, 1993) comfort during 
radiotherapy (Kolcaba & Fox, 1999) and depression and quality of life (e.g. Sloman, 
2002). A recent study has also concluded that guided imagery and relaxation was 
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successful for alleviating anxiety, depression and body discomfort in cancer patients 
receiving brachytherapy treatment (Leon-Pizarro et al., 2007).   
Possible reasons given for the beneficial effects of guided imagery include 
increases in patient’s feelings of control and ‘self-efficacy’ (Walker et al, 2007) and 
diversion of attention from the adverse cancer-related experience (Lyles, Burish, 
Krozely, & Oldham, 1982). However, research has often failed to assess the differences 
between guided imagery as a sole intervention and guided imagery used in combination 
with progressive relaxation (Roffe et al, 2005). Also research has not provided 
evidence-based explanations of the success of guided imagery treatments.  For example, 
perhaps visualisation is an effective relief from psychological distress and other adverse 
effects of the cancer experience because it replaces negative intrusive imagery that 
cause the distress in the first place. As described in Chapter 1, Brewin (2001) suggested 
that one way to remove the impact of situationally accessible memories (SAMs) is to 
replace them with competing verbally accessible memories (VAMs). This view is also 
supported in relation to future oriented intrusive images, as information may require 
updating and integration in order for images to be resolved, or at least reduced in terms 
of their impact on psychological distress (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). Although 
guided imagery therapy has shown to be generally beneficial, it is not known to what 
extent this was due to the imagery component or whether the treatment could be 
improved by replacing standard imagery instructions (e.g. visualising host cells 
destroying cancer cells) with procedures targeted at patients own idiosyncratic images. 
Moreover, other important factors in the efficacy of guided imagery are often 
omitted. For example, it has been suggested that imaging ability should be considered 
when guided imagery is used (Kwekkeboom, Huseby-Moore, & Ward, 1998; 
Kwekkeboom, 2000).  A pilot study to predict success with guided imagery for cancer 
pain (Kwekkeboom, Kneip, & Pearson, 2003) found that imaging ability predicted 
mean pain intensity, positive affect and perceived control over pain. The importance of 
imagery vividness should not be underestimated as Walker et al (1999) showed that 
self-reported vividness of imagery significantly correlated with clinical response.  In 
relation to this, it has been suggested that very little research has focussed on the 
subjective experience of imagery itself, which is important for the effective use of 
imagery in therapy (Bywaters, Andrade, & Turpin, 2004).   
 Direct imagery techniques focussed on negative imagery, rather than positive 
imagery have also been utilised in cancer patients. Systematic desensitisation (SD) is a 
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standardised behavioural therapy used to alter maladaptive learned responses (Morrow 
& Dobkin, 1988).  Morrow and colleagues adopted a modified version of progressive 
muscle relaxation therapy as a competing response to maladaptive anticipatory nausea 
and vomiting (ANV) in cancer patients currently undergoing chemotherapy (e.g. 
Morrow & Morrell, 1982). During systematic desensitisation, the patient imagines 
scenes from a hierarchy of events related to chemotherapy treatment. For example, the 
patient imagines the evening before treatment, breakfast the morning of the treatment, 
driving to the hospital and entering the waiting room and seeing the clinic nurse. Whilst 
imagining these scenarios, patients are taught relaxation techniques such as tensing a 
particular muscle group, saying the word “relax” to themselves and focussing on 
releasing the tension from the muscle group (Morrow, 1986).  Thus the treatment 
stimuli become associated with relaxation so that when the patient encounters each 
scenario they respond with relaxation rather than nausea and vomiting. Several studies 
have supported the effectiveness of SD on ANV in cancer patients. For example, 
Morrow & Morrell (1982) randomly assigned 60 cancer patients to SD, counselling or a 
no treatment group and found that only patients in the SD group reported significant 
reductions in frequency, severity and duration of ANV. Morrow (1986) assigned 92 
cancer patients to one of four conditions, i) SD, ii) relaxation only iii) counselling iv) no 
treatment control and found that relative to the other 3 groups, SD patients reported a 
significant decrease in the severity and duration of anticipatory nausea from baseline to 
follow-up. Thus, the positive effects on ANV could not be attributed to relaxation alone 
although relaxation and SD were found to produce significant reductions in ANV 
relative to the other groups.  
 Morrow & Dobkin (1988) discussed explanations for the success of SD for the 
treatment of ANV. Several hypotheses have been proposed, which have included 
explaining ANV as a classically conditioned response (Watson, 1993). The conditioning 
model suggests that ANV results because an unconditioned response (nausea and 
vomiting) follows an unconditioned stimulus (chemotherapy). Potentially conditioned 
stimuli (e.g. sensations, images, clinic nurse) alter after a number of trials (i.e. 
chemotherapy treatments) to give rise to a conditioned stimuli (e.g. clinic nurse) 
eliciting a conditioned response (ANV). In this context, SD works by breaking the 
associative bonds between conditioned stimuli and conditioned response and allow 
patients to learn an adaptive response (relaxation). Other suggestions include the notion 
that pairing scenarios with relaxation comprises a form of distraction so that 
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conditioning no longer occurs (Morrow & Dobkin, 1988). Another hypothesis is that 
pairing relaxation with a hierarchy of feared events leading up to chemotherapy 
treatment increases patient’s perceived sense of control so that the subjective feeling of 
helplessness is alleviated. However, Morrow & Dobkins (1988) concluded that although 
these latter explanations are appealing, there are no empirical data to support them.  
Although a series of studies have supported the effectiveness of SD in 
alleviating chemotherapy side-effects such as nausea and vomiting, the recognition of 
higher mental processes and the development of therapies encompassing cognitive as 
well as behavioural components  (Watson, 1993; Moorey, 1991) means there is no 
recent research assessing the effectiveness of SD in cancer patients. Also, it has been 
suggested that the important elements of desensitisation remain uncertain (Hackmann, 
1998). Some suggested that the use of a hierarchy and progressive muscle relaxation 
was not essential (e.g. Dawson & McMurray, 1978) and others emphasised the 
importance of the use of imagery by the patient (Wilkins, 1971). For example, imagery 
is not necessarily static according to each hierarchical stage, the image may evolve 
throughout therapy and other associations may come to the fore.  
Psychological therapies currently prevalent for alleviating distress in cancer 
patients include Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for cancer patients (e.g. Moorey 
& Greer, 2002) and Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). 
These will now be discussed in relation to how they approach imagery in therapy.  
4.3.2. Psychological therapies for cancer patients with imagery 
components.  
CBT is an approach which was developed by Beck (1976) and is a structured, 
collaborative short-term therapy which involves both behavioural (e.g. activity 
scheduling) and cognitive (e.g. monitoring automatic negative thoughts) techniques. 
CBT is focussed on addressing and managing specific problems rather than global 
issues (Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk, & Clark, 2002). In 1989 the first text describing a 
CBT intervention programme for cancer patients was published (Moorey & Greer, 
1989) which described the cognitive model of adjustment to cancer. The model, which 
is derived from Lazarus & Folkman’s conceptualisation of stress, appraisal and coping 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) described a series of negative consequences in relation to 
the diagnosis of cancer, where the experience of symptoms and treatment side-effects 
leads to changes in mental and physical abilities, changes in personal and social roles 
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and change in appearance which may lead to negative beliefs about the self, others and 
the world. Threats to the self vary according to the meaning associated with 
consequences of cancer. For example, a man to whom work is the most important thing 
in life, will appraise 3 months sick-leave as catastrophic, even if he is assured that the 
cancer is curable. Moorey & Greer (2002) explained that threats to the self can also be 
defined more generally as threats to the personal domain, which was defined by Beck 
(1976) as aspects of life such as friends, relatives, goals, possessions and values. 
Emotional responses to cancer can be conceived as interpretations of particular threats 
to the personal domain (Moorey & Greer, 2002). If an individual perceives danger or 
vulnerability, by appraising a situation as threatening to personal and social well being 
or feeling vulnerable based on the appraisal that the patient cannot deal with the threat, 
then anxiety will be the key emotional response. If an individual perceives that their 
personal domain has been unjustifiably attacked, then anger will be the key emotional 
response. Guilt arises from self-blame, where an individual is searching for meaning to 
explain their experience. Finally, sadness and depression result from a sense of loss 
from the personal domain, where loss covers a wide range of potential factors, including 
physical factors, such as loss of strength, mental factors, such as loss of concentration, 
or social factors such as loss of a valued role (e.g. mother, employee).  
The cognitive model of adjustment to cancer combines emotional responses 
resulting from differential appraisals of cancer into a model which includes a person’s 
pre-existing self-schema, their subsequent survival schema, cognitions, emotions and 
behavioural responses (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Cognitive model of adjustment to cancer. Reproduced from Moorey & 
Greer (2002, p 20) 
 
In summary, following the acceptance of cancer as a precipitator of significant 
psychological distress, the cognitive model of adjustment to cancer (Moorey & Greer, 
2002) proposed that negative appraisals and meanings that individuals assign to the 
cancer experience determines individual emotional and behavioural responses and 
subsequent adjustment.  
Within CBT for cancer patients, imagery has been described as part of an overall 
treatment package including exposure in imagination, image modification and guided 
imagery for cancer patients (see Moorey & Greer, 2002). As previously described, 
imaginal exposure is a direct technique focussed on negative imagery. Patients with 
aversions to treatment are asked to imagine, rather than experience “in vivo” the feared 
stimulus while relaxed so that they learn to control their anxiety. This is different from 
SD because the patient is required to imagine the feared scene in its entirety and not 
graded images of a feared scenario. Image modification was described by Moorey & 
Greer (2002) in the case of a woman with successfully treated sarcoma, who reported 
anxiety which was associated with images of herself as a child. At age 11, she had been 
seriously ill and felt helpless and dependent. Cancer had re-activated the memories of 
 116 
herself as a helpless invalid. In order to remind her that these were images from the past, 
and not facts about the present and future, the woman altered the image of herself as a 
child. Specifically, she imagined herself in hospital, putting on her clothes and leaving. 
This modification also represents a direct imagery technique focussed on negative 
imagery. Moorey & Greer (2002) suggested that images that are vivid and seem real can 
be modified by imagining them on a television screen and visualising the self watching 
them with friends or relatives. This helps reinforce the idea that they are mental 
constructs and not perceptions. Guided imagery has also been previously described  
within the context of CBT for cancer patients and involves creating an image in the 
mind’s eyes, for example, of the cancer being destroyed by the treatment and body’s 
defences (Simonton et al., 2000). Although research has supported the effectiveness of 
cognitive-behavioural based therapies in cancer patients (e.g. Edelman, Bell, & Kidman, 
1999; Osborn, Demoncada, & Feuerstein, 2006; Tatrow & Montgomery, 2006; 
Andrykowski & Manne, 2006) these studies do not assess the relative effectiveness of 
components of this therapy, including imagery components.  
In line with the framework described by Holmes et al (2007), other imagery-
related therapeutic techniques used with cancer patients include mindfulness based 
cognitive therapy which is an indirect technique addressing negative imagery. 
Individuals are taught to experience mental events (e.g. intrusive images) in a 
dispassionate way instead of reacting emotionally to them.  A systematic review of the 
literature applying mindfulness based stress reduction in cancer care (Smith, 
Richardson, Hoffman, & Pilkington, 2005) described 11 clinical trials of mindfulness 
therapy with cancer patients (both controlled and uncontrolled studies) and concluded 
that mindfulness based stress reduction has the potential to be a clinically valuable 
intervention for cancer patients to improve mood, sleep quality and reduction in stress.  
The main application of imagery techniques in therapy for cancer patients 
includes guided imagery and systematic desensitisation. The use of cognitive 
behavioural therapy and mindfulness based stress reduction also comprise components 
which target intrusive images. However, research investigating imagery in cancer 
patients has mainly focussed on the use of positive imagery with minor emphasis on 
negative imagery in the systematic desensitisation work of Morrow and colleagues (e.g. 
Morrow, 1986). So far, aside from work conducted by Brewin et al (1998a, 1998b) and 
the present thesis, the presence of negative imagery in cancer patients has remained 
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largely unexplored. As a consequence, there is no recent research systematically 
exploring the use of direct imagery techniques on negative imagery in cancer patients.  
4.4. Modular approaches to therapy  
A modular view of therapy suggests that having treatment components tailored 
to individual presentation rather than giving everyone the same overall treatment 
package may be beneficial (Brewin, 2006). Further, it has been argued that there is a 
lack of systematic research investigating mechanisms of change behind therapy for 
cancer (Gurevich et al., 2002). Awareness of specific risk and distress symptoms can 
provide a platform to explore personal meaning for cancer patients and decide which 
psychological processes are most challenging (White, 2004).  For example, mental 
imagery has been identified as a key component of anxiety that needs to be addressed in 
psychological therapy (Hirsch & Holmes, 2007), but studies of psychological 
intervention for cancer patients often fail to identify such components. Indeed, although 
stress response symptoms such as intrusive thoughts and images have been identified 
and linked to psychological distress in cancer patients, there is little systematic evidence 
for the benefit of interventions to treat stress response syndromes in cancer (Gurveich et 
al, 2002). There are some exceptions, for example a single-case study showed that a 
trauma focussed intervention successfully reduced PTSD symptoms in a 40-year old 
man, 3 years post-bone marrow transplantation for leukaemia (Duhamel et al., 2000). 
With research identifying cognitive processes associated with psychological distress in 
cancer patients (e.g. intrusive memories, White, 2004) research should take these into 
account when evaluating the effectiveness and applicability of psychological therapy for 
cancer patients.  
A recent meta-analysis of psychological treatments for PTSD (Bisson et al., 
2007) found that of five therapies assessed in randomised controlled designs, therapies 
targeted at specific traumatic memories and their meaning, rather than treatments which 
were not trauma-focussed had the most significant impact on PTSD symptoms, anxiety 
and depression. Other research specifically with cancer patients has also supported the 
specificity of therapy. In evaluating the effectiveness of expressing writing on intrusive 
thoughts in women with breast cancer (Zakowski, Ramati, Morton, Johnson, & 
Flanigan, 2004), it was concluded that psychological therapy for cancer patients should 
be tailor-made to individual needs. Further, a meta-analysis of psychosocial intervention 
components (Graves, 2003) suggested that interventions designed to include social 
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cognitive theory components (e.g. self-efficacy, outcome expectations and self-
regulation) produced larger effect sizes than interventions lacking those components. 
Little is known about the therapeutic processes contributing to the effectiveness of 
psychological interventions for cancer patients (Andersen, Shelby, & Golden-Kreutz, 
2007) and evaluating mechanisms of change is important for a number of reasons. 
Information can help in choosing appropriate interventions, providing explanations for 
the success or failure of therapy, identifying treatment moderators and enhancing the 
translation of tested therapies to clinical practice (Kazdin, 2006). By choosing strategies 
that are most responsible for change, there will be increased efficiency, effect sizes and 
maintenance of intervention effects for patients (Andersen et al, 2007).  
A model that may be useful in conceptualising mechanisms of change in therapy 
is the retrieval competition account of CBT (Brewin, 2006). This account suggests that 
different therapies may work on the same principle, and that discipline-specific 
strategies such as logical reasoning (cognitive therapy) and associative learning 
(behaviour therapy), result in the same process, where an alternative and positive 
representation is created which is potent enough to compete with negative 
representations for attention at the crucial time of retrieval. Using behaviour therapy as 
an example, and specifically the extinction of fear, Brewin (2006) cited evidence that 
fear is not unlearned through exposure but rather extinction involves learning a lack of 
association in a new context. There are several implications of this account in terms of 
the success of psychological therapy, including the possibility that simply teaching 
individuals methods of personally disengaging attention from negative representations 
has the same effect on reducing negative symptoms as more elaborate and indirect 
techniques (Brewin, 2006, p 778).  
Specifically, it was suggested that in order for modular therapy to be successful, 
processes meeting the following criteria should be focus; a) they are a common feature 
of the disorder, b) they have been shown empirically to be critical in mediating or 
maintaining the disorder and c) they are amenable to direct modification (Brewin, 
2006). Modular therapy fits with the law of parsimony (Ockham’s razor) which argues 
that if you explain something adequately without introducing further complexity, then 
the simple explanation is the best explanation (Warburton, 2000). Modular therapy also 
fits with the principles of a transdiagnostic approach to clinical disorders, by identifying 
modifiable, common processes underlying emotional distress. The key question when 
assessing the applicability of therapy to emotional distress may thus focus on which 
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processes meet the three criteria described above. Once processes have been identified, 
specific therapeutic techniques can be applied. 
Intrusive imagery was identified in Study 1 and Study 2 as a cognitive process 
associated with psychological distress and maladaptive adjustment in cancer patients. 
Intrusive images meet the criteria proposed above because they are a common feature of 
anxiety and depression (Holmes et al, 2007), have a causal role in the maintenance of 
anxiety and PTSD (Hirsch et al, 2004; Jones et al, 2007) and are amenable to direct 
modification. Of the above techniques utilising imagery in therapy, imagery rescripting 
has recently received considerable attention (see Holmes et al, 2007 for a review). 
Imagery rescripting will now be described and recent empirical evidence supporting its 
effectiveness will be presented.  
4.5. Imagery rescripting therapy 
Although the earliest form of imagery rescripting was described in 1889 as 
imagery substitution by Janet (Van Der Kolk & Van Der Hart, 1989), imagery 
rescripting was more recently presented as a treatment of PTSD for survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse (Smucker, Dancu, Foa, & Niederee, 1995; Arntz & Weertman, 
1999). The technique involves a combination of imaginal exposure (deliberately 
recalling the intrusive imagery) followed by imagery rescripting (modifying the 
negative imagery to produce a positive outcome). For survivors of childhood sexual 
abuse, patients are required to evoke the negative image and whilst visualising the 
intrusive imagery, the patient is encouraged to develop a new scenario to replace the 
negative scene, where the patient as an adult interrupts the abuse, “rescues” the child, 
and provides protection and nurturance. Smucker et al (1995) found the treatment to be 
extremely effective; at 3 month and 6 month follow-up, no patients met criteria for 
PTSD and patients reported enhanced feelings of control, less self-blame and a greater 
capacity to assign responsibility to the perpetrator. 
 In addition to the treatment of traumatic childhood memories, imagery 
rescripting has been described in other populations of patients including patients 
experiencing posttraumatic symptoms as a result of motor vehicle accidents, epileptic 
seizures and industrial accidents (Rusch, Grunert, Mendelsohn, & Smucker, 2000), 
bulimia (Ohanian, 2002) and patients suffering from PTSD as a result of industrial 
accidents (Grunert, Smucker, Weis, & Rusch, 2003). The above studies reported a 
positive and rapid improvement in patients distress associated with intrusive imagery 
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(Rusch et al., 2000), maladaptive behaviour (Ohanian, 2002), depression, anxiety, 
intrusion and avoidance on the Impact of Events Scale (IES) and subjective distress 
(Grunert et al, 2003). One study found that imagery rescripting therapy was so 
powerful, that it was effective in only one session (Rusch et al, 2000).  
 Significant progress in the use of imagery rescripting in therapy has been made 
and the special issue “Imagery Rescripting in Cognitive Behaviour Therapy: Images, 
Treatment, Techniques and Outcomes” presented a series of papers reporting intrusive 
imagery in a range of disorders including social phobia (Stopa & Jenkins, 2007), OCD 
(Rachman, 2007; Speckens et al., 2007), suicidality (Holmes, Crane, Fennell, & 
Williams, 2007) and bulimia (Somerville, Cooper, & Hackmann, 2007). Beyond studies 
exploring the frequency and nature of intrusive imagery in various patient groups, the 
special issue extends the literature on the clinical application of using imagery in 
therapy for patients with social phobia (Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2007), PTSD (Arntz 
et al., 2007; Grunert, Weis, Smucker, & Christianson, 2007) snake phobia (Hunt & 
Fenton, 2007) and depression (Wheatley et al, 2007).   
 Wild et al (2007) described the use of imagery rescripting for 14 patients with 
social phobia. After assessing the content and meaning (including associated memories) 
of negative intrusive images, cognitive restructuring was employed to verbally 
challenge beliefs associated with the image (e.g. “I am ugly”) and rescripting was 
subsequently used to help view the negative imagery from different perspectives in 
order to update the patient’s understanding of the image. Rescripting was conducted in 
three phases; the first stage involved reliving the memory at the age it happened, in the 
second stage the patient relived the memory at their current age, watching what 
happened to their younger self and in the third phase, the patient relived the memory 
again from the perspective of their younger self with their adult self in the room 
intervening (Wild et al., 2007). At this point the younger self is asked what they need to 
happen in the image in order to feel better and then imagine this happening. One case 
study was of a patient who had a recurrent image of himself looking extremely self-
conscious, with a red face and big ears. The image was related to a memory of being 
humiliated by a friend at a party. In the imaginal rescripting, the patient intervened in 
the party scene, telling his friend to leave his younger self alone. He also chose to 
introduce friends and family into the image and confronted the bullies with their 
support. Wild et al (2007) found that within a single imagery rescripting session, 
patients rated their beliefs associated with the image as significantly weaker and the 
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images were significantly less distressing and vivid. One week later, patients still rated 
their images as less distressing (although not less vivid) and patients reported 
significantly fewer negative social concerns in the previous week (e.g. “I am weird”). 
Following imagery rescripting patients also showed significantly lower scores on a 
measure assessing the severity of components of social phobia, including anxious affect. 
Further evidence for the success of imagery rescripting in social phobia was provided in 
a controlled study, where the control group showed no significant changes and the 
experimental group showed significant improvements in negative beliefs, image and 
memory distress and vividness, fear of negative evaluation and anxiety in feared social 
situations (Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2008).   
 Arntz et al (2007) compared the use of imaginal exposure with and without 
imagery rescripting in a sample of 67 patients with posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). Imaginal exposure alone involves recalling the details of a traumatic event in 
the present tense while focussing on accompanying emotions, thoughts and behaviours. 
At toxic moments during the trauma, patients are required to ‘rewind or hold’ an image 
to focus on the most anxiety provoking aspects of the trauma. Imaginal exposure with 
imagery rescripting introduces a new component to exposure in the 5th-10th session, 
where patients are asked to imagine how they wish they had reacted (Arntz et al, 2007). 
Although the combination group did not show higher reductions in PTSD severity 
compared to the imaginal exposure alone, patients in the combination group were 
significantly less likely to drop out of therapy and also showed greater reduction in 
variables such as anger, guilt and shame. After the trial Arntz et al (2007) asked 
therapists to complete an anonymous questionnaire about their preference for imaginal 
exposure alone or in combination with rescripting and it was found that therapists also 
found the combination therapy more acceptable. In conclusion, Arntz et al (2007) 
argued that adding rescripting to imaginal exposure may be more acceptable to patients 
and therapists whilst also leading to greater effects on non-fear problems such as anger 
and guilt.  
 Others have suggested that imagery rescripting may not only be beneficial as an 
adjunct therapy to exposure but as a stand-alone therapy for PTSD patients for whom 
prolonged exposure (PE) is unsuccessful (Grunert et al, 2007). Twenty-three 
participants with PTSD as a result of industrial accidents and for whom PE had failed 
participated in Imagery Rescripting and Reprocessing Therapy (IRRT). There were 
three stages of therapy; re-experiencing, mastery and consolidation. In the first stage, 
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patients were required to experience the trauma, including associated emotional and 
physical sensations. In the second stage, patients were encouraged to use mastery and 
adaptive imagery to develop an alternative visual representation of oneself as a 
competent survivor helping the “today-self” help the “traumatised-self” to cope with the 
trauma more effectively. The final stage, named “post-imagery re-processing” enabled 
further linguistic processing of the imagery session and consolidation of the alternative 
positive representation. Over the course of treatment, mean levels of avoidance, 
intrusions (measured by IES), depression and anxiety decreased following treatment and 
concentration levels (WAIS) improved. At the end of IRRT 18/23 (79%) of patients 
made a complete and sustained recovery.  
Imagery rescripting has also been investigated in the treatment of snake phobia 
by comparing 4 treatment groups; imaginal exposure, imagery rescripting, a 
combination of these or a relaxation control (Hunt & Fenton, 2007). Fifty-two 
individuals with snake phobia were allocated to the four treatment groups. The 
relaxation control group received minimal exposure (e.g. therapist approaching snake 
video) and relaxation technique training such as controlled breathing. The in vivo group 
were required to produce a hierarchy of fear and gradually be exposed to each level of 
fear by getting closer to the feared stimuli (a mature male bull python and a mature 
female corn snake). The imagery rescripting component required individuals to modify 
distorted beliefs about the snake through imagery (e.g. “imagine the snake with no teeth 
like an old man”).Hunt & Fenton (2007) found that imagery rescripting was as effective 
as in vivo exposure in reducing behavioural avoidance and fear of snakes.   
Finally, two single-case studies were presented of two clinically depressed 
patients receiving imagery rescripting therapy (Wheatley et al, 2007). Imagery 
rescripting was associated with a significant reduction in distress and it was suggested 
that imagery rescripting in depression may be a viable approach when patients report 
distressing intrusive memories. Imagery rescripting was a relatively short intervention, 
with improvements maintained at 1 year follow-up.  
One possible explanation for the success of imagery rescripting in reducing 
intrusion frequency and intrusion associated distress can be gleaned from the retrieval 
competition account of CBT (Brewin, 2006). Rather than imagery modification leading 
to direct changes to information represented in memory, Brewin (2006) proposed that 
imagery rescripting functions to increase the activation of positive rather than negative 
images. In therapy, this process involves creating a new but related memory or image to 
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have a positive outcome, and helping this representation to win the retrieval 
competition. According to this account, for the target representation to win over existing 
negative representations, it must be “positive, highly memorable and attention-grabbing 
in the presence of negative cues” (p777). In addition to the immediate positive effects 
on mood, Brewin (2006) argued that altering intrusive images and thoughts can reduce 
the troublesome representations being activated in the future.  
Holmes et al (2007) emphasised that imagery rescripting does not simply 
function by changing a negative image into a positive image. Modification of 
distressing imagery offers patients new perspectives on past events which elicit new 
feelings, identify unmet needs and encourage constructive processing of emotional 
material. Hackmann (1998) also emphasised that modifying intrusive imagery may 
operate on two levels, one encouraging cognitive change (i.e. changing the meaning of 
the content of the image) and one encouraging metacognitive change (i.e. change the 
meaning of having the image). For example, Hackmann (1998) described a case of a 
woman who had a repetitive image of her own gravestone and the happy faces of her 
husband and child when they visited it. During therapy, the woman pictured the 
negative image on a television screen and imagined herself alive and well. She then 
imagined turning off the television and driving away from the house. This changed her 
beliefs about the meaning of having the image, as she no longer felt it reflected her 
future but was only a product of her fearful imagination (Hackmann, 1998).  
Study 1 and Study 2 reported that anxious cancer patients experienced negative 
intrusive images which were associated with psychological distress and maladaptive 
adjustment. Intrusive imagery has been identified as a cognitive process that is 
amenable to direct modification, may have a causal role in psychological distress and is 
prevalent across anxiety and mood disorders. Imagery rescripting has proved an 
effective technique for alleviating distress across clinical groups (PTSD, depression, 
bulimia, snake phobia, social phobia). Therefore imagery rescripting targeted at 
reducing the frequency and negative properties of intrusive images may be an effective 
therapy for anxiety in cancer patients.   
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In Chapter 4, the use of imagery in psychological therapy was discussed and the 
possibility of using imagery rescripting for cancer patients reporting intrusive imagery 
was raised. The following chapter describes a series of single-case studies aimed at 
piloting the use of this short therapy for anxiety in a new patient group. Before 
describing the case studies, the utility of using single-case studies for assessing 
psychological interventions is addressed. 
5.1. Single-case studies 
5.1.1. Single-case design 
Single-case experimental design provides a methodology for studying behaviour 
change in individuals (Hersen & Barlow, 1978). Following an initial period of baseline 
observation (A phase) the treatment approach is introduced (B phase) and the selected 
target behaviour is continually monitored via behavioural, subjective (e.g. self-report) or 
physiological indices of improvement. The baseline phase of single-case design serves 
two fundamental purposes, to describe the current level of behaviour and to predict what 
the behaviour would be like in the future if no intervention was introduced (Kazdin, 
1982). Once the initial baseline has been established and the specific treatment is 
introduced, a multitude of variations on the AB design can be implemented (Hersen & 
Barlow, 1978).  
Aldridge (1991) argued that the prime feature of the single-case design is that they 
are feasible. The approach is cost-effective and practical as the problems of finding 
large groups of patients are avoided. Further, the design approach is flexible and allows 
for varying levels of scientific rigour (Aldridge, 1991). Single-case designs are also 
noted for providing clinical rather than statistical significance (Hersen & Barlow, 1978; 
Kazdin, 1982) which is important in therapeutic research as statistical significance can 
lead to overestimation of  treatment success (e.g. patients are less depressed but are still 
suicidal) and underestimation (e.g. some individuals in experimental group improved 
drastically but some  do not improve or get worse and thus any effect is cancelled out in 
comparison to a control group). Single-case studies thus have the benefit of focussing 
on individuals and obtaining more detailed information to help identify those for whom 
treatment is not working (Hersen & Barlow, 1978). Further, focussing on the individual 
removes problems with inter-participant variability (Hersen & Barlow, 1978). For 
example, although methodologically sound randomised controlled trials (RCTs) aim to 
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control for possible confounding factors such as age, there are several inter-individual 
factors which still vary and are beyond control, such as compliance with treatment and 
comorbidity (Kazdin, 2001). Kazdin (2001) also suggested that the continual 
assessment of outcome measures of the targeted behaviour throughout treatment and 
follow-up provides important feedback about the success of the treatment that pre-post 
treatment assessment of group designs does not allow.  
Some suggest that single-case studies are a useful pre-cursor to costly RCTs, for 
example, Gedo (1999) concluded that “perhaps in order to understand the general 
case, we first need a more thorough and subtle understanding of the single-case” (p 
278). Single-case studies also suit a cyclical approach to research (Barkham & Mellor-
Clark, 2003),  as it has been recognised that single-case design can be implemented 
following large scale studies identifying a particular area requiring more in depth 
investigation (Gedo, 1999). Following queries and amendments arising from single-case 
design, the treatment approach could once again be subjected to large-scale research 
designs such as RCTs.  
One of the major criticisms levelled at single-case design is the inability to 
generalise findings from individuals to other populations. In answer to this criticism 
single-case research designs do not claim to be generalisable to populations outside the 
study domain. Also, the use of multiple baseline designs can overcome the problem of 
applying general validity to a treatment (Aldridge, 1991). As long as clinicians follow a 
shared protocol, by targeting a specific behaviour, individual case studies can be 
analysed as a group and more information regarding the efficacy of treatment can be 
gleaned. 
Another issue that is central to the usefulness of single-case design is that 
measurement of change must be carefully considered  For example, self-report measures 
of the experience of imagery rely on self-monitoring which can be unreliable (Hersen &  
Barlow, 1978) and the manner in which the outcome measure is assessed should be 
replicable. 
5.1.2. Clinical significance  
The clinical significance of a treatment refers to whether the change in a specific 
outcome measure makes any real difference in the everyday life of the client (Kazdin, 
1999), and whether the treatment has met standards of usefulness set by clinicians, 
researchers and consumers (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Although it is unclear what the 
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standards should be, various suggestions have been made, including a) a high 
percentage of clients improving, b) a level of change recognisable by family or 
friends/the individual/the therapist, c) an elimination of the presenting difficulty and d) 
normative levels of functioning by the end of treatment (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). 
Clinical significance has been broadly defined as “returning to normal functioning” 
(Jacobson, Roberts, Berns, & McGlinchey, 1999, p 300). Statistical indices have been 
developed in order to ascertain whether the amount of change from outside the normal 
range towards the normal range for individuals is large enough to be considered 
meaningful (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Clinically significant change can be calculated 
in three ways (Jacobson & Truax, 1991); a) the level of functioning post-treatment falls 
outside the range of the dysfunctional population, where range is considered within 2 
standard deviations (in direction of functionality) of the mean of that population, a=M 
of dysfunctional population- 2SD of dysfunctional population  b) the level of 
functioning post-treatment falls within the range of the functional population, where 
range is considered within 2 standard deviations of the mean of that population, b=M of 
functional population + 2SD of functional population and c) the level of functioning 
post-treatment is closer to the mean of the functional population compared to the mean 
of the dysfunctional population. This cut off score is calculated using the following 
equation (Jacobson & Truax, 1991): 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge of the functional and non-functional norms is required, which may 
be problematic because this information is not always available. The preferable method 
of establishing clinical significance via the cut-offs stipulated above varies according to 
individual studies and the availability of normative data for outcome measures in 
functional and dysfunctional populations (Jacobson et al, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
c = (SD of functional pop x M of dysfunctional pop) + (SD of dysfunctional pop x M of functional pop) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
SD of functional pop + SD of dysfunctional pop 
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5.1.3. Reliable change  
 Jacobson and colleagues recognised that although clinical significance is a 
useful assessment of whether patients are returning to normal functioning, a second 
criterion is required to establish a reliable clinically significant effect of treatment. To 
determine whether the amount of change observed between pre and post-treatment is 
statistically reliable, Jacobson and colleagues developed the reliable change index (RCI; 
Jacobson, Folette, & Revenstorf, 1984). The formula (see Table 17) ascertains not only 
whether specific outcome measures have changed post-therapy but precisely how much 
change has occurred and whether this is greater than the change that would be expected 
to occur due to unreliability in the outcome measure (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). The 
RCI is a z score, with a score greater than 1.96 indicating reliable change (Jacobson & 
Truax, 1991).  
Table 17 Calculating Reliable Change Index 
Statistical measure Calculation 
Standard error  (SE) SD of functional population√ 1- Reliability 
Standard difference 
(Sdiff) 
√2(SE)2 
Reliable change (RC) Post intervention score – Pre-intervention score 
Sdiff 
 
The RCI allows more precise evaluation of the efficacy of treatment than clinical 
significance alone (Jacobson et al, 1999) and should not be confused as simply another 
method for determining clinical significance (Jacobson et al, 1999). This is because if a 
client’s change post-treatment is reliable but the patient remains within the range of the 
dysfunctional population the patient is deemed to have “improved but not recovered”, 
whilst if the patient’s change on a specific outcome measure is reliable and within the 
range of the functional population, the patient is considered to have “recovered.”  
 
In summary, based on the finding that anxious cancer patients experienced vivid 
and uncontrollable intrusive imagery, it is important to investigate whether imagery 
rescripting therapy can be applied to cancer patients. This is the first time imagery 
rescripting has been investigated in this sample.   
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5.2. Study 3  
Key research questions included: 
1. Can the frequency, interference, vividness, uncontrollability and distress 
associated with intrusive images be reduced by individual rescripting of the 
image? 
2. Does imagery rescripting lead to a decrease in anxiety and depression? 
5.2.1. Aims and hypotheses  
It was predicted that imagery rescripting would reduce the frequency, interference, 
vividness and distress associated with intrusive imagery and increase the controllability 
of intrusive imagery and it was predicted that imagery rescripting would lead to a 
reduction in anxiety and depression levels. It was also expected that the positive 
outcomes associated with imagery rescripting would remain at 3 month and 6 month 
follow-up. 
5.2.2. Method 
I. Participants 
A series of single-case studies were conducted from people reporting intrusive 
imagery in the interview study discussed in Chapter 3. To be invited to take part in 
imagery rescripting, patients had to score above cut-off for anxiety on the HADS (=>8) 
and report frequent (defined as occurring more than half the time in the past week) 
distressing images or memories. They were also required not to be receiving any other 
one-to-one support. Eleven patients met the above criteria and were invited to take part 
in imagery rescripting therapy. The uptake rate was 18%, with 2 patients consenting to 
and completing therapy.  
Of the nine patients who did not take up imagery rescripting therapy, one patient 
withdrew due to work commitments, two patients did not reply to the invitation, two 
wanted to stay with their current counsellor and four expressed that they did not want to 
remove the intrusions. For example, one patient described how she would prefer to 
continue trying to ignore the intrusions and another patient expressed concern that if he 
were to face his intrusions, they would get worse, not better. The two patients who 
participated in imagery rescripting therapy did not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD 
measured by the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptom Scale (PSS-I; Foa et al., 
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1993). The names of the patients have been changed in order to protect patient 
confidentiality.   
II. Materials  
Patients were selected based on their involvement in Study 2 and thus 
information on the initial intrusive cognitions interview and related materials can be 
found in Chapter 3. This section will include detail of materials used during the imagery 
rescripting sessions.  
 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
 PTSD was assessed with the PTSD Symptom Scale-Interview Version (PSS-I; 
Foa et al., 1993), a 17-item scale corresponding to symptoms of PTSD including re-
experiencing, avoidance and arousal. Each item is rated for severity on a 4 point scale (0 
= not at all, 1 = once per week or less, 2 = 2-4 times per week and 3 = 5 or more times 
per week. The PSS-I shows good internal consistency, test re-test reliability, inter-rater 
reliability and high sensitivity (Foa et al, 1993). 
 Anxiety & Depression 
Anxiety and depression were assessed using the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV (SCID: First et al., 2002) and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). The HADS scale has been described in detail 
elsewhere (p 47).   
 Frequency and nature of intrusive cognitions 
 Five Likert scales were used to assess the frequency (0 = none of the time, 100 = 
all the time), interference (0 =not at all, 100 = severely), uncontrollability (0 = not at 
all, 100 = completely), distress (0 = not at all, 100 = severely) and vividness (0 = hazy 
memory, 100 = clearest and vividest memory) associated with intrusive imagery. The 
scales were based on questions from the interview schedule described in Chapter 2, 
which asked about the frequency and nature of intrusive cognitions.   
 Distress associated with intrusive cognitions 
The IES (Horowitz et al., 1979) is a 15-item self-report scale which examines 
subjective distress as a result of a specific event. The IES is made up of two sub-scales 
of intrusion and avoidance. The IES was used to measure intrusion and avoidance 
associated with intrusive imagery.  
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III. Procedure 
Patients were initially monitored over a baseline period of 3 weeks to ensure that 
symptoms were stable, and treatment progress was assessed with weekly administration 
of the HADS and weekly ratings of intrusive memories. Following Wheatley et al 
(2007) and due to high inter-correlations between the five scales, ratings were summed 
to provide a single measure of intrusive memories. Emotion ratings associated with the 
intrusive memories were collected at various points throughout the imagery rescripting 
sessions.  
The treatment protocol was based on previous work of Wheatley et al (2007) 
and following the imagery rescripting treatment manual (Wheatley & Brewin, 2005). 
The intervention took between 3 and 7 hour-long sessions and intrusion and affect were 
measured continuously throughout this period. The main aim of imagery rescripting was 
to encourage cognitive (changing the meaning of the imagery) and metacognitive 
(changing beliefs about the image) change by intervening with mental phenomena that 
maintain distress (Wheatley & Brewin, 2005). This was attained by encouraging the 
patient to construct a competing image which has strong associations with the negative 
image, is easier to remember and retrieve and involves positive rather than negative 
affect. In session 1, patients were given a rationale for working with negative imagery.  
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Table 18 Rationale for imagery rescripting therapy (from Wheatley & Brewin, 
2005).  
 
 
“Intrusive visual memories are very common.  Sometimes these can be very pleasant, 
such as images of a special day we remember well.  When we recall that day we might 
recall smells and sensations as well as mental pictures.  However when bad things 
happen we may be left with distressing images and memories that haunt us and colour 
our present.  Sometimes these distressing memories reflect negative, self-defining 
moments that are stored with the meanings they had at the time of the event and without 
a time code.  It can feel almost as if the past event is happening all over again, and it is 
not unusual for people to feel emotions or even physical sensations that they had at the 
time.  These memories need to be updated, and need to find their proper place amongst 
your other memories.  The best way to do this is to access and reflect on the contents of 
these distressing fragments of memory.  The meanings of the memory can then be 
carefully thought about, and it may be that some of them are distorted or out of date.  If 
we decide that this is the case we can then change the images/memories in various ways 
using creative imagery. 
A common response to distressing visual images is to avoid them or to block them out 
in some way.  This is understandable, especially if you experience similar emotions or 
sensations to those you experienced at the time of the original event. Some common 
ways to try and block things out are cleaning excessively, drinking alcohol or avoiding 
people or places that remind us of past events.  Rather than try to avoid the memory you 
need to bring it into awareness and learn how to respond to it.  Instead of having the 
memory lurking in the shadows, we need to bring it into the light where we can see it.  
Its important to note that we are not trying to get rid of these distressing memories or 
erase them from your mind, we are trying to learn new ways of responding to them so 
that they don’t cause you so much distress.” 
 
Patients were also given personalised case formulations, devised to aid 
understanding of the mechanisms behind intrusive imagery (e.g. how images may lead 
anxiety). See Figure 3 for a generic example of case formulation.  
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Activation of visual memory network (b)
Negative beliefs about self, others and world (c)
Experiences of images as uncontrollable (d)
DEPRESSION/ANXIETY
a) Trigger: Negative thoughts, emotions, rumination, 
environmental cues such as row with partner, TV shows, 
places associated with a lost loved one
b) Activation: Visual, verbal, emotional, kinaesthetic, olfactory 
images ‘Ghosts from the past’ 
c) Enduring beliefs of worthlessness, hopelessness, etc
d) Experience of intrusive memories as uncontrollable, and a 
sign of madness or weakness
TRIGGER (a)
 
Figure 3 Case formulation given to participants in Session 1.  
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Following rationale and case formulation, patients were encouraged to develop a 
positive image of a ‘safe place’ (e.g. a beach), in case they felt overwhelmed by the 
negative imagery. Patients were then required to describe intrusive images in detail. The 
therapist helped cue the intrusive imagery using specific trigger questions. Patients were 
also helped to identify potential triggers, associated emotions, meaning and possible 
avoidant behaviours. At the end of the first session patients were encouraged to think of 
the possibility of modifying the negative images. Examples of trigger questions used in 
therapy are presented in Table 19.  
Table 19 Imagery Rescripting trigger questions  
To bring image 
online 
• Can you describe what you see in your mind’s eye?  
• Where are you in the image? What do you look like? 
• What/who else is there? 
Other sensory 
modalities 
 
• Can you hear anything? Apart from your own voice? 
• Breathe in and tell me what you smell in the image. 
• Can you taste anything in the image? 
Perspective • Can you see yourself in the image?  
• Are you on the outside looking in or are you looking out 
from behind your own eyes?  
Associated 
emotions/triggers  
• What types of emotions are brought up by this image? 
• How intense are these feelings from 0-100? 
• What were you doing, thinking or feeling immediately 
before you had the intrusive image? 
Meaning  • What does the image say about you/others/the world? 
• What is the worst thing in the image? (e.g. its 
intrusiveness, content, the way it makes you feel) 
Avoidance  • Are you aware of actively suppressing or avoiding images 
when they occur? 
• What are you afraid might happen if you do not push it 
away?  
Considering 
transformation  
• How do you need to feel when you have this intrusive 
image? In control? Protected? 
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In session 2, patients were required to bring intrusive imagery into awareness in 
the same way as in Session 1. Following imagery exposure, the possibility of image 
modification was approached and the following sessions involved coming up with a 
detailed alternative to the negative image. Transformation of negative imagery was 
encouraged by asking patients to change the perspective of the image (e.g. “Imagine 
yourself looking at the image as though it is on a television, then switching it off or 
making it smaller or dimmer.”), change its physical features (e.g. “Can you make things 
bigger/smaller?”) or prevent the image from freezing at the worst point (e.g. “What 
would happen if you allowed the image to continue?”) Other options included changing 
personal characteristics (e.g. making self stronger), or making themselves feel safe. 
Patients were also encouraged to introduce new information into the image, for 
example, themselves or someone else entering the image. At the end of transformation 
sessions, patients were debriefed by asking what it was like for them to transform the 
image. Once one image had been dealt with, new images were addressed in an identical 
way. For case 1, Sessions 4-7 involved fine tuning alternative images via rehearsal until 
the patient was happy with them. Consolidation was the final step in imagery rescripting 
and required patients to consider how new images were beneficial and what they meant 
about the self/others the world and the future. 
IV. Supervision 
 All sessions were conducted at the Royal Marsden NHS Foundation 
Trust by Katriina Whitaker (doctoral student). On site clinical supervision was provided 
by Dr Maggie Watson. Before commencing therapy, Katriina attended an imagery 
workshop conducted by Professor Chris Brewin and Dr Jon Wheatley. Katriina also 
attended several sessions of supervision at University College London (UCL) in 
preparation for conducting imagery rescripting therapy. These included listening to 
taped sessions of imagery rescripting with depressed patients (Wheatley et al, 2007) and 
discussing the treatment manual with Chris Brewin and Jon Wheatley. All therapeutic 
sessions were audiotaped to ensure adherence to the treatment manual. Weekly 
supervision was provided at UCL with Chris Brewin.  
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5.2.3. Case 1- John  
I. Background information 
John was 52, a former brick layer and had been diagnosed with multiple 
myeloma on 18th July 2006. Multiple myeloma is an incurable cancer of plasma cells 
which is associated with back pain as it affects the bones of the spine. John had 
experienced loss of height due to his myeloma. Other symptoms include excessive 
tiredness and lethargy, repeated colds, coughs and infections due to a shortage of 
normal antibodies, loss of appetite and unexplained bruising. John presented with high 
depression and anxiety scores on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (11 and 16 
respectively) and he met full criteria for current major depressive episode, with 
numerous previous episodes, and also met criteria for current Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder. When asked whether his cancer diagnosis was involved in the reported 
symptoms, John reported that he had a history of anxiety and depression and a 
combination of factors were contributing to him feeling this way, including the cancer 
diagnosis.  
For John, feelings evoked since being diagnosed with cancer had triggered off 
memories from the past including distressing flashbacks where he felt frightened or 
vulnerable and also where he had acted like a bully. Moorey & Greer (2002) suggested 
that the personal meaning attached to illness and its consequences determines the 
adjustment to cancer and these personal meanings are shaped by an individual’s core 
beliefs and cognitive rules and assumptions about the self, the world and others as well 
as their beliefs and assumptions about illness and death. Figure 4 demonstrates John’s 
schema, appraisals, cognitions, emotions and behaviour associated with the cancer 
diagnosis. 
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Survival schema
-View of cancer as debilitating.
-View of cancer as destroying 
physical strength (lost several inches 
in height due to spinal cord 
compression). 
-Hopeless about the future.
Cognitions
-I feel vulnerable in social situations
-I’m weak
-I’m worthless
-Images of self in humiliating situations were being 
bullied/bullying others
Emotion and Physiology
-Frightened/panicked -Muscular tension
-Angry -Breathlessness
-Humiliated -Heart racing
-Worthless -Unsteady/shaky
-Low mood -Hot/cold sweats
-Anxious -Flushed
-Dizzy
Confirmation
-Avoiding contact with people and thus 
confirm feelings of worthlessness/
helplessness.
-Constant reliving of emotional and 
physical feelings felt during specific 
negative events in the past, experienced as 
intrusive memories in the present. 
Behaviour
-Avoiding social situations
-Avoiding people
-Avoiding places that are 
associated with intrusive 
memories
Self schema
-View of the self as weak & worthless. 
-View of the world as an extremely 
negative and dangerous place.
-View of other people as threatening. 
 
Figure 4 The cognitive model of adjustment to cancer applied to John (from 
Moorey & Greer, 2002).  
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5.2.4. Case 1- Treatment overview 
I. Session 1 
The first intrusive memory that John reported was of an incident that had 
happened 3 years previously, when he was working as a bricklayer for a small firm. The 
memory that kept coming back involved his boss coming over to the area where he was 
working and criticising his work, getting more and more aggressive, belittling his work 
and saying he didn’t want him there. John was finishing the job that day and asked for 
the money he was owed for 3 days work but his boss refused to pay him. John kept 
reliving the memory, wishing that rather than walk away from the situation he had stood 
up for himself and confronted his boss, by using violence and not being such a coward. 
John reported feeling 100% anger, 100% worthlessness, 100% humiliation and the 
memory was associated with physical feelings of panic, for example, heart beating 
faster, difficulty breathing and tenseness in forehead and chest. John was trying to avoid 
thinking about the intrusive memory, or would try to pinch himself to stop himself from 
thinking about it.  
At the end of session 1, the notion of rescripting the image was introduced and 
some possible ideas were discussed. John felt that he wanted his boss to be humiliated 
in the image, rather than him. The session ended with John thinking about how he could 
create an alternative image, which would make him feel less angry, humiliated and 
worthless. By the end of the first session, John reported that he already felt less foolish, 
as it was the first time he had spoken about the memory. He said that the memory was 
not as intense as it initially was and two emotion ratings had reduced slightly; 65% 
worthlessness, 80% humiliation. Anger remained at 100%.  
II. Session 2 
At the beginning of session 2, emotion ratings were 70% anger, 50% humiliation 
and 50% worthlessness in relation to the intrusive memory at work.  John realised that 
he didn’t want to hurt his boss in the image and he had conflicting emotions about being 
a coward and being a bully. When asked what needed to change in the image for him to 
feel better, John described how he would like to be in control by being more laid back 
and finding the situation amusing rather than humiliating. John began rescripting the 
image by imagining his boss as an exaggerated character, breathing heavily and puffing 
out, with steam coming out of his ears. John decided that his boss seemed as though he 
was going to explode and he could imagine him like a balloon, becoming bigger and 
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bigger until he burst. John felt that an image of his boss bursting with air was amusing 
and made him feel better about the situation. John also spontaneously imagined his boss 
spinning out of control, so that he was drilling down into the ground. Then, as his boss 
approached him, he would start filling with air, his eyes very large and his cheeks blown 
out and John said “it made me realise, he was just as desperate as I was.” By the end of 
session 2, John felt less than 50% anger, 50% humiliation and 50% worthlessness in 
relation to the memory.  
III. Session 3 
At the beginning of session 3, emotion ratings were 30% anger, 30% humiliated 
and 30% worthlessness. John also reported feeling 30% happiness in response to the 
alternative image. John reported that the frequency of intrusive memories in general (i.e. 
not just the intrusive memory described so far) was greatly reduced and he felt more 
relaxed and fewer physical sensations in relation to the intrusive memory. John had 
developed the intrusive memory further so that he imagined his boss as a toy soldier, in 
a marching pose, marching towards him. Instead of blowing up like a balloon, his boss’s 
head starts spinning round and round, with steam coming out of his ears. He is wearing 
a military uniform and his face is painted like a puppet with red rouge on his cheeks, a 
jutting chin and painted red lips. Whilst describing the uniform, John experimented with 
the uniform his boss was wearing, changing it to a pink colour and then changing it to a 
floral dress with builder’s boots and a grey jumper. John pictured himself laughing at 
his boss, who moved towards him with a powerful jet of stream coming out of his nose 
and ears, spinning out of control. By the end of the session, John reported that he felt 
happier with the image, less tense in his chest and amused by the memory rather than 
afraid of it. 
IV. Session 4  
In Session 4, John reported that he was having a number of different memories 
and therefore in order to deal with them he was using a calming image of a waterfall. It 
was explained that although using a general positive image such as a waterfall may be 
useful as a distraction technique, it does not have the same impact as transforming 
individual images. The rationale for rescripting was discussed again. In addition to 
using the calming theme, John reported that he was still using an alternative image of 
the scene with his boss and now his boss was a clown figure, still with large boots and 
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red rouge on his cheeks. Emotion ratings in relation to the first memory were 50% 
anger, 40% worthlessness and 30% helplessness.  
John reported another intrusive memory of a scene in a shopping centre, where 
he had punched a man in the face and knocked him to the ground because he felt 
threatened by him.  John had a clear image of people standing around looking at him 
following the attack, with accusing faces. He talked about how the image encapsulated 
how he feels about his life, that he is a bully but feels bullied, that he feels complete 
frustration because people do not understand him and do not know the whole story 
before making a judgement. John felt frightened by the man in this second image, and 
felt that he hit him in self-defence. The emotions he associated with the shopping centre 
image were guilt (80%), sadness (80%) and frustration (80%). John suggested that he 
wanted to feel less guilty in the image and to feel that the man wasn’t hurt and would be 
ok.  
When initially trying to rescript the image, John decided he didn’t want to hit the 
man in the image, and following his provocation, he apologises and smiles and the man 
smiles back and John sees the man walking away, smiling. John described how it 
wanted to become more of a “middle man” in the images, and to react better than he did 
at the time. He talked again about how he switches from being a frightened, bullied boy 
or a huge powerful bully. He touched on the fact he has other memories from childhood 
of his father beating him, but they were too disturbing to talk about. John left the 
session with the second transformation in mind, with homework to use the alternative 
images when either of the two distressing memories arose.  
(Note: In session 4, overall intrusion score reaches highest point (42/100, compared to 
82/100 originally). This also corresponds to an increase in anxiety and depression. (see 
peaks on figures 1 & 2).  
V. Session 5  
At the beginning of session 5, John reported that the images were even less 
frequent. He also reported a third image, which involved another incident where he had 
been violent towards another man. In terms of the second image of the shopping centre, 
John reported that his guilt, sadness, rejection and frustration associated with the image 
had dropped to 10%. For the first image at work, the clown transformation was vivid 
and he had elaborated the image so that his boss was wearing a one piece clown suit, 
with yellow dots and red shoes. He described the clown as a “harmless figure”.  
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In session 5, John started to talk about transforming his third most prominent 
intrusive memory, which was where he had been drunk in a pub and attacked a man for 
making racist comments about English people. He regretted hitting the man, and wanted 
to feel less guilty in the image. John talked about wanting to shake the man’s hand in 
the image, instead of fighting.   
Although John had grasped the idea of imagery rescripting, he was creating 
rescripts which tried to prevent the negative event from happening at all. When probed 
whether this was completely successful, John admitted that he was finding it difficult to 
wipe away the memories. The therapist considered that John was reverting back to an 
avoidance strategy. In addition to this, John was also not willing to talk about other 
intrusive distressing memories because he had never talked to anyone about them before 
and he was worried about “opening a can of worms”. John was reassured that he would 
only be asked to talk about memories that he was happy to discuss and there was 
another possibility for rescripting that we had not yet discussed.  
Based on previous work conducted by Lee (2005) and described in Compassion 
by Paul Gilbert (Lee, 2005), the therapist introduced the idea of a Perfect Nurturer to 
John, someone that could enter the various images and change the meaning of the 
image. When asked what his perfect nurturer would be like, John found it easy to 
conjure up an image of a religious figure, an angel which was devoid of aggression and 
nastiness and full of understanding and forgiveness. The rest of session 5 was used to 
develop a full image of a perfect nurturer figure and John’s homework was to 
consolidate the image and to consider how he would apply it to the current intrusive 
memories he was willing to discuss. 
VI. Session 6  
At the beginning of session 6, John described the image he had come up with of 
his Perfect Nurturer (see Table 20). 
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Table 20 Description of Perfect Nurturer (John) 
Compassionate image: Perfect nurturer. Description of attributes, physical appearance, 
qualities. 
“It’s an angel, it hasn’t even got features, I just know its there, it’s a human form, with 
very bright white light. I have a very strong sense of what is it, I can’t describe it but I 
know what it is….its a protector, its very kind, devoid of aggression, nastiness……but  
very strong, a destructor of evil forces. I know it can do things, I get a sense when it 
arrives, it envelops me, protects me, I have total trust in it, it has the power to take away 
my anxiety and suffering…virtually nothing can destroy it.” 
As the patient was coming up with the image, he used an image of his Grandfather to 
help decide the characteristics he wanted the angel to have. His Grandfather was 
always firm but fair, warm and consistent. Patient wanted the PN to have these qualities 
too.  
Description of physical response associated with image 
“I’m aware I am carrying a lot of tension in my head and tightness in my chest, and it 
removes that accumulated stress over many years. The angel touches me on the head 
and I feel physical warmth go through my chest…….just a touch can take out this 
terrible anxiety, suffering, fear.” 
Description of emotional response associated with image  
“The image makes me feel as though I count, as though a lot of bad things aren’t 
necessarily my fault.” 
“Not nasty, somebody cares for me, protected. It knows every atom about me; it takes 
away my guilt, and offers me forgiveness.” 
Examples of what PN says 
The angel enters the images at stressful points and says “John, I understand, don’t 
worry”. The angel is kind and firm, “don’t be frightened, don’t worry, you are 
protected”. The angel is very powerful, a power beyond our understanding. 
“I understand, don’t hate yourself, this man will be ok. I’m here to protect you and this 
man. He won’t be damaged long-term.”  
“You’re not bad, you’re not a bad person, it’s not your fault” 
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In the session, John demonstrated that he had applied the PN to the three 
intrusive memories discussed in previous sessions. For the memory of his boss 
humiliating him at work, in addition to transforming the image so the boss is less 
threatening (by making him a clown with ridiculous features etc), the PN comes in at 
the end of the image and reassures John that he has done the right thing. The PN 
touches him on the forehead and takes away the residual fear and pain. For the shopping 
centre image, the PN comes in after John has punched the man and says “Don’t worry, I 
saw everything and I understand”. He also approaches the man on the floor and says 
“you are going to be ok”. For the people looking at John accusingly, the PN turns to 
them and says “you don’t understand the whole situation; this man was frightened and 
acted in self-defence”. The crowd then lose the look of accusation and the scene calms 
down. For the pub scene, following the dispute with the man at the bar, when the scene 
is at its most chaotic (i.e. 6 men have jumped on John to restrain him), the PN appears 
and everything stops, the image freezes. John was still working on this third image by 
the end of Session 6 so it was decided that Session 7 would be the consolidation and 
final session. 
VII. Session 7  
John reported that he had learnt to control his intrusive memories and was 
finding the PN image very helpful. He reported that he felt a lot less angry and less 
tormented by feelings of worthlessness and hopelessness. John reported that physical 
sensations had also reduced (e.g. heart racing, tenseness in forehead and chest) and he 
was more accepting of himself. John realised that he perhaps was a more placid and 
quiet person than he had believed and that his true personality was not of someone who 
liked conflict.  
John talked about how the PN accepted him totally and reassured him that he was 
not worthless but was in fact, valuable. His beliefs about himself had shifted so that he 
felt less worthless and his view of other people was that perhaps they are less 
judgemental than he had believed. John asserted that he realised that you can’t change 
people but you can change your reaction to other people.  
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5.2.5. Case 1- Outcome and Experience of Treatment 
The client’s raw data for anxiety, depression and intrusions are presented 
graphically in Figures 5 and 6.  John’s scores on the anxiety subscale of the HADS 
showed a decreasing trend, moving from the severely anxious to the mildly anxious 
range. As normative data for the dysfunctional population was not available, Jacobson 
& Truax’s (1991) method for establishing clinical significance using normative data 
from the functional population was utilised (see Table 21). Cut-off b is operationalised 
as the level of functioning subsequent to therapy falling within the range of the 
functional population, where range is defined as within two standard deviations of the 
mean of that population (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Once the cut-off has been 
calculated, it can be compared to the post treatment and follow-up scores to establish 
whether the change has reached clinical significance. Cut-off b for establishing clinical 
significance is sometimes considered too lenient when functional and dysfunctional 
populations overlap (Jacobson & Truax, 1991; Jacobson et al., 1999) and thus the scales 
own cut-offs were also utilised (see Table 21) in order to avoid overestimation of 
recovery.  
Table 21 Functional population means, standard deviations, scale reliability and 
scale cut-offs 
Scale Mean 
(S.D.) 
Cronbach’s 
alpha  
Scale cut-offs References 
HADS-
anxiety 
6.14 
(3.76) 
.82 0-7 = not anxious 
8-10 = mild anxiety 
11-14 = moderate anxiety 
15-21 = severe anxiety 
(Snaith & Zigmond, 
1994; Crawford, 
Henry, Crombie, & 
Taylor, 2001) 
HADS-
depression 
3.68 
(3.07) 
.77 0-7 = not depressed 
8-10 = mild depression 
11-14 = moderate depression 
15-21 = severe depression 
(Snaith & Zigmond, 
1994; Crawford et al, 
2001) 
   
For HADS-anxiety cut-off b was calculated [b= 6.14 + (2 x 3.76) =13.66], 
showing that the patient had recovered by moving from the severely anxious (HADS 
anxiety =16) into the normative range (HADS anxiety = 9, < 13.66). The Reliable 
Change Index (RCI = 3.10, > 1.96), showed that the client had reliably improved on 
anxiety measured by the HADS. According to HADS cut-offs the patient had moved 
 145 
from severely anxious to mildly anxious range. The client’s scores on the depression 
subscale of the HADS also showed a decreasing trend, moving from the moderately 
depressed (HADS depression = 11) to not depressed range (HADS depression = 6).The 
RCI (RCI = 2.40, > 1.96) and cut-off b [b = 3.68 + (2 x 3.07) = 9.82] calculations 
showed the client had recovered on the depression subscale. The increase in anxious and 
depressive symptoms at session 4 can be attributed to the reports of further intrusive 
memories and the subsequent misuse of imagery rescripting described above (p 139). At 
3 month and 6 month follow-up John no longer met criteria for anxiety on the HADS (a 
score of 7 (RCI=3.98) and 5 (RCI= 4.87) respectively) and he also remained in the not 
depressed range (score of 2 at both follow ups RCI= 4.33).  
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Figure 5 HADS anxiety and depression for baseline, during therapy and 3-month 
and 6-month follow-up (B = baseline, S = Therapy session, HADS = Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale) 
 
For parsimony, the measure of intrusive symptoms is presented as an aggregate 
of scores for frequency, distress, vividness, interference with daily life and 
uncontrollability (Wheatley et al, 2007). When more than one memory was reported a 
single rating of the frequency, distress, vividness, interference with daily life and 
controllability of intrusive memories was taken each week.  The particular memory 
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referred to in the scale therefore changes as the therapist shifts to work on a new 
memory.  Intrusive symptoms also showed a decreasing trend across sessions, with an 
average 68 point drop in intrusive symptoms from baseline to end of treatment. In 
correspondence with an increase in anxiety and depression in Figure 5 and session 4, 
there was an increase in intrusive symptoms to 42/100. This can also be attributed to the 
reports of further intrusive memories and the misuse of imagery rescripting in session 4. 
At 3 month and 6 month follow-up, the average point drop in intrusive symptoms 
stabilised at 50.  
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Figure 6 Aggregate intrusive symptoms score (including frequency, interference, 
uncontrollability, distress, and vividness) at baseline, during therapy and 3-month 
and 6-month follow-up (B = baseline, S = Therapy session)  
 
Pre-treatment and post-treatment measures also included the IES. The client’s 
subjective distress associated with intrusive memories (IES) fell 10 points, from a total 
of 53 (24 avoidance, 29 intrusion) to a total of 43 (26 avoidance and 17 intrusion). As 
there are no functional population means for using the IES as a measure of subjective 
distress associated with intrusive cognitions, a statistical approach to clinical 
significance could not be utilised, although the reduction in subjective distress 
associated with intrusive memories is in concordance with the reduction in overall 
intrusion rating in Figure 6.  There was a further reduction in subjective distress 
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associated with intrusive memories at 3 month follow-up, with a total score of 20 on the 
IES (12 avoidance and 8 intrusion). However, at 6 month follow-up, this had levelled 
out to match the post-treatment drop of 10 points, with a total of 42 (27 avoidance and 
15 intrusion).  
By the end of treatment, John also showed changes in his desire for behavioural 
change, by volunteering that he would be keen to go back to work and this would be a 
new short-term goal for him. By the end of treatment the patient reported that the 
original distressing intrusive memories had become extremely rare, although he did 
sometimes picture the transformed images in his mind’s eye at times of stress.  The 
patient also expressed an interest in using the perfect nurturer image for other intrusive 
memories that he was not willing to discuss during treatment.  
5.2.6. Case 2- Sarah 
I. Background information 
Sarah was 43 years old and had been diagnosed with early stage breast cancer on 
27th October 2005. She was currently on hormone therapy (Zoladex) after completing 
other treatments including chemotherapy, a mastectomy and radiotherapy by September 
2006. Following her breast cancer diagnosis, Sarah left her job as an operations 
manager and subsequently took her employer to an employment tribunal for unfair 
dismissal and sexual discrimination. Sarah felt that she had been pushed out of her job 
due to her diagnosis and people’s mistaken assumption that she was no longer able to 
fulfil her role at work.   
Sarah presented with high depression and anxiety scores on the Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale (15 and 12 respectively) and she met full criteria for current 
adjustment disorder with anxiety. Sarah reported that her anxiety had started since the 
cancer diagnosis and thus the symptoms reported were a direct result of cancer-related 
concerns. For example, post-surgery Sarah experienced hyperventilation and panic 
attacks whenever confronted with crowded places. The cancer diagnosis also affected 
how Sarah felt about herself, as it challenged core beliefs about herself (e.g. confident, 
successful) other people and the world (e.g. people/the world is unfair as I have been 
pushed out of the job I love). Figure 7 demonstrates Sarah’s schema, appraisals, 
cognitions, emotions and behaviour associated with the cancer diagnosis, in line with 
Moorey & Greer’s cognitive model of adjustment (Moorey & Greer, 2002).  
 
 148 
 
 
 
Survival schema
-View of cancer as physically 
debilitating (e.g. breast implants gone 
wrong, image of self as distorted)
-View of cancer as destroying career
-Fearful of the future (e.g. financial 
concerns)
Cognitions
-I am useless
-I am not the person I used to be
-I lack confidence
-I am unemployable
-Images of self being suffocated and humiliated by 
ex-colleagues
Emotion and Physiology
-Frightened/panicked -Muscular tension
-Worthless -Stomach churning
-Helpless -Pins and needles
-Anxious -Hyperventilation
Confirmation
-Constant reliving of emotional and 
physical feelings felt during specific 
negative events in the past, experienced as 
intrusive memories in the present. 
Behaviour
-Avoiding people associated with 
previous job
-Avoiding places that are 
associated with intrusive 
memories
-Avoiding applying for jobs
Self schema
-View of the self as awful/useless and 
not the person used to be
-View of the world as against her
-View of other people as 
unsupportive/untrustworthy 
 
 
Figure 7 The cognitive model of adjustment to cancer applied to Sarah (from 
Moorey & Greer, 2002). 
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5.2.7. Case 2-Treatment overview 
I. Session 1 
The first intrusive memory that Sarah reported was of an incident that had 
happened following her breast cancer surgery. The most frequent intrusive memory was 
Sarah’s first day back after surgery- she felt so happy to be returning to work and people 
were very pleased to see her. But as she got to her desk, all her belongings had been put 
in a cloakroom and a male colleague came over to her and was shouting and swearing 
“If you can’t do your job I’ll f****** do it for you”. A female colleague joined him and 
started whispering in his ear, “Sarah’s done this wrong, Sarah’s done that wrong”. 
Sarah felt as though it was unjust and wanted a chance to explain but they wouldn’t let 
her speak. 
 At this point in the description of the image, Sarah started to hyperventilate in 
the session and therefore we spent some time using a safe image she had created of a 
sandy beach and her friends and family to try and help her relax. Sarah found it 
challenging to do this and reported difficulty in getting to the beach. She could see her 
nieces playing there but was unable to get to them. When asked about what emotions 
she associated with the intrusive memory she reported feeling 100% panic, 100% 
worthlessness, 100% helplessness. In addition to hyperventilation, the memory was 
associated with other physical sensations including, stomach churning and pins and 
needles in hands and feet. Sarah reported that the worst thing about the mental picture at 
work was feeling out of control. On experiencing the intrusive memory, Sarah avoided 
it by reading books, listening to music or phoning a friend. At the end of the session, the 
emotion ratings were still extremely high (100% for all). The notion of rescripting the 
image was introduced and some possible ideas were discussed. Sarah felt that she 
wanted to feel in control, to speak up for herself and make them listen. The session 
ended with Sarah thinking about how she could create an alternative image, which 
would make her feel less panicked, worthless and helpless. For example, she imagined a 
real scenario where her male colleague had fallen off his chair in a bar and was 
humiliated. This helped the session to end on a more positive note, and gave Sarah some 
content to work with over the following week.  
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II. Session 2 
At the beginning of session 2, emotion ratings remained at 100% panic, 100% 
worthlessness, 100% helplessness in relation to the intrusive memory at work.  Sarah 
reported that she had also found the safe image distressing, because it triggered fears 
that something was wrong with her nieces. During the past week, Sarah had 
spontaneously used an image of one of her nieces coming out of school with a smile on 
her face to counteract the negative beach scene. This was encouraged as an example of 
imagery rescripting-challenging a negative image with a more positive one. At this 
point, some time was spent elaborating the safe image on the beach so it was no longer 
frightening. Sarah imagined herself being buried in the sand by her nieces, which meant 
she wouldn’t be outside the image, looking in, but a strong part of the image. Once 
Sarah was satisfied with the safe image, the distressing negative memory from session 1 
was discussed.  
 As Sarah had hyperventilated while describing the image for the first time, it 
was decided that before we would start reliving the image, we would have some ideas in 
mind to use as we went along.  When asked, what would need to happen in the image 
for it to be less distressing, Sarah suggested that she would like to go back in time and 
defend herself- she recalled something she had said in court-“I lost my boob, not my 
brain.” To start with, Sarah struggled to come up with an alternative image and we 
discussed changing the main characters in the image. After the use of prompts (e.g. 
“what would you like to happen next?”) and suggested transformation options (e.g. 
“imagine the key character one foot high. Shrink the shouting face that you see and 
make the voice squeaky”), Sarah decided she wanted to turn the male colleague into a 
snake and the female colleague into a rat which then shrank and scurried away.  
The negative image was brought online and the alternative images were 
conjured up when required. Sarah started rescripting the image by imagining the scene 
and using a purple wand to change the characters into a snake and rat respectively. 
Sarah imagined the snake slithering down a little hole and the rat scurrying off to 
nowhere. Once they have gone, other members of staff become central in the image, 
including two receptionists. The two receptionists begin to cheer shouting “Well done 
Sarah”. Sarah asks them “Where were you when I needed you?” At this point, Sarah 
realised that the receptionists had not betrayed her; they were just scared themselves, 
and scared for their own jobs. Unfortunately, Sarah then imagined that the snake had 
come back out of the hole. Although this was distressing, Sarah recognised that this 
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may be necessary as it is symbolic of the way she wanted to protect her staff from her 
bullying colleagues. She chased the snake away and concreted over the hole. The end of 
the image involved her hugging the two receptionists. Sarah felt very relieved at this 
point, in realising that not everyone was against her and reported emotion ratings were 
as follows; 100% relieved, 100% exhausted, 0% helpless, 80% worthless and 20% 
panicked.   
Following the success of transforming the first intrusive memory, Sarah reported 
a second intrusive memory which had not been discussed previously but which was 
triggered from thinking about who betrayed her when she returned to work following 
breast cancer surgery. The image was of other work colleagues taunting her when she 
was out having a meal in a restaurant. Sarah said this image was also associated with 
extreme feelings of worthlessness (100%) and helplessness (100%) and she couldn’t 
believe people could make her feel so bad. As we were coming towards the end of the 
session, we discussed thinking about transformations for the second image, to review in 
Session 3. Sarah was also given an intrusive image record form in order to write down 
specific images that came up over the next week and the use of the alternative image.  
When asked how it felt to try and transform the first image, Sarah said she felt good 
trying to change it although she wasn’t sure what the current emotion ratings were- it 
depended on whether she could “keep the snake bolted down”.  
III. Session 3 
At the beginning of session 3, Sarah reported experiencing no intrusive 
memories in the past week- in fact, all scores on the intrusion rating scale fell to 0 and 
Sarah no longer met criteria for anxiety or depression on the HADS. Sarah had been on 
holiday for the previous week which she found relaxing. Emotion ratings for the first 
intrusive memory were 100% in control, 50% confidence, 0% helplessness, 0% 
worthlessness and 0% panic. A recap of the alternative image revealed that it was the 
same as before, and blocking up the hole after the snake went down it was successful. 
The image had been elaborated somewhat, so that the rat scurried away and ends up in a 
garden being eaten by a one-legged fox. When the snake tried to return, Sarah slammed 
it down the hole and it doesn’t come back. After the scene where the receptionists were 
cheering, Sarah walked away with her head held high.  
Due to the success of the transformation of the first image, Session 3 was spent 
mainly working on the second image. The image was explored in more detail and it 
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transpired that it was of five (female) ex-colleagues sitting at a table in a restaurant. The 
women are laughing at her, getting closer and closer, surrounding Sarah so she feels 
claustrophobic. Sarah recognised that although the image is based on an event that 
actually happened, the intrusive image that keeps coming back is an abstracted version 
of the memory. Emotion ratings for the second image were 100% fear/anxiety, 100% 
panic. Sarah could hear laughter in the image and the restaurant slips away and Sarah 
can just see her colleagues crowding in on her, taunting her. When asked what meaning 
the image had for her, Sarah reported that it made her feel like a complete failure and 
that she wanted revenge for the way they had treated her following her breast cancer 
diagnosis. The worst thing about the image was the women cackling at her. When asked 
to consider some alternative images, Sarah found it very difficult to imagine how the 
image could be changed. Using the cackling element as key to the image, it was 
suggested that the women could be imagined as witches. With the mention of this 
theme, Sarah instantly began thinking about a transformation. Sarah imagined the 
women as witches, with big pointed noses, bad teeth and bad hair. Sarah imagined that 
in the middle of the table was a cauldron, with frogs, eyeballs, a snake and a rat. The 
snake and rat were symbolic of the other ex- colleagues that had been tackled in the 
previous image. Sarah introduced the purple wand which was used to make the witches 
shrivel into nothing; they melt away (Sarah likens this melting to a scene in the Wizard 
of Oz where the witch melts away). The nasty scene fades away and Sarah is left with a 
friend who was there in real life, who hands her a long island iced tea.  
At the end of session 3, we agreed that Sarah would practice the second image 
and we would recap the image in session 4 and continue with any other prominent 
intrusive memories.  
IV. Session 4  
Sarah did not attend for session 4 as she went on a last minute holiday. She 
telephoned on her return to say she had not been experiencing intrusive memories and 
felt she did not need to continue with the therapy for now. It was explained that 
although we can learn new ways of responding to negative images, they will not 
necessarily disappear completely. Sarah reported that she felt she had learnt a new skill 
which could be used in the future if the imagery re-emerged. Sarah was reassured that 
she could telephone at any time if she wanted to consolidate the imagery rescripting 
sessions. Due to Sarah’s non-attendance at the final session, end of study questionnaires 
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were sent in the post to Sarah. However, these were not returned for 3 months and 
therefore although there is not a full set of end of study data, there is full data for 3 
month follow-up.  
5.2.8. Case 2- Outcome and Experience of Treatment 
The client’s raw data for anxiety, depression and intrusions are presented 
graphically in Figures 8 and 9. Sarah’s scores on the anxiety subscale of the HADS 
showed a decreasing trend and she moved from the severely anxious (HADS anxiety = 
15) to the not anxious range (HADS anxiety = 4). The RCI (RCI = 4.87, > 1.96) and 
cut-off b (b = 13.66) showed that the client had recovered according to the anxiety 
subscale of the HADS. At 3 month follow-up, the patient had still recovered (RCI=3.54, 
>1.96, HADS anxiety =7). The client’s scores on the depression subscale of the HADS 
also showed a decreasing trend, moving from the moderately depressed (HADS 
depression = 12) to not depressed range (HADS depression =1). The RCI (RCI = 5.29, 
> 1.96) and cut-off b (b = 9.82) showed that the client had recovered on the depression 
subscale. This achievement remained at 3 month follow-up (RCI= 5.29, >1.96), with the 
patient no longer meeting criteria for depression on the HADS (HADS depression = 1).   
As before, the measure of intrusive symptoms is presented as an aggregate of 
scores for frequency, distress, vividness, interference with daily life and 
uncontrollability (Wheatley et al, 2007). The intrusive symptoms also showed a 
decreasing trend across sessions, with an average 56 point drop in intrusive symptoms 
from baseline to 3 months follow-up. 
The client’s subjective distress associated with intrusive memories (IES) fell 25 
points, from a total of 63 (32 avoidance, 31 intrusion) at pre-treatment to a total of 38 
(20 avoidance and 18 intrusion) at 3 month follow-up. Again, a statistical approach to 
clinical significance could not be utilised for the IES, although the reduction in 
subjective distress associated with intrusive memories was in concordance with the 
reduction in overall intrusion rating in Figure 9.  
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Figure 8 HADS anxiety and depression at baseline, during therapy and at 3 month 
follow-up (B = baseline, S = Therapy session, HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale).  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
B1 B2 B3 S1 S2 S3 3 months
Baseline/Session
Sc
o
re
Intrusions
 
Figure 9 Aggregate intrusive symptoms score (including frequency, interference, 
uncontrollability, distress, and vividness) at baseline, during therapy and at 3 
month follow-up (B = baseline, S = Therapy session).  
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5.2.9. Discussion 
The two cases illustrated that imagery rescripting was associated with a 
clinically significant reduction in distress and a significant reduction in negative 
characteristics of intrusive images and supports the notion that it may be a viable 
therapy for cancer patients reporting negative intrusive imagery. The effects were 
relatively long-lasting with Sarah and John remaining in the not depressed and not 
anxious range at 3 month follow-up and John remaining in this range at 6 month follow-
up. Wheatley et al (2007) reported similar success in using imagery rescripting in 
patients with severe and recurrent depression and also reported long-lasting effects after 
1 year follow-up.  
Throughout the therapy sessions, the negative imagery that was addressed 
directly accessed feelings about themselves (worthless, hopeless), others (threatening, 
unsupportive) and the world (dangerous/adverse). According to Moorey & Greer’s 
(2002) cognitive model of adjustment to cancer, viewing the world and other people as 
threatening leads to feelings of anxiety and feeling as though one is being attacked leads 
to anger. Both John and Sarah felt anxious and angry with respect to their intrusive 
images. Also, the model predicted that the belief that cancer has led to a personal loss, 
in John’s case, of physical strength can lead to feelings of depression. In line with this, 
different types of imagery rescripting were utilised and seemed to have varying effects 
on reported emotions. For example, for John’s first imagery rescript we used mastery 
imagery where he regained control of the situation of the image by reducing his boss to 
a comical character. This led to decreased feelings of helplessness and anger and 
increased reports of self-efficacy. The success of mastery imagery with John is 
exemplified by his own recognition in session 7 that “you can’t change people but you 
can change your reaction to other people.” In the later images, where John felt to blame 
for various situations, compassionate imagery (Lee, 2005) was used to help reduce 
feelings of guilt, worthlessness and hopelessness.  
Sarah had reported that the worst component of her intrusive images was being 
out of control and thus for Sarah, mastery imagery was used to help regain her self-
efficacy and reduce feelings of helplessness and worthlessness. In addition to changing 
the meaning of the imagery for John and Sarah, rescripting also encouraged meta-
cognitive change. For example, in session 1, John mentioned that he already felt less 
foolish by talking about the imagery. This may be because previously John appraised 
negative imagery as meaning that he was losing control, or couldn’t cope (assessed 
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using Response to Intrusions Questionnaire when participating in Study 2) and talking 
about the imagery for the first time allowed him to feel that he wasn’t going mad. 
Accessing the meaning of imagery content and the meaning of the presence of imagery 
are both important (Hackmann, 1998; Wheatley & Brewin, 2005).  
 In accordance with  previous research (Wells & Hackmann, 1993, Hackmann, 
1998) accessing intrusive imagery provided an alternative and quick route to accessing 
generic belief systems and meanings underlying emotional responses. The special 
relationship between  imagery and emotion (Holmes & Mathews, 2005) has been 
explained by suggesting that imagery provides direct access to emotional 
representations because imagery may mimic real-life perceptual events and therefore 
provide privileged access to related representations in autobiographical memory 
(Conway, 2001). This explanation was supported by research which showed that 
imagery was associated with greater self-involvement and stronger associations with 
autobiographical memory than verbal thoughts (Holmes et al, 2008) and intrusive 
imagery is often accompanied by a sensation of reliving and accompanying emotional 
sensations felt at the time of the original memory (e.g. Study 1).   
The success of alternative imagery in reducing the toxic nature of intrusive 
memories can be explained using the retrieval competition account of CBT (Brewin, 
2006). This account suggests that by using an alternative positive image and providing 
elaboration of the image, therapy provides a representation in memory which will win 
the retrieval competition when pitched against the original negative memory. In line 
with the notion that imagery may mimic earlier perceptual encoding (Conway, 2001), 
evidence has suggested (Smith, Henson, Dolan, & Rugg, 2004) that encoding and 
retrieval of emotional material activates common areas of the brain, including the left 
amygdala and left angular gyrus. Thus, when a negative memory is triggered and 
recalled, there is recapitulation of brain activity involved in the original experience of an 
emotional state (Buchanan, 2007). Transforming intrusive memories by creating a 
strong alternative image may thus alleviate this reactivation, and lead to a reduction in 
the intensity of accompanying emotional sensations. Brewin (2006) emphasised that 
imagery rescripting works on associative principles rather than logical reasoning so that 
there are direct and automatic changes in the accessibility of representations in memory 
rather indirect manipulation of belief through standard verbal challenging.  
The dual role of imagery in maintaining dysfunctional states (e.g. Hirsch et al., 
2004) and resolving such states (Conway et al., 2004) can also be explained by 
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conceptualising images as goals (see also Chapter 2). Conway et al (2004) argued that 
images are a type of mental representation which holds information about our personal 
goals. Intrusive images often arise at moments when our personal goals are challenged. 
For example, John experienced feeling helpless, worthless and humiliated when he was 
unable to stand up to his boss. The image represented a self-defining moment when 
John’s goals (to be strong and protect himself) were challenged. Sarah reported feeling 
helpless, worthless and panicked when she was forced out of the job she loved 
following her breast cancer diagnosis. Sarah’s imagery also reflected self-defining 
moments where the goal, to move on from her cancer diagnosis and be back at work, 
was challenged.  
According to Carver & Scheier (1998), behaviour can be explained in the 
context of self-regulating feedback systems. These systems are based on an individuals 
concrete (e.g. successful research career) and abstract (e.g. wants to be respected) goals. 
Goal pursuit involves having a goal (referent), assessing where one is in relation to the 
goal (input) and taking steps to reduce the discrepancy between input and referent 
(behaviour). If goals are desirable, individuals take measures to reduce the discrepancy 
between the input and referent (negative feedback loop) and if goals are undesirable, 
individuals take measures to enlarge the discrepancy between input and referent 
(positive feedback loop). The latter type of feedback loop thus leads to avoidance and 
has no endpoint, because there is no target to be reached. Thus negative feedback loops 
are required to constrain the unlimited task of enlarging the discrepancy between input 
and referent. Feedback loops also have comparators which monitor rate of progress by 
comparing the distance between input and referent. If the comparator reveals that 
positive or negative feedback loops are unsuccessful, it leads to negative affect. If the 
comparator reveals that positive or negative feedback loops are successful, it leads to 
positive affect (Carver, 2006). In terms of the single-case studies described in this 
chapter, avoiding undesirable referents (intrusive imagery) is unsuccessful because 1) 
there is no specified end point and 2) avoidance paradoxically leads to increased 
intrusive symptoms (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). Thus, another explanation for distress 
associated with intrusive images is that due to failure to avoid intrusive images and thus 
reduce the discrepancy between input and referent, John and Sarah experienced negative 
affect. Applying imagery rescripting to help create positive alternative imagery allowed 
for new desirable goals to be associated with negative intrusive imagery. In this respect, 
a negative feedback loop was created which constrained the positive feedback loop 
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because although the positive feedback loop remained (with goal to avoid feeling 
humiliated/like a failure), a strategy of avoidance was replaced with a strategy of 
creating new goals. Creating new goals which can then be targeted within a negative 
feedback loop can thus lead to feelings of positive affect in accordance with the affect-
generating systems described above and in Chapter 2.  
To expand on the case studies described above, using imagery rescripting, 
negative feedback loops were introduced with new referents- John as the stronger 
character and Sarah as the person in control/respected at work. Both John and Sarah 
realised through rescripting the image that it was other people in the image who were 
out of control, not them. John’s goal “to be strong/in control” was reinstated because he 
realised that in the first image he had behaved in a desirable way and overall he was a 
calmer, more passive person than he realised. Sarah realised that she was still respected 
by important work colleagues and had been pushed out of her role unfairly.  For both 
patients, the use of positive imagery introduced a negative feedback loop with desirable 
goals (e.g. to feel in control) and continued practice of positive imagery and 
consolidation of the rescripted images led to discrepancy-reduction between the loop’s 
input and referent.  
There were specific limitations for both case examples. For example, although 
John rescripted several images during therapy, some memories were not discussed or 
worked on. Despite this, John no longer met criteria for anxiety or depression on the 
HADS and thus the results provide powerful evidence that accessing imagery affords 
significant emotional shifts in therapy.  For Sarah, there were only 3 sessions, with no 
consolidation of the imagery rescripting from session 3. However, previous research has 
shown that imagery rescripting may be effective in as little as one session (Rusch et al., 
2000) and the suggested number of sessions is between 3 and 6 (Wheatley & Brewin, 
2005). Based on the notion that imagery provides direct access to meaning and emotion 
associated with previous events, it may be that 3 sessions was enough to provide 
alternative coping strategies in response to intrusive memories. The finding that Sarah 
reported a reduction in the frequency and negative properties associated with intrusive 
cognitions and a reduction in anxiety and depression and this was maintained at 3 
month follow-up supports the suggestion that imagery rescripting was successful. 
Despite these case-specific limitations, both single-case studies illuminate the 
potential role of imagery rescripting in cancer patients reporting a wide variety of 
concerns, leading to intrusive imagery. Rescripting was successful for a patient with a 
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history of depression, an incurable type of cancer and a sense of loss associated with 
changes in physical strength. The therapy was equally as successful for a patient with 
adjustment disorder with anxiety, a curable type of cancer and a sense of future-related 
anxiety due to changes in a valued work role.  
Overall limitations of the case examples include the use of cut-off b to assess 
clinically significant change. When dysfunctional and functional populations are 
overlapping, cut-off b can be considered too lenient (Jacobson & Truax, 1991; Jacobson 
et al., 1999). However, in order to avoid overestimating recovery, other methods of 
establishing clinical significance were utilised such as using scale cut-offs. As can be 
seen from the follow-up data, the patients moved into the not anxious and not depressed 
range on the HADS. As clinical significance is broadly defined as “returning to normal 
functioning” (Jacobson et al., 1999) the present findings suggest that the patients 
recovered.  
Other limitations include the reliance on self-report measures and the possibility 
that patients would have over-estimated improvements. However, behavioural changes 
were also noted. For John, he decided he wanted to go back to work and for Sarah, the 
reason she stopped therapy was that she went away on holiday and seemed to be 
embracing life more readily. In fact, the explanation for the 3 month delay in sending 
back the follow-up questionnaires was that Sarah had been on a number of holidays and 
was extremely busy. The follow-up data sent by mail also suggests that demand 
characteristics are unlikely to explain the findings. Longer term follow-up would help to 
clarify this further and also allow assessment of longer-term improvements of intrusive 
symptoms and psychological distress. The use of simple non-validated measures of 
intrusion characteristics is also a limitation, although currently no validated measures 
exist to rectify this. Other important factors to the success of imagery rescripting, such 
as the extent to which imagery is brought online are difficult to measure and require 
further consideration in imagery rescripting research. In general, adherence to the 
imagery rescripting manual and competence in therapy were closely monitored in 
weekly sessions with Professor Chris Brewin.   
An important limitation of the present study concerns the low uptake for 
imagery rescripting by cancer patients reporting intrusive cognitions. Specific reasons 
for refusal included the desire to avoid facing distressing intrusive cognitions. This 
suggests that imagery rescripting and the possibility of intense focus on intrusive 
images may seem like a daunting prospect for some patients. Previous research has 
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suggested that tasks aimed at desensitising individuals to intrusive imagery by reducing 
vividness and emotional distress (e.g. EMDR, visuospatial tapping tasks) may prove a 
useful precursor to therapies aimed at reducing intrusive imagery and alleviating 
distress (Andrade et al, 1997; Kavanagh et al, 2001). Kavanagh et al (2001) proposed 
that if tasks aimed at competing for resources required for imagery blunt the emotional 
impact of negative intrusions, without affecting the course of treatment, they could 
operate as a treatment aid in early stages of therapy.   
Broadening outcome measures in the present study would help elucidate the 
success of imagery rescripting for cancer patients as assessment of other types of 
distress may also prove beneficial. For example, the meaning cancer has for an 
individual is a core component of the cognitive model of adjustment to cancer (Moorey 
& Greer, 2002) and others have recognised the important of assessing global meaning 
as well as situational meaning in cancer patients (White, 2004).  In the present study, 
although meaning was not formally assessed, transformation of imagery had a direct 
impact on changing the meaning of intrusive imagery as documented in both cases. 
Another potential outcome measure is the Mini-MAC (Watson et al, 1994), a measure 
of maladaptive adjustment linked to the presence of intrusive cognitions in cancer 
patients (e.g. Brewin et al, 1998a; Study 1 & 2). It would be interesting to investigate 
whether a reduction in intrusive imagery led to improved adjustment such as less 
hopelessness/hopelessness and anxious preoccupation in cancer patients completing 
imagery rescripting therapy.  
Others have suggested that a difficulty with assessing the benefits of imagery 
rescripting therapy lies in distinguishing separate components of therapy, including 
reliving and rescripting components (Hunt & Fenton, 2007; Wild et al., 2007). In the 
present study, patients were asked to vividly evoke the memories, describing them in 
the present tense. This is considered a reliving component of therapy (Wild et al, 2007) 
which is successful because it allows for habituation, reflection and spontaneous 
cognitive change (Hackmann, 2005). Future research with cancer patients could 
compare reliving and rescripting components, following work with PTSD (Arntz et al., 
2007) and snake phobia (Hunt & Fenton, 2007) samples. Combination therapy 
emphasising these components supports the approach of cognitive behaviour therapy in 
cancer patients (Moorey & Greer, 2002) which uses a variety of approaches in 
treatment, including those with imagery components. Typically when CBT for cancer 
patients is described the emphasis is on challenging verbal thoughts, and the recognition 
 161 
of imagery in therapy may require rejuvenation. Wild et al (2007) also suggested that 
future research could investigate whether belief change is compulsory to the success of 
imagery rescripting therapy, or whether creating a competing image with positive affect 
is sufficient for a shift in symptomatology (Brewin, 2006).  
In summary, the case examples presented here showed a clinically significant 
reduction in anxiety and depression and substantial reductions in the negative properties 
of intrusive imagery, including frequency, distress, interference, uncontrollability and 
vividness. Further empirical work is required to assess whether imagery rescripting is 
beneficial more widely, and inclusion of a control group would be necessary to make 
more robust conclusions. However, these preliminary findings at least support the 
suggestion that mental imagery manipulation be considered a core cognitive therapy 
skill (Wheatley et al, 2007) and intrusive imagery should be assessed, and where 
appropriate, targeted in cancer patients receiving psychological therapy.   
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The present thesis began by discussing the application of a PTSD framework for 
understanding psychological distress in cancer patients. This chapter revisits the central 
assumptions and criticisms of this approach and reflects on how the thesis has addressed 
these issues by utilising a wider literature to approach the phenomenon of intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients. The hypotheses and findings of the present research are 
summarised and an overall comparison of the findings with previous research is 
provided. The clinical implications of the findings and research limitations are 
discussed with suggestions for future research.  
6.1. PTSD and cancer: An alternative approach 
Cancer is a life-threatening illness which is considered traumatic because it 
threatens core assumptions about the self, others and the world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992) 
and is unpredictable and uncontrollable (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). Following the 
introduction of life- threatening illness as a stressor that could precipitate PTSD, several 
studies assessed the prevalence of PTSD in cancer patients. Low prevalence rates (e.g. 
Mundy et al, 2000) led some to suggest that PTSD may be an inappropriate model for 
understanding psychological distress in cancer patients (e.g. Green et al, 1997; Gurevich 
et al, 2002 and Kangas et al, 2002). For example, cancer is a qualitatively different type 
of stressor and reflects an ongoing sense of threat. Traumatic stress for cancer patients 
may manifest in different ways (Baum & Posluszny, 2001) where major stressors (e.g. 
diagnosis of life-threatening disease) are quickly superimposed with other stressors (e.g. 
treatment). Stressors do not necessarily reflect life threatening events but reflect more 
widespread concerns triggered by the cancer experience in general, for example, future 
concerns relating to financial or work commitments (Moorey & Greer, 2002). These 
latter problems are defined as critical life events which are normative and expected to 
happen to individuals (Birrer et al, 2007). Traumatic events are non-normative (Birrer et 
al, 2007) and entail actual or threatened death, serious injury or a threat to physical 
integrity to the self or others (DSM-IV, APA, 1994). Although some aspects of the 
experience of cancer meet this criterion, other aspects such as relationship breakdown, 
job loss or financial concerns do not. Research has found that patients themselves don’t 
always perceive their cancer as a threat to life or as a traumatic stressor precipitating 
fear, helplessness and horror (Cordova et al., 2007). 
In addition to the problems with identifying the specific stressor precipitating 
PTSD symptoms in cancer patients, another major limitation of the approach is the 
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considerable overlap of arousal symptom clusters with symptoms associated with 
PTSD. For example, insomnia, irritability and poor concentration are also side effects of 
cancer treatments such as chemotherapy and thus difficult to separate from arousal 
symptoms. Avoidance symptoms (e.g. forgetting aspects of the trauma, avoiding 
places/people), are not always applicable to cancer patients due to constant follow-up 
hospital appointments and the internal and thus inseparable nature of cancer as a 
stressor (Green et al, 1997).  
 Several studies recognised that although cancer patients often failed to meet all 
symptom clusters of PTSD, intrusive recollections were relatively common (e.g. Palmer 
et al 2004; Matsuoka et al, 2005). A new surge of research assessed the incidence of 
intrusive thoughts in cancer patients (Kangas et al, 2002), using the IES, a scale 
developed to assess intrusiveness and avoidance in response to a traumatic event. 
However, limitations of the IES include its failure to assess the type of intrusive 
cognitions (e.g. visual/verbal), valence (e.g. positive/negative), content and 
characteristics of intrusive cognitions. The items of the IES also allude to the traumatic 
event being in the past, but cancer as a traumatic stressor is experienced in the present 
and also involves a number of potentially stressful future events (e.g. recurrence, 
treatment side-effects). A few studies asked cancer patients about intrusive cognitions 
without using the IES, but were still restrictive in their definitions of what was 
considered traumatic. For example, Matsuoka et al (2002) defined cancer related 
intrusive thoughts as uncontrollable thoughts about the disclosure of the cancer 
diagnosis coming to mind at any time since diagnosis or over a period of more than 4 
weeks. 
 At the same time as psycho-oncology was focussing on assessing the incidence 
of intrusive thoughts in cancer patients, clinical psychology was revisiting the area of 
intrusive cognitions in various clinical samples, including PTSD, depressed and anxious 
groups. Strikingly, different types of visual intrusions considered a hallmark of PTSD 
patients were found to be experienced in these groups and demonstrate similar 
characteristics (Brewin, 1998; Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). For example, although 
intrusive imagery was reported less frequently in a depressed sample compared to a 
PTSD sample, when depressed patients did experience intrusive memories, they were 
similar to intrusive memories reported by PTSD patients (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). 
Both groups experienced vivid, distressing memories that occurred several times a week 
and lasted between several minutes and hours. Hackmann & Holmes (2004) suggested 
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that reports of intrusive imagery in anxious samples were also showing patterns similar 
to those found in PTSD samples. For example, frequent uncontrollable intrusive images 
were reported in social phobia (Hackmann et al, 2000), agoraphobia (Day et al, 2004) 
and OCD (Speckens et al, 2007). Images were distressing, vivid and often related to 
actual memories of traumatic events.  
In the context of PTSD and as discussed in Chapter 1, cognitive models have 
included processes linked to the maintenance of intrusive memories and PTSD (Ehlers 
& Steil, 1995). However, research had not clarified which processes linked to the 
maintenance of intrusive cognitions in other clinical samples. Recent research with 
bereaved, non-clinical and depressed samples has applied the cognitive model to the 
maintenance of intrusive symptoms in other populations (Boelen et al, 2003; Starr & 
Moulds, 2006, Moulds et al, 2008) and found that similar processes, such as the 
meaning individuals give to intrusive cognitions, rather than the intrusions themselves, 
is associated with psychological distress (Starr & Moulds, 2006).  
 Based on the finding that intrusive symptoms are the predominant symptom of 
PTSD reported by cancer patients and intrusive cognitions are ubiquitous and similar 
across clinical groups, the present thesis took an alternative, transdiagnostic approach 
and moved beyond the PTSD model to incorporate literature assessing intrusive 
cognitions across clinical groups. Following from previous research (e.g. Patel et al, 
2007) intrusive cognitions were operationalised into three categories. Intrusive thoughts 
were defined as verbal intrusions that could relate to any time scale (past, present, 
future), intrusive memories were defined as memories of a specific event that occurred 
in the past and intrusive images were defined as images referring to any time-scale. 
Past-oriented intrusive images were distinguished from intrusive memories, because 
they lacked autobiographical context and were more like “snapshots.” In later analyses, 
images and memories were combined and considered visual intrusions, as both are 
pictorial, rather than verbal representations. 
 Indeed, although psycho-oncology research adopted a PTSD framework to 
understand psychological distress in cancer patients, visual imagery, a hallmark 
symptom of PTSD, was rarely considered. The most recent literature investigating 
imagery in cancer patients was in the context of using guided imagery to alleviate 
psychological distress, treatment side-effects, pain and enhance the immune system 
(Roffe et al, 2005). For example, Walker and colleagues (e.g., Walker et al, 1999) found 
that the use of cancer-related images (e.g. immune system attacking cancer cells) was 
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successful in alleviating psychological distress. However, the mechanism by which 
guided imagery alleviated distress was unclear and guided imagery was mainly used 
alongside progressive muscle relaxation and thus the specific role of imagery was 
difficult to identify.  
Based on the rejuvenation of interest in imagery within the field of clinical 
psychology (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004) and the relative lack of interest in imagery in 
cancer patients, the starting point of my thesis was developed during my MSc based on 
work conducted by Baddeley & Andrade (2000), which emphasised the importance of 
memory in the vividness of imagery by focussing on the detrimental effects of various 
concurrent memory tasks on imagery vividness. The work tested further hypotheses 
about the determinants of imagery vividness, for example, valence (positive, negative, 
neutral) and motion (static, dynamic) in non-clinical populations. It was found that 
negative and positive imagery were significantly more vivid than neutral imagery and 
dynamic imagery was significantly more vivid than static imagery. This work led me to 
become familiar with the potential application of understanding imagery for clinical 
practice. Determining the factors that influence imagery is an important task, because 
imagery is useful in therapy (see Chapter 4) and has a significant impact on emotion 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005). 
With this recognition of the ‘special’ relationship between imagery and emotion, 
it soon became clear that investigating intrusive imagery as well as intrusive thoughts in 
cancer patients would be an important next step in research. The present thesis began by 
acknowledging that although there was cause for considering intrusive symptoms in 
cancer patents, intrusions were not sufficiently assessed and important models used to 
understand how intrusions lead to psychological distress were not utilised.   
In summary, starting from a PTSD framework, it became clear that identifying 
common experiences and processes associated with psychological distress in cancer 
patients is a viable alternative to classifying individuals according to diagnostic 
categories (Birrer et al, 2007). In Chapter 3, this was likened to a transdiagnostic 
approach to psychological disorders (Harvey et al, 2004), which assumes that 
experiences such as intrusive thoughts and images exist on a continuum from clinical to 
non-clinical populations.  
  The thesis addressed the limitations of previous research assessing intrusive 
cognitions by asking generally about individuals intrusive experiences in the last week 
(i.e. there were no assumptions about what the content of the intrusions would be). 
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From the broad literature of intrusive symptoms in clinical disorders, research questions 
included whether cancer patients experienced different types (e.g. visual/verbal, 
future/past) of intrusive cognitions, how similar in quality these were to clinical samples 
and whether they were associated with anxiety and maladaptive adjustment. The thesis 
also set out to investigate how patients appraised and coped with intrusive cognitions 
and whether therapeutic interventions could be used to alleviate their frequency and 
impact. Interview methods were utilised throughout in order to provide detail so far 
denied by work assessing intrusive thoughts in cancer patients.  
 Before discussing the specific hypotheses and findings of the present research in 
more detail, a note on outpatient recruitment is warranted. In Study 1 and in order to 
determine whether intrusive cognitions were related to anxiety in cancer patients, a 
series of outpatients were screened for anxiety using the HADS. The rationale was to 
compare matched anxious and non-anxious samples to delineate whether the experience 
of intrusive cognitions was related to psychological distress. During this screening 
process with prostate cancer patients, I worked with urology consultants on analyses 
which are not reported in this thesis (see Burnet, Parker, Dearnaley, Brewin, & Watson, 
2007)2. We were interested in whether there were implications for different medical 
treatments in terms of psychological distress. Specifically, we wanted to assess whether 
a  relatively new approach to the management of prostate cancer (Active Surveillance), 
which involves actively monitoring, rather than radically treating early stage prostate 
cancer patient was associated with increased distress. Our study (Burnet et al, 2007) 
reported that there were no significant differences in anxiety and depression for prostate 
cancer patients left untreated and those who received radical treatment (radiotherapy, 
hormone therapy). From a treatment perspective, it was important for the consultants to 
consider whether living with untreated prostate cancer was associated with increased 
psychological morbidity. From a psychological perspective, one potential avenue would 
be to investigate whether the differences in psychological distress across the treatment 
groups was mediated by experiences such as intrusive cognitions. Although the lack of 
differences between the treatment groups precluded an exploration of this question, the 
extra analyses showed that in addition to investigating mechanisms underlying anxiety 
in cancer patients, screening for anxiety was a useful practice. Later exploratory 
analyses in Study 2 found, as would be expected if intrusions were a mediating variable 
                                                 
2
 Note, name changed from Burnet to Whitaker in 2007 due to marriage 
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in anxiety, that there was no effect of treatment type on whether patients reported 
intrusive cognitions.  
6.2. Overview of hypotheses and findings 
6.2.1. Study 1  
The thesis includes three studies. Study 1 was a cross-sectional controlled study 
comparing anxious and non-anxious cancer patients (see Chapter 2), where it was 
hypothesised that: 
1) There would be a higher number of intrusive thoughts, memories and images in 
anxious patients compared to non-anxious matched controls. 
2) The presence of intrusions cognitions would be associated with maladaptive 
adjustment. 
3) Asking participants about intrusive thoughts, memories and images would not be 
associated with elevated levels of distress.  
The findings of Study 1 supported these hypotheses. Anxious prostate cancer 
patients were significantly more likely to report intrusive thoughts, images and 
memories compared to non-anxious prostate cancer patients and there was a linear 
relationship between anxiety and the number of intrusive cognitions. Anxious cancer 
patients experienced distressing, negative intrusive cognitions which were interfering 
and difficult to control. The content of intrusive cognitions reported was similar to the 
content of intrusive memories reported by depressed cancer patients regarding illness, 
injury or death and specifically about the experience of cancer (Brewin et al, 1998a). 
However, there were a number of intrusive cognitions that were not specifically related 
to illness, injury or death. Unrelated intrusions often reflected individuals feeling of 
failure in life, for example, of negative personal experiences (e.g. work, relationships). 
Also, the majority of intrusive cognitions were future-oriented and thus in order to 
encompass the broad array of concerns precipitated by a cancer diagnosis, asking 
patients about the experience of intrusive cognitions more generally, rather than in the 
context of PTSD would prove beneficial. This would also help divert from the problem 
labelled ‘conceptual bracket creeping’ where an increasingly number of events are 
considered traumatic and can precipitate a PTSD diagnosis (McNally, 2003). 
In line with intrusions reported in PTSD samples, intrusive memories were 
associated with a sense that the event was happening all over again. This reflects the 
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maladaptive processing associated with intrusive memories, where failure to integrate 
traumatic experience into autobiographical memory leads to a lack of information 
updating and subsequent feelings of ‘nowness’.  The intrusions were most often 
associated with feelings of sadness and helplessness and were also related to 
maladaptive adjustment including anxious preoccupation and helplessness-
hopelessness, after controlling for anxiety severity. Patients did not find being asked 
about their intrusive experiences distressing, rather they often perceived the experience 
as beneficial.  
Overall, cancer patients with anxiety reported intrusive cognitions with several 
similarities to those found in PTSD, depressed and anxious groups. However, there 
were several differences between the intrusions reported by cancer patients and other 
clinical groups. For example, anxious patients reported fewer intrusions than found in 
other populations and reported less overall impact of intrusions (Reynolds & Brewin, 
1998). Also, intrusive imagery was less frequent than imagery reported in anxiety 
disorders (e.g. Hackmann et al, 2000). Overall, intrusive thoughts were significantly 
more common than intrusive imagery, which contrasts with previous research reporting 
that intrusive images are more common in PTSD samples (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). 
Intrusive memories reported in Study 1 were more similar to those reported in non-
clinical populations than PTSD samples. For example, intrusive memories reported by 
anxious cancer patients were mainly contextualised autobiographical imagery which 
could be retrieved during an interview without accompanying physical sensations (e.g. 
memory of mother dying of breast cancer), whereas, intrusive memories in PTSD 
samples are often fragmented,  accompanied by high levels of arousal and cannot be 
deliberately retrieved (Brewin, 1998).  
Two possible reasons for the lower frequency and impact of intrusive cognitions 
were that 1) the anxious group was significantly less anxious than clinical groups and 
there is a linear relationship between anxiety and intrusions and 2) cancer patients may 
appraise intrusive cognitions as a normal stress response to the concrete stressor of a 
life-threatening illness. In Chapter 3, the cognitive approach to PTSD (Ehlers & Steil, 
1995) was utilised in order to elucidate the processes linked to the maintenance of 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients.  
 170 
6.2.2. Study 2  
Study 2 was a cross-sectional study of a mixed sample of anxious cancer 
patients (see Chapter 3). The following hypotheses were tested:  
1)  The positive linear relationship between anxiety severity and the number of 
intrusions reported in Study 1 would be replicated.  
2) There would be a significant positive association between i) negative appraisal of 
intrusive cognitions (e.g. “Some day I will go out of my mind”) and anxiety severity 
and ii) negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions and intrusion associated distress; after 
controlling for intrusion frequency. 
3) Negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions would be associated with the extent to 
which patients engaged in coping strategies. Engaging in cognitive avoidance 
mechanisms would be associated with higher levels of psychological distress.  
4) The positive relationship reported in Study 1 between the presence of intrusive 
cognitions and maladaptive adjustment would be replicated. 
Contrary to one explanation for the lower frequency and impact of intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients, it was found that cancer patients appraised intrusive 
cognitions in a negative way, as a sign that they couldn’t cope and had a psychological 
problem. The level of negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions was higher in cancer 
patients than in ambulance workers assessed for PTSD (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) and 
student samples (Starr & Moulds, 2006) and matched levels reported in a depressed 
sample (Moulds et al, 2008).  Negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions was associated 
with increased intrusion-related distress and psychological distress severity, after 
controlling for intrusion frequency, which corresponds to the considerable number of 
findings presented in Chapter 3 (e.g. Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Boelen et al, 2003; 
Williams & Moulds, 2007). As predicted, negative appraisal was associated with the 
extent to which patients engaged in strategies to control the intrusions (e.g. cognitive 
avoidance). These strategies in turn were associated with increased psychological 
distress. The study also replicated the positive linear relationship between number of 
intrusive cognitions and anxiety and the positive relationship between the presence of 
intrusive cognitions and maladaptive adjustment.  
New findings emerged from Study 2, including the greater impact of visual 
compared to verbal intrusions. Visual intrusions were associated with higher levels of 
intrusion and avoidance, greater uncontrollability and were more likely to last for 
seconds than minutes or hours. The fleeting nature of intrusive imagery paralleled work 
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with PTSD populations (e.g. Speckens et al, 2007). Although the differences reported 
between visual and verbal intrusions were post-hoc and require further investigation, 
they are important for two reasons. Firstly, although intrusive imagery is sometimes 
reported less often than intrusive thoughts, it is associated with higher subjective 
distress and feelings of reliving and thus may require targeted intervention. Secondly, 
the finding provides further evidence for the distinction between types of intrusive 
cognitions (e.g. Brewin et al, 1996) which should be considered in future research with 
cancer patients.  
After identifying that intrusive cognitions were associated with anxiety and 
maladaptive adjustment in prostate cancer patients, intrusive cognitions were explored 
in more detail in a mixed sample of anxious cancer patients. Study 2 confirmed the 
findings of Study 1 and extended them by showing that the meaning individuals assign 
to intrusive cognitions and intrusion-specific coping are associated with increased 
psychological distress. Based on the identification of intrusive cognitions as a common 
feature of distress in cancer patients in Study 1 and Study 2, the knowledge that 
intrusive cognitions mediate and maintain psychological distress (e.g. Hirsch et al, 
2004) and the suggestion that intrusive cognitions are amenable to direct modification 
(e.g. Holmes et al, 2007), a modular approach to therapy was utilised in Study 3.  
6.2.3. Study 3 
Study 3 (Chapter 5) used single-case design to assess whether a psychological 
intervention, imagery rescripting, would be successful in reducing the frequency and 
impact of intrusive imagery and associated psychological distress. Imagery rescripting 
was chosen based on the considerable number of studies across PTSD, anxious and 
depressed samples demonstrating its success for patients reporting frequent, distressing 
intrusive imagery. The hypotheses were as follows:  
1) Imagery rescripting would reduce the frequency, interference, vividness and distress 
associated with intrusive imagery and increase the controllability of intrusive imagery.  
2) Imagery rescripting would lead to a reduction in anxiety and depression levels. 
3) Positive outcomes, in terms of reduced frequency, impact and psychological distress, 
associated with imagery rescripting would remain at 3 month and 6 month follow-up. 
  Following previous research (e.g. Wheatley et al, 2007), imagery rescripting 
was found to provide effective and rapid relief from anxiety and depression, with 
reductions in negative intrusion characteristics such as frequency, distress, 
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uncontrollability, interference and vividness. These positive outcomes remained at 3 
month and 6 month follow-up. The success of imagery rescripting was explained using 
a competition retrieval account (Brewin, 2006) and the self-regulation model (Scheier & 
Carver, 2003) following Conway et al’s (2004) work conceptualising images as goals.  
6.2.4. Proposed model of cancer as a traumatic stressor. 
  Based on the findings of the present research an overall model of how cancer as 
a traumatic stressor leads to anxiety and depression through experiences of intrusive 
cognitions is outlined (Figure 10). The flowchart represents a re-formulation of the 
rationale for imagery rescripting therapy (see Figure 3, Chapter 5; Wheatley & Brewin, 
2005) in order to incorporate verbal as well as visual intrusive cognitions, negative 
appraisal and intrusion-specific coping. The figure is marked to indicate where 
supporting findings can be found in the present thesis (e.g. Study 1).  
Evidence suggested that cancer is a traumatic stressor that precipitates 
uncontrollable intrusive thoughts and images (e.g. Bleiker et al, 2000). This was 
confirmed in Study 1 and Study 2 of the thesis. Although these intrusions share some 
similarities with clinical samples, both studies showed that there were marked 
differences. In previous research, although differences were reported in intrusive 
cognitions between psychological disorders (e.g. depression, PTSD), the cognitive 
approach to the maintenance of intrusive memories in PTSD (Ehlers & Steil, 1995) was 
successfully applied to the maintenance of intrusive memories in other samples (e.g. 
Starr & Moulds, 2006). The same approach was thus applied to the experience of 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. 
The findings of Study 2 supported the suggestion that the experience of intrusive 
cognitions in cancer patients leads to psychological distress in the same way as 
proposed in the cognitive approach (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). The experience of intrusive 
cognitions as uncontrollable leads individuals with cancer to think that they are unable 
to cope or have a psychological problem. The relationship is bidirectional because 
having intrusive cognitions which are considered a sign of mental fragility also means 
they are experienced as less controllable. The positive association between negative 
appraisal and intrusion uncontrollability reported in Study 2 supports this suggestion. 
Following negative appraisal, individuals subsequently engage in coping strategies (e.g. 
avoidance) aimed at reducing intrusive cognitions. Study 2 reported a significant 
correlation between negative appraisal and coping with intrusions (e.g. rumination, 
 173 
avoidance). This relationship is also bidirectional because adopting ineffective coping 
strategies enhances the negative meaning of the intrusive cognitions (e.g. “I cannot 
cope”). Coping strategies such as avoidance prevent adequate processing of the 
distressing intrusions and paradoxically exacerbate rather than alleviate intrusive 
cognitions, which in turn lead to maintenance of anxiety and depression (Michaels et al, 
2005). It is suggested that the failure of coping strategies exacerbates intrusive 
cognitions in two ways identified in Figure 10; i) increased frequency of intrusions and 
ii) experience of intrusions as uncontrollable. The relationship between avoidance of 
intrusive cognitions and depression severity reported in Study 2 supports the final 
relationship in the flowchart. This is a preliminary model adopted in the present 
research and requires further empirical testing in order to elucidate the nature of 
relationships. For example, suggested causal relationships need to be empirically tested 
in future research.  
 Interventions specifically targeted at the processes described below, are likely to 
be most useful for cancer patients experiencing intrusive cognitions. This is further 
discussed in the section “Clinical Implications” (p 175).  
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Intrusive thoughts and images
with following characteristics (Study 1 and Study 2):
Frequent
Past/Present/Future oriented
Interfering
Distressing
Vivid imagery
Intrusive memories associated with sense of “nowness”
Last for seconds or minutes
Experiences of thoughts and images as uncontrollable 
(Study 1 and Study 2)
Negative intrusion-appraisal (Study 2)
(e.g. “These thoughts mean that I am going out of my mind”, “Something is 
wrong with me”)
Anxiety/Depression (Study 2)
Cancer as a 
traumatic stressor 
Intrusion-specific coping strategies (Study 2)
 e.g. avoidance, rumination
 
 
Figure 10 Formulation representing how intrusive cognitions experienced by 
cancer patients can lead to anxiety and depression. 
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6.3. Clinical implications 
There are several clinical implications of the present research. Based on the finding 
that intrusive cognitions play a role in psychological distress and maladaptive 
adjustment in cancer patients, identifying them in individuals requiring psychological 
intervention would be helpful in therapy. Clinicians providing psychological therapy 
could be encouraged to routinely assess whether cancer patients experience intrusive 
thoughts or images. Avoidance of intrusive cognitions in Study 2 was associated with 
increased negative intrusion-appraisal and depression severity, after controlling for 
intrusion frequency. Identifying intrusive cognitions would also have implications for 
maladaptive avoidance responses because patients are automatically encouraged to 
confront rather than avoid their intrusions. This has practical application in enhancing 
treatment compliance, as avoidance includes avoiding places or individuals that trigger 
intrusive cognitions, for example, follow-up hospital appointments.  
Based on the finding that the appraisal of intrusive cognitions is associated with 
rumination and cognitive avoidance and both negative appraisal and maladaptive coping 
are associated with increased distress in cancer patients, brief psychological 
interventions may be useful for alleviating distress. For example, simply asking cancer 
patients about whether they experience intrusive cognitions would help normalise the 
experience by showing that they are a common experience following a traumatic or 
critical life event. Therapies aimed at identifying and modifying negative appraisal of 
intrusive cognitions (Steil & Ehlers, 2000) would prove beneficial for cancer patients 
reporting these experiences.  Further, using case formulations such as those presented in 
Chapter 5 could enhance metacognitive awareness by showing patients how the 
experience of intrusive cognitions leads to psychological distress.  
Study 3 explored the use of imagery in psychological therapy and provided a 
rationale for targeting visual intrusions in cancer patients using imagery rescripting. 
Imagery rescripting is a technique which was applied to the treatment of childhood 
abuse memories (e.g. Smucker et al, 1995; Arntz & Weertman, 1999) and more recently 
developed for use in a number of different clinical groups (Holmes et al, 2007). 
Evidence from Study 3 showed that modifying intrusive images by encouraging patients 
to create alternative, more positive images led to decreased frequency and impact of 
intrusive cognitions and clinically significant decreases in anxiety and depression. 
These improvements remained at 3 month and 6 month follow-up. Although single-case 
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design limits generalisability of the use of this therapy in cancer patients, the success 
reported in Study 3 is promising. For patients experiencing negative intrusive images, 
rescripting is a rapid and effective therapy for relieving psychological distress. 
 Another insight gained from imagery rescripting therapy was how a number of 
different types of intrusive images are amenable to modification. For example John 
experienced a series of intrusive images where he had been bullied or acted like a bully. 
Cancer had triggered feelings of loss (in physical strength) and led to depressive 
episodes. John was frightened to leave the house and interact with other people because 
he felt he was no longer able to defend himself based on his illness. By addressing 
imagery he realised that he was not the aggressive person he thought he was, nor did he 
need to resolve situations using violence. It could be hypothesised that the change in 
meaning of these intrusive images meant that the loss of physical strength was no longer 
central to John’s appraisal of cancer.  Although John reported seemingly unrelated 
intrusive imagery, the finding that the images had implications for disease-appraisal 
strengthens the argument that assessing intrusive cognitions more broadly, rather than 
within narrow definitions will encompass the rich experience of coping with cancer.  
Imagery rescripting is one of several therapies that would prove beneficial for 
cancer patients reporting intrusive cognitions. Recent therapeutic techniques have been 
developed to address intrusive thoughts as well as intrusive images by pairing these 
negative processes with positive emotions or mental states (Brewin, 2006). For 
example, techniques such as mindfulness based stress reduction (e.g. MBSR; Smith et 
al, 2005) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al, 2004) differ 
from traditional cognitive behavioural techniques which involve challenging the validity 
of negative thoughts. Instead, MBSR and ACT assume that it is not the presence of 
intrusive thoughts that causes distress, but the tendency of the patient to become 
emotionally involved in them. Participants are trained to distance themselves from their 
intrusive thoughts and acknowledge them in a dispassionate way, without emotional 
involvement. Thus intrusive thoughts are paired with positive mental states such as self-
acceptance in ACT. In Study 3, imagery rescripting of negative memories involved 
pairing negative imagery with positive imagery. These techniques are constructive 
because they help patients distance themselves from extremely negative processes, 
without suggesting that these processes will disappear altogether. Thus, adaptive coping 
strategies are introduced and ultimately replace maladaptive coping strategies such as 
cognitive avoidance. The effectiveness of these approaches on the frequency and impact 
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of intrusive thoughts as well as intrusive images in cancer patients remain a question for 
future research.  
6.4. Limitations  
 The cross-sectional nature of the present research limits the conclusions in terms 
of causality. Prospective studies have reported that intrusive thoughts predicted anxiety 
(Brewin et al, 1998b), psychological distress (Bleiker et al, 2000), anxiety and 
depression (Epping-Jordan et al, 1999) and anxiety (Hipkins et al, 2004) in cancer 
patients. Future research taking different types of intrusive cognitions into account, 
should investigate prospectively the course of intrusions and their relationship to 
psychological morbidity.  
 The present research adopted a cross-sectional design in order to first identify 
whether different types of intrusive cognitions are reported by cancer patients and 
whether intrusive cognitions are similar to and behave in the same way as reported in 
other research. Now that the importance of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients has 
been established, prospective design would be a natural next step in research. Other 
types of study design, such as experimental manipulation used in other anxious samples 
(e.g. Hirsch et al, 2003; Hirsch et al, 2004) also has potential for elucidating causal 
relationships. For example, patients with social phobia holding a negative image in 
mind felt more anxious, used more safety behaviours and believed that they had 
performed poorly compared to when they held a control image in mind. Although 
manipulating intrusive cognitions in cancer patients would require careful ethical 
consideration, establishing causal relationships in cancer patients is important.  
The present study did not assess past psychiatric history or prior traumatic 
events. There is evidence that greater exposure to traumatic events is associated with 
clinically significant stress response symptoms in both early stage and metastatic breast 
cancer patients (Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998; Butler et al, 1999). Although in Study 
3, anxiety and depression were assessed with the SCID (First et al, 2002), other 
psychological disorders were not assessed such as PTSD. The decision not to make an 
exhaustive assessment of past and present psychiatric history was based on the goal to 
keep the time patients were required to spend in the interview to a minimum. In addition 
to potential psychological distress, patients were dealing with a life threatening physical 
illness and this had to be considered when designing interviews and completing NHS 
ethics. In Study 1 and Study 2, assessment of research participation supported previous 
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trauma-related research (e.g. Newman et al, 1999), where participation was perceived as 
beneficial and associated with lack of regret in participating. Furthermore, there were no 
differences according to whether individuals reported intrusive cognitions or not. This is 
encouraging for future research assessing intrusive symptoms in cancer patients.  
In Chapter 3 it was suggested that simple rating scales for intrusion-specific 
coping may have compromised the reliability of assessment and future research could 
introduce more complex measures. Williams & Moulds (2007) addressed this limitation 
by introducing coping measures including the Ruminative Response Scale of the 
Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1984). They also introduced additional 
measures of negative appraisal, including the Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory 
(Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2001).  Future research with cancer 
patients could use a broader array of self-report instruments, such as those mentioned 
above, in order to further elucidate the applicability of Ehlers and Steil’s (1995) model. 
In addition to different self-report measures the use of open-ended questions and 
qualitative analyses would prove useful. Based on the complex aetiology of intrusive 
phenomena, qualitative methodology would also be useful for assessing other aspects of 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients.  
Participants in the present research were mainly White British and married. In 
particular, at the screening stage of Study 1 and Study 2, non-responders were 
significantly more likely to come from a different ethnic origin than be White British. In 
a review of the literature discussing why ethnic minorities are under-represented in 
research within the UK, it was suggested that key barriers were language, socio-cultural 
differences, shortage of resources for translation and fear and mistrust of the healthcare 
system (Hussain-Gambles, Atkin, & Leese, 2004). Future research would benefit from 
sampling more diverse populations of cancer patients. This could include further 
investigate the types of intrusive cognitions reported by children with cancer (e.g. 
Stuber et al, 1994) and also children of parents with cancer (e.g. Huizinga et al, 2007).  
Another limitation of the present research is that all studies included a self-
selected sample (i.e. people who agreed to be interviewed) and so people with severe 
symptoms could be over-represented. Conversely, avoidance is a strong characteristic of 
intrusive cognitions and therefore people may not take up invitation to interview (Birrer 
et al, 2007). Although in Study 1, responders were significantly more anxious than non-
responders and thus this supports the first possibility, there were no significant 
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differences in anxiety between responders and non-responders in Study 2. However, 
there was an extremely low uptake rate for imagery rescripting therapy, which may have 
been as a result of an overall reluctance to focus on distressing intrusions. This is a key 
problem because a therapeutic intervention is only helpful if people agree to participate. 
Perhaps if intrusive imagery is assessed more routinely in clinical practice, the idea of 
using therapies such as imagery rescripting could be introduced more gently over a 
number of sessions rather than in an interview where patients may have acknowledged 
the presence of distressing intrusions for the first time. Another possibility for the future 
use of direct imagery techniques in therapy would be to introduce tasks aimed at 
reducing the vividness and emotional impact of intrusive cognitions (e.g. EMDR; 
Kavanagh et al, 2001). These tasks help introduce challenging therapy by allowing 
patients to initially focus on imagery in a controlled way.  
There was a marked difference in uptake rates between prostate cancer patients 
in Study 1 and the mixed sample of cancer patients in Study 2. For screening, the 
overall response rate was 75% in the former and 58% in the latter. This is despite 
identical methods of outpatient screening. For interview take up rate, this was 65% in 
Study 1 and 47% for outpatient invitations in Study 2. Although rates as low as 44% are 
not uncommon for survey research (Laposa & Alden, 2003), the discrepancy between 
the two studies require some explanation. One factor that could potentially explain the 
discrepancy is age, as in Study 2 screening, responders were significantly older than 
non-responders and prostate cancer patients are a typically older sample. Prostate cancer 
patients were also more likely to be retired than the mixed sample of cancer patients and 
thus have more time for participation.  In Study 2 there was an extremely low response 
rate from Psychological Medicine Referrals (35%). Although purely speculative 
because patients did not complete the HADS, this may be because patients referred to 
Psychological Medicine were at the peak of their anxiety and therefore less likely to 
participate. Another reason is that for Psychological Medicine screening, patients were 
sent an invitation pack consisting of an invitation letter, information sheet, consent 
form, reply form and the HADS. This amount of information in one pack may have 
deterred patients. Future research investigating intrusive cognitions in cancer patients 
should take these findings into account and adopt methods to maximise participation. 
For example, Psychological Medicine patients could have been sent a letter with an 
expression of interest form as the first stage, or therapists could have approached the 
patients face to face.  
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The present thesis started from a PTSD framework and one potential criticism is 
that the symptom clusters of arousal and avoidance were not considered. Although 
prevalence rates are low, some cancer patients do meet full criteria for PTSD. However, 
it is argued that the alternative transdiagnostic approach adopted in this thesis, which 
doesn’t classify individuals according to diagnostic categories, would still identify these 
cancer patients requiring psychological intervention. In fact, the majority of 
interventions for PTSD target intrusive symptoms (e.g. reliving therapy; Foa et al, 1991; 
imagery rescripting; Arntz et al, 2007). Although some may consider it important to 
identify patients meeting full criteria PTSD, the present thesis suggests that identifying 
intrusive cognitions is a more fruitful starting point because this approach includes 
people with PTSD and also includes those who experience significant psychological 
distress as a result of intrusive symptoms but who do not meet full criteria for PTSD. 
This was described as a modular approach to therapy in Chapter 4, where treatment 
approaches are tailor-made to individual presentation.  
Although imagery-based interventions were used in Study 3 and were tailor-
made to individuals reporting intrusive images, participants reporting intrusive thoughts 
were not provided with a specific intervention as this was beyond the scope of the 
present research. Imagery rescripting was used for several reasons. Firstly, it is a short, 
manualised therapy that could be learnt within the available time-scale, it targeted 
intrusive imagery identified in cancer patients in Study 1 and Study 2 and several recent 
studies showed that is can be successful across samples to address negative imagery 
(Holmes et al, 2007). As discussed in terms of clinical implications of the present thesis, 
other psychological therapies aimed at intrusive thoughts as well as intrusive images 
should be assessed in future research.  
In summary, key limitations of the present thesis include the cross-sectional 
design of Study 1 and Study 2 and the inability to generalise from the single-case design 
of Study 3. The research did not assess the psychiatric history of cancer patients, relied 
on self-report measures and the use of simple-rating scales. The findings so far apply to 
a relatively homogenous sample of cancer patients and more diverse populations and 
other hospitals need to be sampled in order to further understand intrusive cognitions in 
cancer patients. The intervention component only targeted a specific type of intrusive 
cognition and interventions targeted at intrusive thoughts are equally important. In order 
to further understand the utility of applying a PTSD framework to cancer patients, other 
symptoms including arousal and avoidance need to be considered.  
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6.5. Future research 
6.5.1. Prospective research 
Although intrusive cognitions have been identified in cancer patients and linked 
to psychological distress, few studies have studied the temporal course of stress 
response (Gurevich et al, 2002) after cancer diagnosis. Andrykowski et al (2000) 
assessed the temporal stability of PTSD symptoms in breast cancer survivors and found 
that symptoms did not significantly decrease between baseline and 1 year follow-up. 
Bleiker et al (2000) in a prospective study of early stage breast cancer survivors found 
that 60% of patients assessed (IES) at baseline (2 months post-surgery) continued to 
report high levels of intrusive thoughts at 2 year follow-up and Brewin et al (1998b) 
found that 68% of patients who had experienced intrusive memories at initial 
assessment continued to experience them six months later. Therefore evidence suggests 
that intrusive cognitions are not a transient phenomenon. In Study 2, it was 
unexpectedly found that a longer time since diagnosis was associated with the presence 
of intrusive cognitions. Although an explanation for this direction is unclear and the 
finding needs to be clarified with future research, this implies that intrusive cognitions 
are not necessarily a result of the cancer diagnosis as a single event but reflects the 
ongoing nature of cancer as a life-threatening stressor. Future work investigating the 
temporal stability of different types of intrusive cognitions is required in order to 
establish the long-term effects of intrusive cognitions on psychological distress. This 
would also help identify the appropriate time for psychological interventions. This work 
could also investigate the possibility that the content of intrusive cognitions changes as 
the immediate stressor changes (Baum & Posluszny, 2001).  
6.5.2. Experimental design 
Drawing on other experimental paradigms in future research would prove useful.  
For example, theoretically the maintenance of imagery depends considerably on 
working memory resources (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Research investigating the 
effects of distracter tasks on desensitising to emotive memories has found that 
visuospatial tasks (e.g. rapid eye movement) reduced the vividness and emotion 
associated with visual images (Andrade et al, 1997; Kavanagh et al, 2001; Kemps & 
Tiggemann, 2007).  Other research has focussed on reactions to traumatic film 
consisting of numerous distressing images. Competition from one specific kind of 
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distraction task while watching the film can significantly reduce the extent to which 
distressing images from the film intrude in the following week but other kinds of 
distraction task actually increases the intrusions (e.g. Holmes et al, 2004; Stuart et al, 
2006). A review of the trauma film paradigm for inducing and modulating intrusive 
memories (Holmes & Bourne, 2008) concluded that it provides an invaluable tool for 
insight into the formation and maintenance of intrusive memories. They suggested that 
the paradigm could be adapted for concerns of other clinical disorders (e.g. social 
phobia, agoraphobia) and this may also prove useful for cancer patients reporting 
intrusive imagery. For example, research could investigate whether the intrusiveness 
and vividness of imagery was reduced by training patients in a visuospatial tapping task 
in response to intrusions.  
Also, further research assessing the utility of imagery rescripting as a 
psychological intervention in cancer patients should include a control group within a 
larger scale study. This might establish the causal relevance of imagery by providing 
evidence that a reduction in negative imagery precedes decreases in anxiety rather than 
the reverse. 
As imagery depends considerably on working memory resources and imagery 
rescripting can be a successful therapy, other factors that influence the vividness of 
imagery in both intrusive images and imagery interventions may be important for the 
successful reduction of distress in cancer patients. In particular, it has been argued that 
imagery treatments for cancer patients such as guided imagery make assumptions about 
people’s imaging ability and specifically about the vividness of individual imagery 
(Kwekkeboom et al, 1998). Interestingly, this was the starting point of the present thesis 
as I studied the determinants of imagery vividness during my MSc in recognition of the 
potential use of imagery in therapy. In this sense, the thesis has been cyclical, as it 
began with the identification of imagery as an important factor to investigate in cancer 
patients and finishes with the suggestion that because imagery does have a role in 
anxiety, imagery vividness remains a significant issue. In addition to the finding that 
imagery vividness is associated with increased positive outcomes (e.g. increased pain 
control) for cancer patients using guided imagery (Kwekkeboom et al, 2003) the 
imagery vividness in imagery rescripting therapy is also important. For example, the 
aim of imagery rescripting is to construct a competing image that has strong associative 
links to the negative image, will effectively compete with the distressing image (i.e. it 
will be easy to remember and retrieve) and involves positive affect. By increasing the 
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vividness of the alternative imagery and decreasing the vividness of intrusive imagery, 
imagery rescripting is more likely to be successful.  
6.5.3. Beyond self-report 
Self-report and interview measures may be the most appropriate methods for 
assessing phenomena such as intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. However, there are 
problems with the method such as the retrospective nature of assessment and their 
vulnerability to demand characteristics (e.g. patients answer in the way they think they 
should).  Beyond the use of self-report scales, alternative assessment methods could be 
considered in future research. For example, in Study 2 patients were explicitly asked 
how they appraised their intrusive cognitions and it was found that negative appraisal 
was associated with intrusion-specific distress/coping and psychological distress. 
However, other measures of negative appraisal such as the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT; Greenwald, Mcghee, & Schwartz, 1998) could be used to gain insights 
impenetrable by self-report measures alone. The IAT is an experimental method which 
measures the association between two concepts (e.g. intrusive thoughts and personally 
significant). Participants are required to categorise stimuli where faster responses 
indicate easier pairings and slower responses indicate more difficult pairings. For 
example, one study experimentally manipulated appraisals of the importance of 
intrusive thoughts in order to test cognitive theories of obsessions (Teachman, Woody, 
& Magee, 2006). Teachman et al (2006) found that the manipulation shifted implicit 
appraisals of intrusive thoughts in the expected direction. Participants who received 
information indicating that their intrusive thoughts were meaningful indicators of their 
values implicitly evaluated themselves as more immoral and dangerous and their 
intrusive thoughts as more important compared to participants who were not given this 
information. However, explicit measures of intrusive thoughts, such as the 
Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (III; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group, 2001) were unaffected by the manipulation. This showed that providing 
information about negative thoughts can change the appraisal of those thoughts but 
implicit and explicit appraisals may be distinct. Future work investigating the role of 
negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients could use implicit as well as 
explicit measures of intrusive cognitions and determine whether such appraisals are 
open to manipulation.  
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As well as using experimental manipulation and finding alternative methods for 
assessing aspects of intrusive cognitions, future research elucidating the similarities and 
differences of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients compared to other clinical groups 
may benefit from using functional imaging methods to assess the presence of intrusive 
symptomatology. Research has started to consider the neural correlates of intrusive 
symptoms in breast cancer patients (e.g. Matsuoka et al, 2003). However, future 
research with cancer patients may benefit from using tasks analogous to previous PTSD 
research such as script-driven imagery (Francati et al, 2007). Also, the emotional stroop 
has been used to assess the presence of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients (Naidich 
& Motta, 2000) and future research could extend this to use the emotional stroop within 
neuroimaging studies. In addition to script-driven imagery and the emotional stroop, 
new tasks such as the trauma-film paradigm may be a useful tool for investigating 
neural correlates of PTSD symptomatology (Holmes & Bourne, 2008).  
The appropriateness of using these experimental techniques for understanding 
intrusive cognitions in cancer patients is yet to be assessed but the central message is 
that other methods exist and future research with cancer patients should continue to use 
the wider literature, beyond psycho-oncology, to guide future research.  
6.5.4. Potential from cancer and PTSD literature 
A potential area for future research is to identify the risk factors associated with 
different types of intrusive cognitions reported in the present research. Risk factors for 
PTSD symptomatology were discussed in Chapter 1 and explored in relation to 
intrusive cognitions in Study 2. The presence of intrusive cognitions was associated 
with longer time since diagnosis and occupation, with retired and unemployed patients 
more likely to report intrusive cognitions. Younger age was identified as a risk factor 
for more severe intrusive cognitions, according to levels of intrusion measured by the 
IES, although sex was not found to be related to intrusive cognitions. Disease stage was 
also unrelated to intrusive cognitions in Study 1 or Study 2 which contradicts some 
research (e.g. Hampton & Frombach, 2000) but corroborates others (e.g. Alter et al, 
1996). Now that the definition of intrusive cognitions has been broadened in cancer 
patients to include different forms (visual/verbal) and timescales (future/past), risk 
factors should be re-explored in prospective research to determine predictors of 
intrusive symptoms in cancer patients and identify patients most likely to experience 
intrusive cognitions and require psychological intervention.  
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 Other factors that are important include social support. Women with metastatic 
breast cancer reporting higher levels of stressful life events and poor social support had 
the most severe intrusive symptoms (Butler et al, 1999). Social constraints have been 
positively related to intrusive cognitions, avoidance and higher levels of depression 
(Cordova et al, 2001; Lepore & Helgeson, 1998). One suggestion is that social support 
and interpersonal relationships buffer the negative emotional effects of intrusive 
thoughts (Lepore, 2001). Although the exact mechanisms are unclear, there are several 
possible explanations.  Based on information processing theories, one explanation is 
that social constraints inhibit cognitive processing of traumatic events, leading to poorer 
adjustment whereas good social support facilitates processing and integration of 
traumatic experiences (Horowitz, 1979). Alternatively, Lepore (2001) suggests that 
talking with supportive others may help restore basic beliefs about the self and the 
world that have been shattered following cancer (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Other potential 
explanations include the idea that talking may lead to habituation to the trauma. Also, 
social support may prevent negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions (Ehlers & Steil, 
1995). This latter suggestion is supported by the current findings, where cancer patients 
were found to appraise intrusive cognitions in a negative way. Future research assessing 
the relationship between social support and intrusive cognitions in cancer patients could 
assess whether good social support is associated with lower negative appraisal of 
intrusive symptoms.  
Pennebaker’s work (e.g. Pennebaker, 1997 for a review) has shown that talking 
and writing about trauma or distressing events leads to decreases in distress. Written 
emotional disclosure can buffer the adverse effects of social constraints in cancer 
patients and may be a beneficial tool in aiding psychological adjustment for those 
unable to express concerns to others (Zakowski et al, 2004).  
6.5.5. Potential from general PTSD literature 
Following the cognitive approach to the maintenance of intrusive memories in 
PTSD (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) there may be several other 
predictions about factors important in the maintenance of PTSD which are relevant to 
cancer patients. In addition to negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions, Ehlers & Clark 
(2000) suggested that a sense of current threat was important for the development of 
PTSD. Current threat can be an external threat to safety or an internal threat to self and 
the future. A sense of current threat may result from negative appraisal of the trauma 
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and its sequelae. Various types of appraisal are important, such as appraisal of trauma, 
self-appraisal (e.g. “I am someone that bad things happen to”) and appraisal of other 
people’s reactions (e.g. “They think I am too weak to cope on my own”). Future 
research with cancer patients could further utilise the cognitive model of PTSD in order 
to guide research questions and facilitate hypotheses testing. For example, is a sense of 
current threat associated with intrusive cognitions in cancer patients? What other types 
of negative appraisal are important in cancer patients? Are other types of negative 
appraisal associated with intrusive cognitions, maladaptive coping or psychological 
distress?  
The present study provides novel findings by assessing the content of several 
different types of intrusive cognitions reported by cancer patients. Future research could 
also ascertain the source of the unwanted memory in line with previous PTSD research 
(see Birrer et al, 2007) by providing a list of options (e.g. “loss of job”, “your own life 
threatening illness”). This might help distinguish between traumatic stressors and 
critical life events (Birrer et al, 2007) whilst providing more detailed information about 
the source of intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. It would also be interesting to 
investigate potential triggers (e.g. places, people, feelings) of intrusive cognitions in 
cancer patients and compare these to PTSD and depressed samples (Birrer et al, 2007).  
One difference noted between intrusive memories reported by depressed and 
PTSD samples is that the latter group reported significantly more out-of body 
experiences associated with their intrusions (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Out-of body 
experiences were described as those where the patient saw themselves and the event 
from an external perspective. Brewin (1998) suggested that this may represent a 
dissociative response to traumatic events in PTSD patients. This phenomenon could be 
investigated in cancer patients by asking patients whether their intrusive memories were 
‘observer’ or ‘field’ memories. Observer memories may be reported by an individual if 
they dissociate from the experience based on extreme fear or risk of imminent death 
(Brewin, 1998). It might be hypothesised that due to the ongoing and chronic nature of 
cancer, these observer memories would be less frequent in cancer patients than in PTSD 
samples.  
Another area of potential interest is hotspots of trauma memories which have 
been identified in PTSD samples, are associated with intense reliving and reflect the 
worst moments of trauma (Holmes, Grey, & Young, 2005). For PTSD patients 
“hotspots” were often associated with a severe negative view of the self and threat to 
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physical integrity and were commonly associated with emotions of anger and sadness as 
well as emotions typical of PTSD; fear, helplessness and horror. It would be interesting 
to investigate whether hotspots occur in intrusive imagery reported by cancer patients. 
Although it has been suggested that adhering to a strict PTSD framework when 
understanding distress in cancer patients may be unwarranted, the field can still utilise 
theoretical models arising from PTSD research. There is a high degree of comorbidity 
between depression, PTSD and anxiety in terms of reports of distressing intrusive 
cognitions and thus consulting this broad literature is necessary to drive future research 
questions in psycho-oncology.  
6.5.6. Summary  
Future research would benefit from adopting prospective designs in order to 
clarify the causal relationships between intrusive cognitions and distress reported by 
cancer patients. Experimental designs (e.g. visuospatial tasks) and assessments (e.g. 
stroop, IAT, functional imaging) may provide alternative approaches for investigating 
how intrusive cognitions are developed and maintained. Potential areas of interest 
include assessing risk factors for developing intrusive cognitions, focussing on other 
factors such as social support and using the PTSD literature to drive research questions 
with cancer patients. Further intervention research assessing the effectiveness of 
imagery rescripting and other intrusion-focused interventions for cancer patients would 
prove valuable.  
6.6. Summary of contribution 
The three studies presented in this thesis add to psycho-oncology research in a 
number of ways. By moving away from a strict trauma framework, patients not meeting 
full criteria for PTSD, those reporting future-oriented as well as past-oriented intrusive 
cognitions and those reporting intrusive cognitions indirectly related to the cancer 
experience can be recognised. Interview methods may be most appropriate for assessing 
the complex phenomenology of intrusive cognitions and this has rarely been utilised in 
previous research (Kangas et al, 2002). 
 Based on detailed exploration of intrusion qualities in cancer patients, this 
research has allowed comparisons to be made between intrusive cognitions reported by 
cancer patients, non-clinical and clinical populations. For the first time, research 
assessing intrusive cognitions in cancer patients has moved beyond identifying that they 
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exist, but that they share similar qualities with clinical groups, such as being frequent, 
uncontrollable, severely distressing and associated with high levels of intrusion and 
avoidance. Intrusive memories were also similar to those reported in PTSD and 
depressed samples (e.g. Birrer et al, 2007), as they were extremely vivid, associated 
with feelings of ‘nowness,’ and re-experiencing of emotional sensations. However, 
there were significant differences between the intrusions reported by cancer patients and 
those reported in clinical samples. If the PTSD framework is entirely appropriate for 
understanding the experience of cancer as a traumatic event, the identification of 
identical types of intrusive memories would be expected. However, although there were 
similarities, several key aspects of the intrusions reported by cancer patients were 
different. For example, cancer patients were more likely to report verbal intrusions 
rather than visual intrusions and when visual intrusions were reported they were 
associated with less overall impact and were not associated with physical sensations. 
Other key findings were the positive relationship between anxiety severity and intrusive 
cognitions and the positive relationship between intrusive cognitions and aspects of 
maladaptive adjustment including anxious preoccupation and helplessness-
hopelessness.  
 This research is also the first to apply information processing theories of 
psychological disorders, including dual representation theory (Brewin et al, 1996) and 
the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 1995; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) to 
understanding intrusive cognitions in cancer patients. Importantly, psychological 
variables, such as negative appraisal of intrusive cognitions were shown to add to 
intrusion specific distress, general distress, and intrusion-specific coping, even after 
controlling for intrusion frequency. This research drew a novel distinction between 
visual and verbal intrusions in cancer patients by showing that visual intrusions are 
associated with more subjective distress and uncontrollability.  
Finally, this investigation is the first to include an intervention component 
comprising a direct imagery technique (Holmes et al, 2007) focussed on negative 
intrusive imagery in cancer patients to alleviate psychological distress. Previous psycho-
oncology research has emphasised the benefit of tailor-made psychological therapies 
that take into account the specific needs of individuals (Zakowski et al, 2004). The case 
studies described in Study 3 demonstrated the utility of applying a retrieval competition 
account to psychological distress in cancer patients because simply pairing negative 
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imagery with imagery that was positive and easily accessible was successful in reducing 
negative intrusion characteristics, anxiety and depression.  
Collectively, the present findings may inform clinical practice by highlighting 
the role of intrusive cognitions in anxiety within mixed samples of cancer patients, 
highlighting the variety and complexity of intrusive cognitions which are experienced 
and allowing new therapeutic techniques to be incorporated within existing clinical 
practice, such as therapies developed in clinical populations to directly target intrusive 
cognitions.  
6.7. Publications  
Study 1 was presented at the British Health Psychology Conference in Nottingham 
and the International Psycho-Oncology Society (IPOS) Conference at Imperial College 
London: 
Burnet, K.L., Brewin, C.R., Watson, M. (2007). Intrusive cognitions and anxiety in 
cancer patients. Psycho-Oncology 16 (9): S132-S133, p1-133 
 
From the screening data of Study 1, an article was published investigating 
whether anxiety varies according to treatment type in early stage prostate cancer 
patients: 
Burnet, K.L., Brewin, C.R., Watson, M., Dearnaley, D., Parker, C. (2007). Does active 
surveillance for men with localized prostate cancer carry psychological morbidity? BJU 
International, 100 (3), 540–543. 
 
Study 1 was published in February 2008: 
Whitaker, K.L., Brewin, C.R., Watson, M. (2008). Intrusive cognitions and anxiety in 
cancer patients. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 64, 509-517  
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6.8. HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
This questionnaire will help you to let us know how you are. Read each item and tick the response which 
comes closest to how you have felt in the last few days. Don’t take too long over your replies, your 
immediate reaction to each item will probably be more accurate than a long thought-out response. 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
 
I feel tense or ‘wound up’: 
 
3  Most of the time          
2   A lot of the time 
1  From time to time, occasionally 
0  Not at all 
 
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy: 
 
0  Definitely as much 
1  Not quite so much 
2  Only a little 
3  Hardly at all 
 
I get a sort of frightened feeling as if  
something awful is about to happen: 
 
3  Very definitely and quite badly 
2  Yes, but not too badly 
1  A little, but it doesn’t worry me 
0  Not at all 
 
I can laugh and see the funny side of things: 
 
0  As much as I always could 
1  Not quite so much now 
2  Definitely not so much now 
3  Not at all 
 
Worrying thoughts go through my mind: 
 
3  A great deal of the time 
2  A lot of the time 
1  From time to time but not too often 
0  Only occasionally 
 
I feel cheerful: 
 
3  Not at all 
2  Not often 
1  Sometimes 
0  Most of the time 
 
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed: 
 
0  Definitely 
1  Usually 
2  Not often 
3  Not at all 
 
 
 
I feel as if I am slowed down: 
 
 Nearly all the time    3  
 Very often     2 
 Sometimes     1 
 Not at all     0 
 
I get a sort of frightened feeling like  
‘butterflies’ in the stomach: 
 
 Not at all     0 
 Occasionally    1 
 Quite often     2 
 Very often     3 
I have lost interest in my appearance: 
 Definitely          3     
 I don’t take as much care as I should   2 
 I may not take quite as much care     1 
 I take just as much care as ever      0 
 
 
I feel restless as if I have to be on the move: 
 
 Very much indeed             3 
 Quite a lot              2 
 Not very much             1  
 Not at all              0 
 
I look forward with enjoyment to things: 
 
 As much as I ever did   0 
 Rather less than I used to   1 
 Definitely less than I used to   2 
 Hardly at all     3 
 
I get sudden feelings of panic: 
 Very often indeed             3 
 Quite often              2  
 Not very often                         1 
 Not at all                          0 
 
I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV 
programme: 
 
 Often      0 
 Sometimes     1 
 Not often     2 
 Very seldom                3            
   Total A:  D:  
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6.9. IES (Horowitz et al, 1979) 
 
Below is a list of comments made by people after stressful experiences, such as the 
intrusive (thoughts/memories/ images) you describe. Please check each item, 
indicating how frequently these comments were true for you DURING THE PAST 
SEVEN DAYS. 
If they did not occur during that time, please mark the “not at all” column. . 
 
      FREQUENCY 
 
Comment 
 
Not at all 
 
Rarely 
 
Sometimes 
 
Often 
1. I thought about it when I didn’t 
mean to. 
    
2. I avoided letting myself get 
upset when I thought about it or 
was reminded of it. 
    
3. I tried to remove it from my 
memory. 
    
4. I had trouble falling asleep or 
staying asleep because of 
pictures or thoughts about it that 
came into my mind. 
    
5. I had waves of strong feelings 
about it. 
    
6. I had dreams about it.     
7. I stayed away from reminders 
of it. 
    
8. I felt as if it hadn’t happened 
or it wasn’t real. 
    
9. I tried not to talk about it.      
10. Pictures about it popped into 
my mind. 
    
11. Other things kept making me 
think about it. 
    
12. I was aware that I still had a 
lot of feelings about it, but I 
didn’t deal with them. 
    
13. I tried not to think about it.     
14. Any reminder brought back 
feelings about it. 
    
15. My feelings about it were 
kind of numb.  
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6.10. Interview Schedule- Intrusive cognitions (Patel et 
al, 2007) 
 
1. MEMORIES 
 
1. In the last week have you had any particular memories from a particular episode 
or event in your past that keeps coming back into your mind? (If last week was 
exceptional then ask about a typical week). 
 
YES/NO 
(Prompts – When you were feeling the most depressed or memories of particular 
negative events) 
 
2. What are the two most distressing memories? (If more than 2 then inform the patient 
that we will just be concentrating on the two most distressing memories).   
 
Memory 1 - 
When did this episode happen? How old were you at the time of this memory?   
 
 
 
 
Can you briefly describe the memory that you have? 
 
a) Please rate the vividness of your memory for the experience: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Hazy                           Normal                       Very clear                            Most  clear &        
memory                          memory                      & vivid memory                          vivid memory        
            
b) What are the emotions that you associate with this memory? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
       Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                            Very much so 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                     
 
Angry:          Anxious:       Helpless: 
 
 
c) When you have this memory, does it feel like it is not just a past event but is 
happening all over again right now? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
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d) When you remember the event do you re-experience emotions the same as, or very 
similar to, those that were felt in the actual event? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
e) When you remember the event do you re-experience physical feelings the same as, 
or very similar to, those that were felt in the actual event? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
f) How many times did you experience the intrusive memory in the last week? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
None of                                                               Half the                                                       All of 
the time                                                           the time                                                     the time 
 
 
g) When you experience the intrusive memory on average how long does it last? 
 
seconds/minutes/hours 
 
 
h) How much did the intrusive memory interfere with your daily life? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
i) How uncontrollable was your intrusive memory in the last week? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
j) How distressing was your intrusive memory? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                  Very much so 
 
 
 
Memory 2: Repeat above questions 
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2. IMAGES 
 
1. In the last week have you had any other mental pictures or images that keep 
coming (spontaneously) to mind and usually involve the same kinds of things? (If 
last week was exceptional then ask about a typical week). 
 
YES/NO 
 
2. What are the two most distressing images? (If more than 2 then inform the patient 
that we will just be concentrating on the two most distressing images).   
 
 
Image 1 - 
Can you briefly describe what you see in the image? 
 
a) Please rate the vividness of your image: 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
     Hazy                           Normal                       Very clear                                     Most clear & 
   memory                      memory                      & vivid memory                           vivid memory  
                  
b) What are the emotions that you associate with this image? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
       Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                            Very much so 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                            
 
Angry:          Anxious:       Helpless: 
 
 
c) When you have this image, does it feel like it is not just a past event but is 
happening all over again right now? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
         Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                          Very much so 
 
 
d) How many times did you experience the intrusive image in the last week? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
None of                                                               Half the                                                    All of 
the time                                                            the time                                                   the time 
 
 
 
e) When you experience the intrusive image on average how long does it last? 
 
seconds/minutes/hours 
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f) How much did the intrusive image interfere with your daily life? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
g) How uncontrollable was your intrusive image in the last week? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                  Very much so 
 
 
h) How distressing was your intrusive image? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
Image 2: Repeat above questions 
 
3. THOUGHTS 
 
Have you been aware in the past week of thoughts that keep coming spontaneously 
into your mind?  (If last week was exceptional then ask about a typical week). 
 
YES/NO 
 
What are the two most distressing thoughts? (If more than 2 then inform the patient that we 
will just be concentrating on the two most distressing voices).   
 
 
Thought 1: 
What kind of spontaneous intrusive thoughts do you have? 
 
a) Are your thoughts always the same or do they vary? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Always                          Mostly                          Mostly the                                              Always 
different                       different                        same                                                      the same    
 
 
b) What are the emotions that you associate with this thought? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
       Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                            Very much so 
 
 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                     
 
Angry:          Anxious:       Helpless: 
 
 238 
 
 
c) How many times did you experience the intrusive thought in the last week? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
None of                                                   Half the                                                                 All of 
the time                                                  the time                                                              the time 
 
 
d) When you experience the intrusive thought on average how long does it last? 
 
seconds/minutes/hours 
 
e) How much did the intrusive thought interfere with your daily life? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
f) How uncontrollable was your intrusive thought in the last week? 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
g) How distressing was your intrusive thought? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                                   Very much so 
 
 
 
Thought 2: Repeat above questions  
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6.11. Mini-MAC (Watson et al, 1994) 
A number of statements are given below which describe people's reactions to having 
cancer.  Please tick the box to the right of each statement, indicating how far it applies to 
you at present.  
 
 
Definitely 
does not 
apply to me 
Does not 
apply to 
me 
Applies to 
me 
Definitely 
applies to 
me 
1. At the moment I take one 
day at a time   
    
2. I see my illness as a  
   challenge  
    
3. I've put myself in the   
    hands of God  
    
4. I feel like giving up     
5.  I feel very angry about 
what has happened to me          
    
6. I feel completely at a loss 
about what to do 
    
7. It is a devastating feeling     
8. I count my blessings     
9. I worry about the cancer 
returning or getting worse 
    
10. I try to fight the illness     
11. I distract myself when  
 thoughts about my illness 
come into my head 
    
12. I can’t handle it     
13. I am apprehensive     
14. I am not very hopeful  
        about the future 
    
15. I feel there is nothing I 
can do to help myself 
    
16. I think this is the end of 
 the world 
    
17. Not thinking about it 
helps me cope 
    
18. I am very optimistic     
19. I’ve had a good life what’s 
     left is a bonus 
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20. I feel that life is hopeless     
21. I can’t cope     
 
22. I am upset about having 
         cancer 
    
23. I am determined to beat 
this disease 
    
24. Since my cancer 
diagnosis I now realise how 
precious life is and I’m 
making the most of it  
 
  
 
25.I have difficulty in 
believing that this happened 
to me 
    
26. I make a positive effort 
not to think about my illness 
    
27. I deliberately push all 
thoughts of cancer out of my 
mind 
    
28.I suffer great anxiety 
about it 
    
29. I am a little frightened     
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6.12. PSS-I (Foa et al, 1993) 
1) Briefly describe below the stressful event reported by the individual. 
 
 
2) Did the event evoke fear, helplessness and horror? (circle magnitude) 
Fear:                  0  Little or none  1  Moderate  2  Intense 
Helplessness     0  Little or none  1  Moderate   2  Intense 
Horror                0  Little or none  1  Moderate   2  Intense 
 
How long before the interview did the event occur? 
  < one month 
  1-6 months 
  6-12 months 
  >12 months 
 
For each item listed below, ascertain the individual experienced the symptoms during 
the past two weeks. Probe all positive responses in order to determine severity of the 
symptom (e.g. in the past two weeks, how often have you had bad dreams or 
nightmares), then rate the severity on the scale presented below. Rating scale (ratings 
made over the past two weeks) 
 
0 = not at all 
1 = once per week or less/a little bit/once in a while 
2 = 2-4 times per week/somewhat/half the time 
3 = 5 or more times per week/very much/almost always 
 
Re-experiencing symptoms (need one) 
1. Have you had recurrent intrusive distressing thoughts or recollections about the 
event?            
2. Have you had recurrent bad dreams about the event?          
3. Have you had the experience of suddenly reliving the event, flashbacks of in, 
acting or feeling as if it were re-occurring?           
4. Have you been intensely emotionally upset when reminded of the event 
(includes anniversary reactions)?           
 
Avoidance symptoms (need three) 
5. Have you persistently been making efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings 
associated with the event?           
6. Have you persistently been making efforts to avoid activities, situations or 
places that remind you of the event?           
7. Are there any important aspects of the event that you still cannot remember? 
          
8. Have you markedly lost interest in free time activities since the event? 
          
9. Have you felt detached or cut off from others around you since the event? 
                
10. Have you felt that your ability to experience emotions is less?        
11. Have you felt that any future plans or hopes have changed because of the 
event?           
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Arousal symptoms (need two) 
 
12. Have you been having persistent difficulty falling or staying asleep?  
          
13. Have you been continuously irritable or having outbursts of anger? 
          
14. Have you been having persistent difficulty concentrating?        
15. Are you overly alert since the event?           
16. Have you been jumpier, more easily startled, since the event?      
17. Have you been having intense physical reactions (for example, break into a 
sweat, hear beating fast) when reminded of the event?            
 
 
Indicate below if the problems you rated in Part 1 have interfered with any of the 
following areas of the person’s life DURING THE PAST MONTH. Mark Y for Yes and N 
for No. Remember that interference must be due to problems above and not due to 
general problems associated with having cancer.  
1. Work        Y N  
2. Household chores and duties     Y N 
3. Relationships with friends     Y N 
4. Fun and leisure activities      Y N 
5. School work       Y N 
6. Relationships with your family    Y N 
7. Sex life       Y N 
8. General satisfaction with life     Y N 
9. Overall level of functioning in all areas of your life    Y N 
 
6.13. RIQ (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) and coping 
1. A number of statements are given below which describe possible reactions to the 
intrusions you have reported.  Please tick the box to the right of each statement, 
indicating how far you agree with each of the statements.  
 
 Totally                                                                   Totally                                        
agree                                                                    disagree 
   1            2             3            4           5            6              7 
1.Something is wrong with me   
 
       
2. Some day I will go out of my 
mind 
       
3. I am inadequate 
 
       
4. I cannot cope 
 
       
5. I have a psychological 
problem 
 
       
6. I will not achieve goals that 
are important to me 
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2. We would also like to know how you cope with the intrusions you have reported.  
Please indicate, by marking on the following scale how much you have participated in 
the following techniques for coping and how effective these coping strategies are. 
 
a) I try to distract myself 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not used at all          Used  
                   very much 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                          Very 
effective                                    effective 
  
b) I try to push the intrusions out of my mind 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not used at all          Used  
                   very much 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                          Very 
effective                                    effective 
 
c) I dwell on it 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not used at all          Used  
                   very much 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Not at all                          Very 
effective                                    effective 
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6.14. RPQ (Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002) 
We want to know your opinions about what it was like for you to be in this study.  What 
it was like for you to be interviewed about the types of intrusive thoughts/ memories/ 
images you experience.  Your answers will help us understand how people feel about 
being in studies like this one.  We REALLY want to hear your opinions, even if there 
were things you did not like. 
For each item below, please circle the number under the answer that is true for you.  
There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Maybe 
(in the 
middle) 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Being in this study was 
boring. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I am glad that I was in this 
study. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. It was my choice if I was in 
the study (I could have said 
no even if other people 
wanted me to say yes). 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Being in this study made 
me feel upset or sad. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. The things I said will stay 
private (no one else will know 
I said them). 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am sorry I was in this 
study. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. Being in this study made 
me feel good about myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I was told the truth about 
the study before it started. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I feel good about helping 
other people by being in this 
study. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I knew I could skip 
questions or parts of the study 
if I wanted to. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I knew I could stop at any 
time. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. I knew I could ask to take 
a break whenever I wanted. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS FOR THE RESEARCHERS? 
(Please write here or on the back of this sheet). 
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6.15. Anxiety and Depression subsections of the SCID 
(First et al, 2002). 
 
 
 
Now I would like to ask you some specific questions about problems you may have had. 
We’ll go into more detail about them later. 
 
 
1 = not present, 2 = unsure or equivocal 3 = present 
 
1. In the last month, has there ever been a period of time when you were feeling 
depressed or down most of the day nearly every day?  
       1   2     3 
 
2. In the last six months have you been particularly nervous or anxious?             
       1   2     3 
 
If answer is 2/3 for any of above, continue with relevant questions corresponding 
to 1. 2. or 3. below.  
 
(NOTE: ?= inadequate information, 1 =absent or false 2 =sub threshold, 3 = threshold 
or true) 
 
 
3. Are your concerns related/unrelated to your cancer diagnosis?  
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1. Current major depressive disorder   MDE Criteria 
 
In the last month…. 
Has there been a period of time when 
you were feeling depressed or down 
most of the day nearly every day? 
(What was that like?) 
 
If YES: How long did it last? (As long 
as 2 weeks?) 
 
What about losing interest or pleasure 
in things you usually enjoyed?  
If YES: Was it nearly every day? How 
long did it last (As long as 2 weeks?) 
 
For the following questions, focus on 
the worst two weeks in the past month 
(or else the past 2 weeks if equally 
depressed for one month) 
 
During this (2 week period) 
..how was your appetite? (What about 
compared to your usual appetite? Did 
you have to force yourself to eat? Eat 
less/more than usual? Did you lose/gain 
weight? How much? Were you trying to 
lose/gain weight?) 
 
…..how were you sleeping? (Trouble 
falling or staying asleep, waking 
frequently, waking too early OR 
sleeping too much? How many hours a 
night compared to usual? Was that 
nearly every night?) 
 
….were you so fidgety or restless that 
you were unable to sit still? (was it so 
bad other people noticed? What did they 
notice? Was that nearly every day?) 
If NO 
What about the opposite? Talking or 
moving more slowly than is normal for 
you? (was it so bad other people 
noticed? What did they notice? Was that 
nearly every day?) 
 
 
 
 
A. Five or more of the following 
symptoms have been present during the 
same two week period and represent a 
change from previous  
 
 
(1) depressed mood every day, as 
indicated by subjective report (e.g. 
feels sad or empty) or observation 
made by others (e.g. appears 
tearful). 
(2) Markedly diminished interest or 
pleasure at all, or almost all, 
activities most of the day, nearly 
every day (as indicated by 
subjective account or observation by 
others). 
(3) Significant weight loss when not 
dieting, or weight gain (change of 
more than 5% of body weight or 
decrease/increase in appetite nearly 
every day). 
(4) Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly 
every day 
(5) Psychomotor agitation or retardation 
nearly every day (observed by 
others, not merely subjective 
feelings of restlessness or being 
slowed down).  
(NOTE: CONSIDER BEHAVIOUR 
DURING INTERVIEW) 
 
 
(6) Fatigue or loss of energy nearly 
every day?  
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During this time… 
How did you feel about yourself? 
(worthless? Nearly every day?) 
 
Did you have trouble thinking or 
concentrating? (What kind of things did 
it interfere with?) (Nearly every day?) 
 
IF NO: Was it hard to make decisions 
about everyday things? (Nearly every 
day?) 
 
…were things so bad that you were 
thinking a lot about death or that you 
would be better off dead? What about 
thinking of hurting yourself? 
 
IF YES: Did you do anything to hurt 
yourself?  
 
 
 
If unclear- has (depressive episode) 
made it difficult to work, take care of 
things at home, or get along with other 
people? 
 
Just before this began, were you 
physically ill?  
If YES: what did the doctor say?  
Just before this began, were you using 
any medications?  
If YES: any change in the amount you 
were using? 
 
Just before this began, were you 
drinking or using street drugs?  
  
 
Did this occur soon after someone close 
to you died? 
 
How many times have you been 
depressed nearly every day for at least 
two weeks and had several of the 
symptoms you described?  
 
 
 
 
(7) Feeling worthlessness or excessive 
or inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional) nearly every day (not 
merely self-reproach or guilt about 
being sick) 
 
NOTE CODE 1 or 2 if only self-esteem 
 
(8) diminished ability to think or 
concentrate, or indecisiveness, 
nearly every day (subjective or 
observed) 
(9) recurrent thoughts of death (not just 
fear of dying), recurrent suicidal 
ideation without a specific plan or a 
suicide attempt or a specific plan for 
committing suicide 
NOTE: Code 1 for self mutilation W/O 
suicidal intent. 
 
AT LEAST 5 OF ABOVE ARE 
CODED 3 AND AT LEAST ONE OF 
THESE ITEMS IS (1) OR (2)   
 
(No Criterion B in SCID). 
 
C. The symptoms cause clinically 
significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational or other important 
areas of functioning 
 
D. The symptoms are not due to the 
direct physiological effects of a 
substance (drug abuse, medication) or 
to a general medical condition (e.g. 
Parkinson’s, stroke, metabolic 
conditions, endocrine conditions, viral 
infections, certain cancers) 
 
E. Not better accounted for by 
bereavement (after loss of loved one) 
Total no of MD Episodes: (code 99 if 
can’t count) but should be above 5 
otherwise minor depressive disorder. 
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2. Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
You’ve said that in the last 6 months 
you have been particularly nervous or 
anxious…. 
OR in the last 6 months have you been 
particularly nervous or anxious….? 
 
Do you also worry a lot about bad 
things that might happen? 
 
IF YES, What do you worry about? 
How much do you worry about 
(events/activities?) 
During the past 6 months, would you 
say you have been worrying more days 
than not?  
When you are worrying in this way, do 
you find it hard to stop yourself? 
 
When did this anxiety start?  
 
Now I am going to ask you some 
questions about symptoms that often go 
along with being nervous. 
Thinking about those periods in the past 
six months when you’re feeling nervous 
or anxious…. 
..do you often feel physically restless-
can’t sit still? 
…do you often feel keyed up or on 
edge?  
..do you often tire easily? 
..do you have trouble concentrating or 
does your mind go blank?  
..are you often irritable? 
..are your muscles often tense? 
..do you often have trouble falling or 
staying asleep?  
 
 
If unclear- what effect has the anxiety, 
worry or physical symptoms had on 
your life? Has it made it hard for you to 
do your work or be with your friends?  
 
 
 
 
 
A. Excessive anxiety and worry 
(apprehensive expectation), 
occurring more days than not for at 
least six months, about a number of 
events or activities (such as work or 
school performance) 
B. The person finds it difficult to 
control worry. 
 
(Does not occur exclusively during the 
course of a mood disorder, psychotic 
disorder or a pervasive developmental 
disorder.) 
 
C. The anxiety and worry are 
associated with three or more of the 
following six symptoms present for 
more days than not for the past six 
months.   
 
(1) restlessness or feeling keyed up 
or on edge 
(2) being easily fatigued 
(3) difficulty concentrating or mind 
going blank 
(4) irritability 
(5) muscle tension 
(6) sleep disturbance (difficulty 
falling or staying asleep, or 
restless unsatisfying sleep).  
(At least 3 “C” are coded 3) 
 
D. The focus of the anxiety and worry 
is not confined to the features of 
another axis 1 disorder e.g about 
having a panic attack, social phobia, 
OCD, separation disorder, anorexia, 
somatization disorder, 
hypochondriasis and the anxiety and 
worry do not occur exclusively 
during PTSD.  
E. The anxiety, worry or physical 
symptoms cause clinically 
significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning.  
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Just before you began having this 
anxiety, were you taking any drugs, 
caffeine, diet pills or other medicine? 
 
(How much caffeine, tea or caffeinated 
soda do you drink a day?) 
 
Just before these problems began were 
you physically ill?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F. Not due to the direct physiological 
effects of a substance or general 
medical condition 
 
General medical conditions include 
Hyper and hypo-thyroidism, 
hypoglycaemia, hyper parathyriodism, 
pheochrmomcytoma, congestive heart 
failure, arryythmias, pulmonary 
embolism, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, pneumonia, 
hyperventilation, B-12 deficiency, 
porphyria, CNS neoplasms, vestibular 
dysfunction, encephalitis 
 
Etiological substances include cocaine, 
amphetamines, cannabis, hallucinogens, 
PCO, or alcohol or withdrawal from 
CNS depressants. 
 
GAD criteria A, B, C, D, E and F are 
coded 3.  
 
Indicate current severity: 
Mild 1. few, if any symptoms 
Moderate 2- symptoms of functional 
impairment 
Severe 3-any symptoms in excess of 
those required.  
 
Age at onset?  
Code 99 if unknown
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ADJUSTMENT DISORDERS 
 
Do you think that your cancer diagnosis has anything to do with getting your 
symptoms? 
 
What effect have your symptoms had on you and your ability to do things? How 
upset were you? Has it made it hard for you to do your work or be with friends? 
 
Have you had this reaction many times before? 
 
Were you having them even before the stressor happened? 
 
How long has it been since the stressor/ complications arising from the stressor 
were over? 
 
Criteria for AD: 
A. The development of emotional or behavioural symptoms in response to 
an identifiable stressor occurring within 3 months of the onset of the 
stressor 
B. These symptoms/behaviours are clinically significant as evidenced by 
i. marked distress in excess of what would be expected from 
exposure to the stressor 
ii. significant impairment in social or occupational functioning 
C. The stress-related disturbance does not meet criteria for another 
specific Axis 1 disorder and is not merely an exacerbation of a pre-
existing Axis I or Axis II disorder. 
D. The symptoms do not represent bereavement 
E. Once the stressor has terminated, the symptoms do not persist for more 
than an additional 6 months.  
 
Make diagnosis of adjustment disorder based on predominant symptoms: 
 
Adjustment disorder with depressed mood 
Adjustment disorder with anxiety  
Adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood 
Unspecified adjustment disorder 
 
 
 
